

THE POLITICS IN SATISFACTION:
CITIZEN EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN
AFRICA

by

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ABSTRACT

SALMA INYANJI. The politics of satisfaction: Citizen evaluations of government performance in Africa. (Under the direction of DR. BETH WHITAKER and DR. JOANNE CARMAN)

Citizen assessment of government performance remains a contentious issue among public management researchers. Some contend that citizen surveys are inevitably inadequate for gathering information. Others question citizens' reliability as consistent sources of performance feedback. Yet citizen satisfaction should be an integral part of the evaluation process because they are the *end* consumers of government goods and services. However, compared to Western countries, relatively little is known about African citizens' attitudes towards governments' performance in public service delivery. Therefore, this study analyses 30 African nations, and includes a survey experiment conducted in Kenya. The study draws from three perspectives – politics, administration, and policymaking. Findings suggest that Africa's government evaluation trends are not necessarily different from those in the West; and democracy certainly facilitates more satisfaction among citizens. The study also demonstrates that *de facto* country-level contextual nuances must be accounted for. However, contrary to persisting assumptions, ethnicity is not one of those nuances. Just as in other countries there are several other important factors that influence Africans' satisfaction with public service delivery.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HOG	Head of government
ICC	Intra-class correlation
IFI	International financial institution
(I)NGO	(International) non-governmental organization
KCPE	Kenya Certificate of Primary Education
MP	Member of Parliament
VPC	Variance partition coefficient
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor

CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, many nations around the world have drifted towards performance management in government as a tool for enhancing quality of services and accountability. In Africa, some countries have made constitutional provisions that require active involvement of citizens not only in public service delivery, but also in policy and strategy formulation. Unfortunately, circumstances often depart from this inclusive standard. Because of the complexity and diversity in African politics, and because the process of liberalization has been rather uneven, the implementation of citizen participation policies has had mixed outcomes. The different nations vary in terms of methodically gathering citizen input on government performance and applying it to institutional performance management.

Meanwhile, the value of citizen evaluations remains contentious. Practitioners and analysts question the capacity of citizens to be reliable sources of government performance feedback (Glimcher & Fehr, 2010; Hecllo, 1994; Oliver, 2010; Page & Shapiro 2010; Wilson & Hodge, 2013). There are also doubts on the congruity of those evaluations with objective measures of performance (Brudney & England, 1982; Podskadoff, McKenie, Lee & Podskadoff, 2003; van de Walle & van Ryzin, 2011). In fact, each nation's political environment plays a role in determining citizens' views on performance at different levels of government. In order to determine how best to serve the public interests, research is therefore tasked with answering the following questions: (1) What are the determinants of

citizen satisfaction with public service delivery in Africa; and (2) How do citizens' subjective evaluations relate to objective measures of government performance?

But while Public Administration and Political Science both contribute theoretical perspectives, the Public Policy standpoint is obliged to take an expansive view of citizen satisfaction theory. The differences in terminology, research methods and goals do not mean that the different disciplines addressing citizen satisfaction should be treated discretely. In fact, different dimensions relevant to citizen satisfaction are examined using discipline-specific language and constructs. For example, citizen satisfaction from the business perspective is "customer satisfaction"; while in economics, the concept can be estimated quantitatively as "utility". Yet regardless of branch of learning, *people* acting as political agents and driven by both subjective and collective interests, are the common denominator in satisfaction studies. As a result, this assessment weaves together disciplinary constructs through their shared theories on institutions and individuals.

Because policies and policy implementation are highly influenced by context, there are several propositions on why citizens respond the way they do to government public service provision. In fact, both political science and public administration literature contribute a substantial number of models, frameworks, and analyses that attempt to explain citizens' approval of, or satisfaction with, government performance. There are certainly many individual qualities and attributes that determine how a citizen feels about government service provision at any given time. Race or ethnicity, education level, income level, age, and occupation are examples of characteristics that have been tested widely for significance in citizen satisfaction literature (Ingram & Smith, 2011; Kelly & Swindell, 2002; Lyons, Lowery & de Hoog, 1993; Reisig & Parks, 2003; Stepanikova, Triplett, &

Simpson, 2011; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). In addition, democratic values, agency performance, and other contextual factors have been found, in some cases, to affect each individual's response to government performance (Brown & Coulter, 1983; Chamberlain, 2012; Murphy 2008; Valentino, Gregorowicz & Groenendyk, 2009).

Yet citizen satisfaction remains an interesting and challenging research area, and analysts continue to produce findings heuristically through higher data refinement and better analytical techniques that maximize precision and validity. In implementing different variations on comparative and multivariate correlation analyses, some studies have even attempted to capture the factors influencing citizen satisfaction based on ecological levels (Davis, 2013; Kelly & Swindell; 2002; Trentmann, 2006). Yet, there is a deficiency in the research as far as the exploration of individual-level factors is concerned. Specifically, this concerns experience and perception-based attitudes existing within the individual before and during the time of evaluation. In short, citizen satisfaction studies have insufficiently accounted for the psychosocial pressures influencing human behavior. A possible explanation for this deficiency stems from the fact that the theoretical bases of citizen satisfaction have been tested primarily in Western democratic nations.

In the West, many citizens feel politically empowered within the relative stability and freedom that is nurtured by egalitarian values and traditions. Yet even in these countries not all citizens perceive themselves as having audible political voices, let alone an audience for their opinions (Ingram & Schneider, 1993; Krosnik, 1990; Manza & Cook, 2002; Nisbet, 2011). Such individuals may be reluctant to participate in providing government performance feedback because they may perceive themselves as having low political power or political self-efficacy; and their communities may also treat them in ways

that reflect that socio-political status. Indeed in Africa, many people are still trapped in a seemingly perpetual struggle against powerful and corrupt elites and politicians (Kalejuaye & Alliyu, 2013; Khemani, 2013; Mulinge & Lesetedi; 1998; Platteau, 2007). Citizens often have to fight to protect their civil rights and liberties. Therefore as different individuals and groups exercise different levels of political influence, political self-efficacy and its behavioral consequences also varies among different citizens and groups of citizens.

Just as the subjective feelings associated with political self-efficacy or lack thereof vary, so do the political environments in which they manifest. Africa has nations that occupy the full spectrum of levels of democratization. Consequently, certain factors and concepts that may be taken for granted in the West should not be treated as such in the African context. In fact, when importing citizen satisfaction theory to any non-Western setting, one may begin by posing broad preliminary questions such as: What is the government's level of performance in providing public services? What contextual factors enhance or diminish citizen satisfaction in that setting? Furthermore, it is also worthwhile to explore the influence of subjective sentiments pertaining to the individual as a member of a collective. For this reason I also specifically investigate how political self-efficacy affects citizens' evaluations of government performance relative to other determinants of satisfaction with public services.

In order to answer the questions relevant for this study, the subsequent chapters in this thesis are presented as a two-pronged approach to exploring the correlation between citizen satisfaction and government performance evaluation. The study focusses on the African context, and Kenya as a case study. Ultimately, the goals study are: (1) to explore the suitability of Western theories on citizen satisfaction when applied in Africa; (2) to

compare trends in Africa with trends in the world's well-studied democracies; (3) to enhance understanding on the policy implications of findings for Africans, and the democratization and development processes in Africa. At stake for African citizens is the continued increase in use of government performance evaluation surveys – but in a manner that is relevant to their experiences and realities. Also at issue for nations across the continent is the need for socialization of citizens towards development-fostering civic behavior.

To accomplish these goals I assess citizen satisfaction as a broad dichotomy between citizen approval and disapproval of public services. That is to say, while the discussion makes general references to approval and disapproval, the analysis applies the regressand as an ordinal measure. Thus in this study, the concept captures the basic overall responses to qualities of government public service provision. Yet even as I explore this topic, it is necessary to situate citizen satisfaction among the stages of the policy process – specifically between the policy implementation and policy evaluation stages. This emphasizes the importance of accounting for citizen feedback as a source of performance management information. Using cross-national and experimental analytical approaches, my specific primary objectives are: to determine whether subjective public opinion is congruent with objective measures of government performance; and, to identify statistically significant determinants of citizen satisfaction in the sample of African nations. In order to meet these objectives, I take into account several institutional, individual, and contextual determinants.

The general layout of this study is therefore as follows: A broad review of the literature in the second chapter leads to a discussion of the contextual environments of

Africa and Kenya in chapter three. Chapters four and five present the details of each of the two parts of this assessment, starting with the Africa study. In both, I identify from the literature and experiential insight, the factors applicable in the study frameworks. I also present the analyses of findings and results of the data. The sixth and final chapter is a discussion of citizen satisfaction as it relates to politics and the policy environment in general. The final chapter also concludes with summary remarks and prospects for future research geared towards illuminating the behavioral processes at play in translating citizen satisfaction into public opinion.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Approval vs. Disapproval of Government Performance

Relative to government performance evaluation, citizen satisfaction is the precursory response to performance quality as perceived by the individual citizen (van Ryzin, Muzzio, & Immerwahr, 2004; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). As it is conceptualized, it manifests prior to behavioral consequences such as complaints (public opinion), protests, migration, and so on. Citizen satisfaction presents theoretical and statistical challenges to research because it is measured as a subjective response to service quality, which in itself is both “an objective and [a] collective experience of citizenry,” (Shin, 1977). This means that citizens’ expressed approval/disapproval does not necessarily match either the objectively measured ratings of quality, or even the people’s own true satisfaction/dissatisfaction responses.

In fact, in everyday life, there are many exogenous incentives for citizens to exaggerate, underrate, or completely lie about their satisfaction with government’s performance. Furthermore, many studies also acknowledge that individuals innately generate multiple and often conflicting opinions towards important issues (Arnstein, 1969; Dean & Moran, 1977; Hogarth, 1982; Oliver, 2010; Oliver & van Ryzin, 2016; Redford, 1958; Stone, 2001). On the other hand, some scholars question why consistency should be expected of citizens given humans’ natural and necessary ability to perceive and respond to variability in an ever-changing environment (Cantril, 2015; Davis, 2013; Hogarth, 1982; Oliver, 2011; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 2001). If variability is the norm in their environments, citizens should also be variable in their perceptions.

Based on what are considered highly developed market research studies, Oliver (2010) offers a realistic defense to this view on the effects of constant change. He suggests that, satisfaction is an internal frame of mind, tied only to mental interpretations of extant performance levels. “It is an individual pursuit – a goal to be attained from the consumption of products and the patronization of service,” (Ibid. p. 4). Oliver therefore infers that meaning is attached only when performance can be compared to a personal subjective standard. But if citizen satisfaction reflects varying societal norms and objectives, as well as subjective private preferences, these assertions affirm that standards change too. Hence there is a sense that benchmarks in service provision are, themselves, not well understood for similar reasons (Oliver, 2010).

Therefore analyzing citizen satisfaction requires accounting for at least the following elements of citizenship: the fact of changing and unchanging attributes in individuals; human (ir)rationality and preferences; and the tension between subjectivity and objectivity (inter-subjectivity) in society. Furthermore, it is also important not to ignore the Economics views that perceive a certain logical weakness in attempting to correlate variables that are static with those that are part of the constantly changing ecology of the individual (Davis, 2013). Indeed, in light of theories of the individual reasoning, Davis calls for the development of individual re-identification as an analytical technique to overcome the impediments presented by constantly changing individuals.

Individual re-identification is supported on the basis that people have unchanging attributes by which they can be identified in the future even as they transform with both exogenously and endogenously driven personal changes. There are two criteria for identifying those unchanging attributes or qualities of the individual and relating only those

to the concept of interest. It must be possible to show for a given conception of the individual: (a) how individuals are distinct from one another in terms of that conception's key defining respect, and (b) how they may be tracked through change as unaltered in terms of that conception's key defining respect. (Davis, 2013, p. 14). Thus by example, if attributes such as gender and race are unchanging over time relative to citizen satisfaction then those attributes can be considered ecologically sound in association with the individuals' satisfaction. This is called re-identifying the individual and is an interesting but underdeveloped approach in economics mainly because it is as yet unclear what the "unchanging individual" looks like; or to what extent that individual is amenable to statistical analysis (Ibid, p. 49).

Nevertheless, the unchanging and changing attributes in individuals undoubtedly play a role in each one's interaction with her/his external environment. For instance, economic theories on consumer demand, rationality, welfare and public choice have been used to investigate the concept of revealed preferences as it relates to citizen satisfaction surveys (Frey & Stutzer, 2012; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Page & Shapiro, 2010). Consumer demand theory suggests that humans prioritize consumption based on resources available to them in an attempt to maximize satisfaction. Similarly, rational choice theory proposes that consumers consistently balance their preferences and expenditures at their points of maximum satisfaction or convenience, and as subject to their budget constraints. How do such views apply to government performance evaluation?

Citizens similarly balance the good and ills of public services at their points of maximum satisfaction depending on their ability to influence the provision and/or production of those services. Their influence is exerted in avenues of civic participation

such as collaborative production, tax contributions, or through public issue forums. However, disparities in power and influence create conditions whereby citizens are inclined to judge public services depending on partisan political sensibilities (Oliver & van Ryzin, 2016). For example, while a citizen may feel subjectively satisfied with objectively “good” health care services in her country, she may feign dissatisfaction and express disapproval in an opinion poll simply because the sponsoring elected official is an opposition party member.

In actuality, attempts to covertly elicit citizens’ true preferences in the real world typically pertain to public goods provision and taxation for these very reasons. There are many incentives for citizens to lie or hide their true preferences in these policy areas. They may do so in order to oppose or support an ideological position; or in order to avoid shouldering financial burdens; or for any number of different reasons. Nevertheless, critics have called for the abandonment of revealed preference theory citing issues pertaining to its lack of clarity; testing limitations; and the epistemologically-driven value neutrality in economics (Hausman, 2000; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Grüne, 2004; Mongin, 2006; Wong, 2006). Indeed others call for greater plurality and acknowledgement of normative “real world” values in the relevant economic policy studies, which may help develop better theories and frameworks (Caldwell, 2003; Davis, 2013; McCloskey, 1998).

Meanwhile, the subjective quality of citizen satisfaction also confounds performance evaluation analyses by suggesting that there are potentially countless factors that influence citizens’ responses to public service delivery at any given time; and to varying degrees of intensity for different individuals. That is to say, citizen satisfaction is a judgment (Price, 1992). It is a subjective perception of whether public services are good

or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, necessary or unnecessary, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, legitimate or illegitimate, and other similar categorizations. But while the response is fundamentally one of approval or disapproval, any number of gradations can be inserted between the polar conditions to generate hypothetically corresponding levels of satisfaction in each individual. Furthermore, there are several qualities and attributes in any individual citizen that may influence her satisfaction.

Fortunately for analytic purposes, public services are delivered to a public – a collective. Public services are not for individual citizens according to tastes and preferences. Nevertheless, as scholars have long pointed out, public needs are not homogenous and often conflict with private ideals (Barry, 1965; Shin, 1977; Stone, 2001). If one considers these points and the fact that public needs are themselves also not the only originators of public policy, it becomes apparent how the subjectivity-objectivity tension creates deeply complex challenges for government institutions trying to satisfy their publics in service provision.

Consequently, the processes of solving societies' problems tend to be neither linear nor logical in conventional terms (Conklin, 2006). This means that citizens may not even necessarily rate the same service according to expertly prescribed criteria or even in an overall sense (Reisig & Chandek, 2001). Respondents may simply isolate and select certain tasks or aspects of the service, and base their judgments on these alone due to limitations in information, bias, or other factors. Nevertheless, some analysts insist that if no objective scores of government performance are available, "subjective interpretation is the immediate antecedent of satisfaction," (Oliver, 2010, p. 105; Percy, 1986). Furthermore in practice, because objective measures of government performance pose their own set of

measurement and statistical challenges (especially in comparison studies), citizens' subjective views often come close to being equally valued as important sources of government performance information.

Yet there is an important difference between being “valued” and being “useful” in performance management. Performance management was developed to improve policy implementation – that is outputs and outcomes, for the benefit of public interests. Indeed Shin (1977) argues that it is one of the principal objectives of service providers. For example, in democratic political systems, the norms and values around the social contract and egalitarian ideals create a strong perception that government policy is driven by citizen approval or disapproval as expressed in the media, opinion polls, and more importantly through votes. Such perspectives infuse a normative quality to the arguments in defense of citizen participation in government performance evaluation.

Nevertheless, technocrats may see little or no practical connection between specific policies and the public preferences uttered in opinion surveys (Cassia & Magno, 2015; Kelly, 2005; Lovrich & Taylor, 1976; Page & Shapiro, 1983). In the complex policy environment, citizens' views are likely deemed of little use and consequence if political agents and forces do not favor them. Further, officials' seemingly methodical means of arriving at “objective” policy solutions may even evoke enough trust among members of the public such that they delegate all policy deliberation to the “experts”. Briefly put, while social-democratic ideals may value the notion of citizen input in government performance evaluation, it is not clear that expert policy implementers make use of this feedback or even see an association between policy implementation and citizen satisfaction (Cassia &

Magno, 2015; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Kathi & Cooper, 2005)

Even so, citizen satisfaction cannot be dismissed off hand from the policymaking process. Harold Lasswell wrote in 1941 (p. 15), "... the open interplay of opinion and policy is the distinguishing mark of popular rule." Later, Barker (1961, p. 239) expressed this view more vehemently when he stated, "...if discussion be the vital process of the life of any organized community, to abolish discussion is suicide and the end of common life," Yet, private interests of individuals in groups also often impede the efficient production of public goods – an effect that is contingent upon citizens' inclination towards anti-social behavior such as greed and free-riding (Olson, 1965). In fact, collective action theorists have long argued that the policy process itself presents elements that often effectively curb citizens' satisfaction with government performance (Box, 2008; Hardin, 1982; Moe, 1989; Nabatchi, 2012; Olson, 1965; Shattschneider, 1960).

It is therefore part of performance management practice/mandate to identify and control, or attempt to eliminate such eventualities. This is particularly the case when considering the influence of policy elites, interest groups, issue networks, and other powerful and influential policy actors working to advance their private agendas ahead of public interests. For example, some analysts (Krosnick, 1990; Manza & Cook, 2002) connect policy making and public opinion through participatory individuals called the "issue" public (as conceived by Almond, 1950; and Key, 1961). The "issue" public is led informally by opinion leaders, and most policy decisions reflect this group's preferences as they are the most vocal group (Nisbet, 2011, p. 356). Conventional experience is that the most powerful voices get the most attention from elected officials.

Thus in returning to the focus of this chapter, and as has been mentioned previously, the relationship between citizen satisfaction and government performance evaluation is complicated. Consider a 5-point scale of degrees of satisfaction. Ideally, citizens' subjective approval or disapproval of government performance should have a positive correlation with "objective" measures of government performance. This means that if government performance increases, citizens' sentiments should improve on the scale; and if government performance deteriorates, citizens' sentiments should also reflect a negative change – or at least remain neutral in either case. Research is yet to unearth stable patterns in this aspect of the relationship. Indeed, Winter (2006) suggested a decade ago, there may also exist as yet undiscovered citizen satisfaction determinants that are universally influential in all policy areas, or within specific policy areas.

In sum, understanding the different aspects of citizen satisfaction brings us a step closer to establishing citizens' role in the implementation and evaluation/change stages of the policy process. Unfortunately, citizens exist in a realm of puzzlement (Hecl, 1994) and it has proven difficult to develop models that have strong generalizability, especially cross-nationally. In an attempt to create a usable analytical framework I extract four broad dimensions from satisfaction literature and use them as the bases for variable and factor identification in my analysis. Citizen judgment or evaluation of government performance can be viewed as being essentially contingent upon individuals, political, administrative, and contextual dimensions of the policy environment.

The individuals dimension derives from the fact that people are the originators of *authentic* (dis)satisfaction sentiments, and are the units of analysis in this area of research. I must, nevertheless, also treat these individuals as members of collectives in order to

account for the influence their respective socio-cultural environments have on their translation of those authentic internal sentiments into measurable public opinion. Thus *individuals* is to be considered a discrete dimension within my analytical framework, and this label should not be taken as a grammatical error in the possessive case. The distinction is a means to acknowledge that the constructs attached to persons in one part of the world do not necessarily apply in other parts – or even among individuals in the same community. For example, racial constructs are only relevant in racially diverse places; and gender is rigidly dichotomous only in sexually repressed societies and cultures. Hence the complexity of human individuals and their collectives is acknowledged as a dimension unto itself.

Otherwise, the administrative dimension represents the institutional factors that are likely to influence citizen satisfaction. These are trends and characteristics that citizens can actually perceive regarding their service providers. The political dimension features factors originating and pertaining to political concerns; and which affect both government institutions and individuals, and the manner in which they function and relate to each other vis-à-vis citizen satisfaction. Finally, but potentially equally relevant, is the contextual dimension. It situates both institutions and individuals in their respective political economies and jurisdictions in order to determine if and how these environmental factors influence satisfaction alongside the factors assigned to the other dimensions.

2.2. Dimensions and Determinants of Citizen Satisfaction

2.2.1. Individuals

It is important for any perspective on public service delivery to first clearly define and contextually situate the “public” it aims to analyze, and do so with a firm grounding in locally-meaningful realities (Murphy, 2008). Hence, I define public in this study in terms of three theory-based assumptions. These assumptions are: (1) individuals are “political animals” by virtue of their membership in their *respective* polities – such as those polities may exist. When active in the public sphere, individuals’ behavior presupposes that they are communicating perceptibly with government officials, institutions, policies, and/or fellow citizens. (2) Citizen satisfaction is an internal judgment that is only accessible upon the expression of political values and/or the manifestation of political behavior. (3) Citizen satisfaction manifests as approval or disapproval of government and/or policies through activities such as voting, protesting, responding to public opinion polls and satisfaction surveys, migrating, and so on.

Based on these assumptions and Price’s (2008) inclusive definition, the political “public” can therefore be thought of as “one or another of any number of sociological entities comprising: a complex of groups pressing for political action (that is, interest groups); people engaged in debate over some societal issue; people who have thought about an issue and know enough to form and express opinions (whether or not they have been engaged in conversation or debate); or groups of people who are following and acting publicly on some issue in the media (that is, audiences or attention aggregates). In short, the public in this study is essentially a community of individuals expressing themselves (sincerely or falsely) in their political environment.

Based on a study on civic engagement in Boston, Massachusetts, Bueker (2010) proposes that what encourages formal political participation also encourages other forms of civic engagement. But given the variability in individuals' personal lives and experiences, we must consider whether citizens are able, if willing, to engage in the formal process of providing *constructive* government performance feedback – particularly in the complex socioeconomic and political contexts that exist in Africa. In fact, so far I have made little mention of the socioeconomic and political stratifications that typify societies in general, and which influence individuals' attitudes. Indeed, studies that assess citizens' sense of political power find that if the citizens feel politically efficacious – that is “if they feel good about themselves as political participants,” they are more likely to have positive feelings about public services (Brown & Coulter, 1983, p.52; Chamberlain, 2012; Morrell, 2003; Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenendyk, 2009).

Social cognitive theory explains that self-efficacy pertains to a sense of control over one's environment and behavior (Bandura, 1997). This is a perception that is inherent *within the individual* as a member of a collective, but which is also in part shaped by the sociopolitical environment. For example, distinctions may manifest based on the different societal circumstances in which individuals find themselves. A prisoner may have all her civil liberties revoked in the non-democratic penal system. However, if she is a “leader” in her prison block, then she has measurably greater control over her environment and therefore a higher sense of self-efficacy even within that non-democratic system. Similarly, market women in many patriarchal African communities may experience a higher sense of self-efficacy within the collective of the public markets, even though outside those spaces they remain subjugated to men.

A visual analogy for ranking citizens according to this sense of control over their environments and behavior is Arnstein's (1969) "ladder of citizen participation". This framework presents citizen participation – or citizen engagement – as a categorical term for assessing interpersonal relations among individuals in a collective. There have been other ladders presented in the literature, which portray fewer or more gradations of power and influence, and in different contexts of sociopolitical empowerment. Boley and McGehee (2014) and Choguill (1996) propose a ladder for underdeveloped nations, whose rungs would include: empowerment, partnership, conciliation, dissimulation, and diplomacy.

The different perspectives concur that social hierarchical relations influence citizens' rights to define the public good; and determine the policies by which they will seek the good, and reform or replace institutions that do not serve that good (Korten, 2011). This means that even where citizens may appear to be equally involved in collective decision-making, the overarching societal power structure is what actually determines the level of efficacy (if any) each individual has in political participation. However, other scholars argue that the meaning and purposes of participation have diversified since Arnstein's conception of social ladders (Collins & Ison, 2009; Crosby, Kelly & Schaefer, 1986; Tritter & McCallum, 2006). They propose accounting for other approaches to understanding political participation, such as social learning.

Yet, as supported by theories on social constructs as well as common everyday life experiences, a citizen's internal perceptions of her place in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic hierarchies – as well as that society's sense of how high or how low she ranks, can determine what opportunities she may take advantage of to voice her satisfaction

or dissatisfaction. Social learning and civic education alone do not guarantee exercise of political voice in individuals. Hence the social constructs view provides propositions on how society perceives social groups and assigns public resources and privileges according to constructs of the “deserving” and “undeserving” – or those with a voice, and those without. Indeed due to social inequity and varied degrees of civil liberty protections in Africa, the manner in which citizens perceive their personal socio-political power and status is likely to be as important as how individuals perceive other individuals’ socio-political rankings.

The socio-political effects of elevating or lowering an individual’s social status are therefore expected to affect whether or not they perceive satisfaction with public services or not, if only because more powerful citizens are likely to receive better quality services than their less powerful counterparts. Figure 2.1 below is a summary of the typology in Arnstein’s ladder rungs starting at the bottom of the participation ladder. Rungs (1) *manipulation*, and (2) *therapy*, are contrived as substitutes for genuine participation. They are, however, non-participation rungs where more powerful agents essentially control these individuals. Rungs (3) *informing*, and (4) *consultation*, are rungs where citizens may actually engage their elected representatives and government officials – albeit with no guarantee of follow through and subsequently no guarantee of a change in circumstances. These are rungs of tokenism. The fifth through eighth rungs depict increasing levels of power and influence among knowledgeable citizens. Arnstein’s concept of political power thus presented becomes a useful metaphor in defining and discussing political self-efficacy as it relates to citizen satisfaction with government performance.




Figure 2.1: Arnstein's ladder depicting political participation and efficacy

This is a stratified view of how citizens' socio-cultural status relates to satisfaction depending on how powerful and influential individuals are within their community. It also lends insight into individual citizen's expectations regarding public service provision. Studies exploring this concept have found that expectations, and particularly disconfirmation of those expectations, have a significant (although not conclusively understood) influence on citizen satisfaction (Badri, Al Kalili & Al Mansoori, 2015; Marvel, 2015; Morgeson, 2013; Poister & Thomas, 2011; Reisig & Chandek, 2001; van

Ryzin, 2004; van Ryzin, Muzzio & Immerwahr, 2004). “Expectancy disconfirmation” is a term, which is used generally to mean the negation of a citizen’s expectations (regarding performance) between two time periods.

In fact, a citizen relating judgments of approval/disapproval between the current year and the previous year will deliver an evaluation that is certain to reflect one of three positions. The first position is an increase in satisfaction/decrease in dissatisfaction. This is a positive opinion. The second position is a decrease in satisfaction/increase in dissatisfaction – which is a negative opinion. Strictly speaking, these shifts are expectancy confirmation and disconfirmation respectively. Meanwhile, the third and neutral position reflects no change in level of satisfaction. This is not to be confused with not having an opinion, because an individual can remain satisfied for any period of time – justifiably or not – and rate government performance as such. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that among the low efficacy, disenfranchised, and/or non-discerning public, settling on a position of “no opinion” is likely. This is unless opinion is required by law – as in the case of mandatory voting, or by moral imperative. However, within the framework of this study indecisiveness, lack of knowledge, and/or disinterestedness undermine the argument that citizens have good judgment when it comes to evaluating government performance.

In fact, as far as citizens’ actual evaluation responses are concerned, indeterminate positions mean that the individual is not a useful contributor of constructive information on government performance. Therefore using that quality of “opinion” is as futile as taking a measurement using a ruler with no tick marks. Meanwhile, there are analysts who have demonstrated that inconsistency in responses can be a result of methodological flaws – such as internal threats to the validity of the survey instruments in terms of question

framing and ordering (Cantril 2015; Dean & Moran, 1977; Hogarth, 1982; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003; van de Walle & van Ryzin, 2011). Still others have argued that surveys are temporary constructs (Crespi, 2013; Wilson & Hodge, 1992, 2013; Wyer & Srull, 1989). They do not reveal true attitudes and opinions, but merely reflect the topmost thoughts in the respondent's mind at the time the survey is taken – level of respondent's sophistication notwithstanding (Bishop, 1990; Crespi, 2013; Krosnick & Schuman, 1988; Wilson & Hodge, 2013; Zaller & Feldman, 1992).

Other reasons why the validity of citizens' expectations based on prior performance remains inconclusively related to satisfaction include the fact that there is just as strong support for the crystallization of citizens' attitudes. This means that over time, attitudes are stable and therefore contribute less to survey response instability (Achen, 1975; Markus & Converse, 1979; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Diener, 1994; Argyle, 2013). Meanwhile, Oliver (2011) adds another layer of complexity by distinguishing between positive expectations, that is opinion on what performance *will* be; and normative expectations or opinion on what performance *should* be. Contributing insights from a marketing management perspective, this scholar concludes (from a random sample of 9,500 citizens) that satisfaction increases with the lowering of normative expectations and the increasing of performance.

Relating to these ideas on the cognitive processes at work between citizen satisfaction and public opinion, some observers highlight the importance of media exposure in “constructing” opinion. For instance, McCombs (2004, p. 1) states that “...for nearly all of the concerns on the public agenda, citizens deal with a second-hand reality – a reality that is structured by journalists' reports on these events and situations,” (Lippman,

1921; McCombs, 2004; White, 1973). Indeed, Lippmann considers that public opinion is derived not from the [real] environment, but from the second-hand media construct – the “pictures in people’s heads”. Yet Nyamnjoh (2005, p.1) argues that audiences are neither passive nor helpless, and that what people make of particular media content depends on “where their vested interests lie; interests which are not fixed.” However in Africa, even as more countries shift towards democratization, the media on the continent has been typified by State and self-censorship particularly in matters pertaining to coverage of or support for anti-statist perspectives or interests (Joseph, 2016; Makumbe, 1998; Norris, 2010; Skjerdal, 2008; VonDoepp & Young, 2015).

The deficiencies in media objectivity do not necessarily set Africa apart with regards to citizens falling victim to the vagaries of the media as the “fourth estate” – that is a media co-opted by government, or seized in monopolistic elite capture. Of the world’s most powerful democracy, White (2004, p.7) is famously quoted as having said: “The engagement of the press in America is a primordial one – that is to say that it determines what people talk and think about.” Nevertheless, some views are hopeful that the move towards privatization in the media across Africa translates into opportunities for average citizens to influence the advancement of socio-political change and development (Makumbe, 1998; Olorunnisola & Douai, 2013).

Hence in Africa as around the world, because the media can either enhance the salience of an issue or effectively filter information, individual’s media access ultimately plays an important role in determining what those citizens discuss, and how they express themselves politically in the public sphere. It can even ultimately have an impact on whether citizens respond to government performance with satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Nevertheless, the media itself is not the only determinant of the degree to which an issue achieves salience in a society. Issue salience sheds light on matters that are at the forefront of the social psyche, and is defined by the political environment, the collective, and the individuals within that collective.

Converse (1972, p. 324) suggests that education is the “universal solvent” that determines what issues on the public agenda become salient, and how long they remain there. However, the relationship is more nuanced in the sense that education increases individuals’ attention to the news media while sensitizing them to a broader range of issues (McCombs & Zhu, 1995; McCombs, 2004). Yet it would be incorrect to assume that increased sensitivity and a broad perspective automatically heighten issue salience within a demographic group. MacKuen (1981) observes that media agenda-setting effects are not manifested in creating different levels of salience among individuals – regardless of education level, but are evident at driving the salience of all individuals up and down over time.

Meanwhile, in studies conducted in Western nations, analyses suggest that race, age, income, and to a lesser extent, education are significant drivers of opinion (Erikson, 1979; Kelly & Swindell, 2002; Lyons, Lowery & de Hoog, 1993; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). Particularly noteworthy is the effect of race, which has been extensively studied in the United States. The general finding is that ethnic minorities express more dissatisfaction than whites (Hero & Tolbert, 2004; Reisig & Parks, 2000). However, Reisig and Parks (2000) modify this generalized assumption by suggesting that neighborhood context affects satisfaction among African Americans.

In a study that was nonetheless limited by its focus on police services, the authors verify what makes sense intuitively: People (African American or not) who live in neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage are, on average, more likely to express dissatisfaction than those in better neighborhoods. Social constructs and social inequity perspectives predict that citizens who are victimized, marginalized, criminalized or otherwise perceived to be undeserving of public assistance tend to receive a quality of government public service delivery that more or less reflects their lesser socio-economic and political rankings (Ingram & Schneider, 1993; Ingram & Smith, 2011; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; Stepanikova, Triplett, & Simpson, 2011). These studies affirm satisfaction's positive association with political attitudes and, as has been discussed, perceived political self-efficacy among citizens. Underprivileged citizens are likely to harbor negative political attitudes because of life's challenges and a sense of disenfranchisement.

Nevertheless, findings on the effects of individuals' other attributes including age, employment, and education – are not yet consistent enough across policies, settings and ecologies to be considered conclusive in generating a set of generalizable determinants (Kelly, 2003, 2005, p. 77). For instance, in a study in the Netherlands, Bovens and Wille (2010) observe that less educated individuals tend to be very distrustful and cynical about politics and politicians, whereas the well-educated tend to be much more positive about government and political institutions. However, despite the apparent hypothetical clarity, these authors point out that their findings are mainly pertinent to socio-cultural issues, such as crime, the admittance of asylum seekers, cultural integration of immigrants, and EU

unification. Bovens and Wille add that even the demographic impact of issue salience appears to change over time as groups slip in and out of visibility.

Broadly speaking, Oliver (2011) recognizes a widespread negativity bias in citizen satisfaction responses. Meanwhile, some discrepancies in findings are suspected to be the result of differing methodological approaches. Thus due to the on-going uncertainty, analysts assessing this subject continue to grapple with model specification and the confounding attributes of individuals' behavior. In fact, the mixed results and validity issues associated with satisfaction surveys mean that there remains much work to be done in behavioral and statistical research. The enduring challenge is to disentangle and identify determinants of citizens' attitudes and properly assess their relative importance for public service delivery evaluation.

2.2.2. Political Perspectives

Departing from the individuals dimension and its themes, I now turn to political factors that shape citizen satisfaction. Political behavior and relationships become particularly important considerations as we expand satisfaction theory development to the context of developing nations. Again, citizen satisfaction and public opinion are two sequential responses to government performance. Citizen satisfaction is the initial internal response to service outputs; whereas public opinion is the expression of that internal response in the public sphere. Therefore, if we take a global perspective of this process, we quickly see that depending on the system of government and political climate, citizen satisfaction does not automatically translate into public opinion. There must exist the

opportunities to express opinion, an audience, and the individual's personal motivation to communicate with that audience.

As I have mentioned previously, much of citizen satisfaction theory is based on studies conducted in democratic countries (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole & Walker, 2005; Ariely, 2013; Box, Marshall, Reed & Reed, 2001; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Lijphart, 2012; Swindell & Kelly, 2000; van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Naturally democracy is a foundational premise in citizen satisfaction studies because absent its protection of civil liberties in choice, speech, and association, there are limited bases upon which citizens can successfully argue for input in government evaluation. Yet, while the notion of public discourse has a long tradition in social-democratic theory, researchers must also account for the fact that public actions are generally comingled with the self-interested and political motivations of the individuals involved (Habermas, 1992, 1962; Stone 2001). The political agents themselves include both members of the public, and their elected representatives and government officials.

Within the citizens' sphere, Tönnies (1855-1936) felt that public opinion displaces religion as the glue of society in the modern Western world. He argued that if "community is signified through its social will as concord, custom, and religion; society is signified through its social will as convention, policy, and public opinion," (2001, p. 205). Still as mentioned previously, contemporary views contend that public opinion is no longer created through deliberation (Page & Shapiro, 1983; Savigny; 2002) as may have been the case in early eras of democratic idealism. Instead these authors argue that it is now constructed through systems of communication, and in conflict with other political actors who have interests in controlling the dissemination of information. Consequently, there isn't one

fixed political definition of the concept of public opinion. It certainly varies with time and context (Herbst, 1998). Therefore, Herbst argues that it is also important to look at *how opinion is created* in the minds of citizens rather than just taking it for granted.

So how is public opinion fomented in citizens' minds prior to its behavioral manifestation? There is certainly a sense that democratic systems of governance are obliged to nurture independent political deliberation and choice among citizens. In fact, many nations are constitutionally committed to the inclusion of their publics in the processes of government. Frequently hard won, these statutory provisions reflect the pluralist ideals that are the preserve of modern electoral systems, parties, and houses of representatives (Barker, 1961; Hogarth, 1982; Redford, 1958; Stone, 2001). Hence the right to hold opposing views, and the right to choose and voice perspectives are democratic freedoms that not only intrinsically stimulate citizen satisfaction (Bratton, 2010; Brown & Coulter, 1983; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007), but they also facilitate communication of opinion with the relevant parties in government. Nevertheless, apathy or low self-efficacy often precludes citizens from taking advantage of these freedoms as a matter of democratic principle.

It follows that in national domestic affairs, democratic governments are mainly swayed by vocal citizens who exercise their freedom of speech to communicate with their political representatives. Indeed, modern electoral systems, parties, and houses of representatives are viewed as the three institutions that constitute the organs of political discussion – that is participation in government (Barker, 1961, p. 236). Well summarized by Myron Wiener, and as cited by Singerman (1995, p.7), political participation is “any voluntary action, successful or unsuccessful, organized or unorganized, episodic or

continuous, employing legitimate or illegitimate methods intended to influence the choice of public policies, the management of public affairs, or the choice of political leaders at any level of government, local or national.” Citizen participation therefore idealizes equal opportunity for myriad policy actors to exercise their voice and/or power and influence to advance their political interests.

Consequently, factors such as electoral competitiveness or candidate popularity are also expected to have an impact on citizen satisfaction with public service delivery. This is in as far as citizens perceive a just, consistent and inclusive political system; and in the extent to which competitiveness motivates candidates to fulfill their campaign mandates as part of their strategy to win reelection. Some empirical studies conducted in the U.S. suggest that there is little or no relationship between electoral politics and public service delivery (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1993). However in multijurisdictional studies, other analysts broadly concur that where there is little competition, political parties and candidates are inclined to “rest on their laurels,” (Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2003; Besley & Burgess, 2002; Holbrook & van Dunk, 1993; Key, 1949). Still, others have pointed out that the relationship is not necessarily straightforward (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). This latter view is corroborated in environments like Africa where politicians are notorious for employing different tactics to win votes and ultimately influence public service delivery.

With relevance to ethnicity, some political views maintain that diversity lowers spending on productive services and instead encourages rent-seeking behavior among powerful and influential policy actors (Collier & Garg, 1999; i Miquel, 2007). This often pits ethnic groups against each other. Yet some studies suggest that ethnic favoritism can

be moderated by other factors such as religion (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Franck & Rainer, 2012; Kasara, 2007; Kramon & Posner, 2013). In Africa, Senegal is an example of such cases. Still, other findings suggest that as highly fractionalized societies are less likely to experience ethnic conflict than less fractionalized societies, high diversity in Africa reduces rather than exacerbates conflict (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; Pleskovic & Stiglitz, 1999). Nonetheless, because of the tendency towards kin-group patronage, Pleskovic and Stiglitz (1998, p. 388-389) point out that high fractionalization does work to reduce efficiency in public service delivery.

Because of the higher degree of ethnic fractionalization in Africa compared to many of the Western democracies assessed for public service provision, it is worth digging deeper into the concept of ethnicity in order to correctly account for this variable's effect in determining citizen satisfaction. Baldwin and Huber (2010) assert that ethnicity is typically only considered in terms of ethno-linguistic fractionalization – which correlates strongly with cultural fractionalization. Based on this study and others in India and Mexico, it is worth considering between-group inequality because limited economic resources are likely to result in poor service provision and citizen satisfaction (Bardhan, 2000; Dayton-Johnson, 2000). Furthermore, this characterization of the implications of ethnicity for public service delivery can also have attitudinal consequences based on social identity perceptions. This means that citizens are more positive when members of their own group accrue service benefits, but are more negative when members of other groups benefit (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2005).

Yet, despite the widespread view that ethnicity has a role to play in citizens' attitudes towards government, there are perspectives that suggest otherwise (Bratton, 2010;

Kasara, 2007). Thus even in light of the empirical work that has been done regarding ethnicity in Africa, this variable's effect on citizen satisfaction with government performance is not conclusively understood. While identity politics emphasize differences among individuals and limit cooperation and development, other contextual factors and the degree of fractionalization within a jurisdiction can counter the effect as decision-making shifts through different ethnic spaces (Pleskovic & Stiglitz, 1998). This means that the variable merits investigation in Africa as in other parts of the world where ethnicity plays an important role in civic engagement, institutional performance, and socio-economic growth and development.

Finally, even as citizens have their personal preferences in leadership, their inclination to vote plays an important role in determining the nature and quality of that leadership – and ultimately those voters' quality of public services. This concept can be interpreted as the citizens' preferences in voting, or the citizens' actual engagement in the act of voting (Aldrich, 1993; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Smets & van Ham, 2013; Solt, 2008). The latter perspective – voter turnout – is therefore pertinent for this study on citizen approval or disapproval of government public service provision. In fact, studies based on the rational behavior theory of voter participation have long suggested that participation is generally determined by income, information, efficacy, context, and other factors (Silberman & Durden, 1975; Settle & Abrams, 1976; Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957).

However, while these studies shed light on the attributes of voters, they do not fully address the sentiments expressed by the individuals within the voting public. Yet this view adds an important dimension to my investigation because it suggests the possibility of a relationship between the different modes of political participation; and it also leads to the

question of whether the voting public is largely represented by naysayers or supporters, given their specific individual attributes.

2.2.3. Public Management and Institutions

Public administration – or as it has relatively recently come to be termed – public management, is intimately involved with public service delivery and citizen satisfaction. But it is worth noting first, that the nominal adjustment is not trivial. It reflects the contemporary view of public service as an organ of government that, based on evolving political and economic conditions, must necessarily function according to the private sector model of business operations in order to effectively address the challenges of the 21st Century (Barzelay, 2001; Dudding & Nielsen, 2013; Kettl, 2005; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 1999). Consequently, unlike in the political perspective, public management and institutions have a mandate to address the challenge of generating citizen satisfaction through performance evaluation.

Yet like political interests, public management also seeks to get to the heart of citizen satisfaction by engaging more frequently and more directly with citizens through their opinions or feedback. This is a possible cause of the general tendency among observers to associate performance measurement with reform. However, as Kettl (2005, p. viii) points out, management reform is less about management and more about serving the reformers' political purposes. Kettl's view of performance-related professional mandates lends insight into an epistemological challenge public service continues to grapple with. The dilemma is whether public management's primary directive is to serve, or whether it

is to steer, to control and gain results (Clarke, Newman, Smith, Vidler, & Westmarland, 2007; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Hughes, 2012)

From the social-democratic perspective, Mintzberg (1996) insists – and others agree, that the relationship between a government and its citizens is at a minimum implicitly fiduciary (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; du Gay, 2005; Green, Wamsley, & Keller, 1990; Kettl, 2002). They strongly oppose the public management reform advocates of the 1990s such as Tom Peters; Jonathan Boston; and Ted Gaebler and David Osborne, who were the originators of the “steer not row” principle. The opponents decry the notion of citizens as mere customers of government, and Kettl (2002) points out that citizens fulfill roles beyond simple product consumers. That is to say, citizens’ treatment – whenever their personal affairs fall within the purview of government “business” – involves consideration of many intricacies and difficulties that transcend impersonal commercial transaction relationships (Mintzberg, 1996; Osborne, 2006; Osborne, Radnor, & Nasi, 2013; Peters, 1987)

In response to the apparently prevailing frustration with government performance, some scholars (Mintzberg, 1996; Osborne, et al., 2013) ask whether we really want government to operate like a business – a hawkker of products. Toothbrushes were specifically considered. The scholars speculate that the current malaise about government among Western nations is because government has become too much like business rather than not enough. Mintzberg’s (p. 77-78) discourse asserts that there is a difference between a *customer* and a *client*. In his mind, customer denotes arms-length trading with a private organization, while client better reflects the professional services he expects to receive from his government. Some scholars support this view in stating that the public service is

meant to serve *citizens*, not *customers*; that public service derives from the civic virtues of duty and responsibility (Barber, 1998, p. 195) and should focus on building relationships of trust and collaboration with and among citizens (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007, p. 45).

Popular normative and democratic perspectives maintain that citizens are owners of government and are entitled to demanding accountability from their governments. They are, after all, tax payers and pay their governments' bills. But above all, citizens are also partners or collaborators in service provision – as in social service provision, environmental protection, and welfare reform. Hence while, early public administration writers and practitioners such as Woodrow Wilson, Dwight Waldo, Luther Gulick, and Frederick W. Taylor heavily emphasized efficiency as the most important measure of government performance, other scholars of the day such as Marshall Dimock (1936) disagreed. Dimock argued that responsiveness to citizen concerns or satisfaction is just as important a criterion in assessing government performance.

But what of perspectives that dispute the view of public service entrepreneurship as an abandonment of social sensitivity and ethics (Bardach, 1998; Cohen & Eimicke, 2008; Haas, 1999; Light, 1999, 1997; Riccuci, 1995). These authors counter that entrepreneurship inspires proactivity, innovation, and value creation. As such, scholars strike a compromise in emphasizing performance measurement and accountability in governance. Hatry's (2006, p. 196) eleven-point list of uses of subjective performance information is essentially crafted to enhance government transparency and accountability. This list features justifications for performance measurement that include: assisting in resource allocation; investigating performance problems; motivating personnel to continue improving their programs; and providing services more effectively.

Other authors – most notably Hecló (1974, p. 305), articulate an intractable fact with relatively few willing supporters. This is the perspective which notes that the business of governing is essentially professionals participating in “collective puzzlement on behalf of society” (Culpepper, 2002; Hemerijck, 2008; Hood, 2000; van Buuren, Vink, & Warner, 2014). In other words, professionals are possibly no better than citizens at evaluating government performance, let alone managing it. Hence, Moynihan (2010, p. 295) asks: “What explains the ongoing appeal of performance management given its mixed record in practice?” For his part, Moynihan suggests that rather than a single response to this question, there may be a range of answers.

Institutional theory contains several analytical frameworks that have been used to explain government performance from the view of citizens’ perceptive reach. But in the broadest sense, the classic systems model of policy implementation streams inputs (public resources) through the “black box of public management” in order to produce outputs/outcomes (policy results). The happenings in the black box can prove enigmatic to identify and isolate. Hence one conspicuous dimension of institutional performance that lends itself to empirical evaluation for purposes of quality assurance and personnel development is managerial quality. In fact many studies in both public and business management have demonstrated that managerial capacity has a strong positive relationship with performance.

Capacity in governance is typically assessed in terms of four concepts: government’s management systems, leadership, inter-agency integration and alignment, and results orientation (Andrews & Boyne, 2010; Doig & Hargrove, 1987; Hill & Lynn, 2009; Ingraham, Joyce, & Kneeder, 2003, p. 16-22; Joyce & Donahue, 2003; Pollitt, 2003;

van Wart, 2013). Yet also relevant for consideration in management capacity is gender participation (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Fine, 2009; Pounder & Coleman, 2002; Schlozman, Burns, Verba & Donahue, 1995). This is because some studies suggest influences of the sexes in management (Bellou, 2009; Fine, 2009; Trinidad & Normore, 2005), while others infer that the relationship is not so clear (Pounder & Coleman, 2002). But how do these concepts relate to citizen satisfaction?

The correct answer in a technical sense is that many of them probably do not. This is why it is important for performance management analysis frameworks to consider questions pertaining to the circumstantial realities of the study subjects. For instance, in tackling issues pertaining to citizen satisfaction, to what extent can untrained or unsophisticated citizens properly perceive such a technical dimension as “capacity” and apply it to their subjective evaluation of government performance? How can citizens possibly grasp all the relevant objective independent variables such as the “type of management system”, and “inter-agency integration and alignment”? Beyond that, even analytical frameworks themselves have constituent measures that are contingent upon the intentions and biases of the researcher(s).

Oliver (2010, p. 112) offers guidelines on when not to completely trust citizen judgments of [institutional] performance. These conditions are: (1) whenever no objective performance can be observed; (2) whenever performance is an ambiguous concept; (3) when measurement is too technically involving. However, there are usually alternative ways to look at the same concept that can accommodate empirical assessment of citizen satisfaction. As Mintzberg (1996) suggests, perhaps government performance should be appraised with some degree of soft judgment. For example, behavioral research

perspectives consider the limitations of individual decision-making (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; O'Toole, 1997; Simon, 1947). This is because studies have found that primarily due to their inability to maximize efficiency and use of information, decision-makers typically resort to habit and emotion more often than truth-seeking and rational-comprehensive problem resolution (Duit, Galaz, Eckerberg, & Ebbeson, 2010; Simon, 1983; Workman, Jones & Jochim, 2010).

Therefore, more contextually realistic practices based on institutional tradition, and bureaucratic discretion at the point of service may suffice in improving citizens' perceptions about government effectiveness. That is to say, point-of-service operations and incremental habits – especially in financial management and budgeting – are far more accessible to citizens than technocratic managerial specifications. Consequently, if such factors can be properly captured in empirical analysis, they should better help explain individual responses through systematic assessment of service quality relevant to the citizenry's point of view.

Yet Prottas' (1979) study of bureaucrats working in health care and welfare office settings concluded that, "The core characteristic of public service bureaucracies is not that they deliver public service goods to citizens. Rather it is that they deliver public goods to clients which they "manufacture for that express purpose." Lipsky (1980 p. 54, 2010) also argues that citizens are essentially subject to the public service products of the bureaucracy. He observes that clients in street-level bureaucracies are non-voluntary as they cannot seek alternative services if they are dissatisfied or poorly treated in government agencies. Therefore improving performance management in public service delivery is not just a matter of fulfilling mandatory obligation; it is more profoundly a matter of preserving

public interests in spite of the political and technical challenges that exist in service delivery institutions.

2.2.4. Contextual Factors

Beyond the individuals, political, and public management spheres are context specific variables. These are events and phenomena that affect public service delivery and citizens' assessment at any given point in time. Even in everyday life, it is easy to observe how individuals attitudes are affected by socio-cultural influences through activities such as trade, travel and migration (Castles, Miller, Ammendola, 2005; Curran & Saguy, 2013), hegemonic dominance (Smith, 2013; Tomlinson, 1999), technological development, (O'Brien & Williams, 2004), and so on. Jurisdictional factors, however, impact citizen satisfaction within specified political units - from local to international levels of government. Therefore the citizen satisfaction and public opinion literature is informed not only by domestic assessments, but also cross-national studies (Ariely, 2013; Dalton, 2013; Leiter & Clark, 2015; Lijphart, 2012) and theories on globalization and transnationalism.

Meanwhile, the turn of the century saw heightened institutional-perspective debate on the impact of new technology on public-sector service delivery and citizens' attitudes towards government. West (2004) assessed the effect of e-government for service delivery, democratic responsiveness, and public attitudes. In his assessment, he found little impact on citizen's attitudes, but increased potential for responsiveness. Later studies also present similar results (Norris & Reddick, 2013; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006; Torres, Pina, & Acerete, 2006). In fact, the internet-based innovations in government remain an area of

contention for their effect of building trust among citizens. It is, however, noteworthy that a meta-analysis of website evaluation literature found that there is no uniform or comprehensive set of website evaluation metrics and that the public value perspective is largely neglected in the website evaluation literature (Karkin & Jansen, 2014).

Elsewhere and with particular relevance to developing nations around the world, wars, famine and drought, global economic incidents, epidemics and other occurrences frequently affect public service delivery, as well as citizens' reactions to those services. As a result of the relief and aid initiatives afforded by a globalized international community, foreign aid donors and non-governmental institutions often step in and play an important role in making up for state government deficiencies in a broad range of service areas. Further, as part of their policy mandates to uphold international human rights standards, many state governments apparently collaborate with the United Nations and numerous IFIs (international financial institutions) and (I)NGOs ((international) non-governmental organizations) to promote citizen participation in political discourse (Gaventa, 2002; Mercer, 2002; Warleigh, 2001). Particularly in countries with failing governments, IFIs and (I)NGOs complement, and in many cases, entirely take over government responsibilities in public service provision (Brass, 2012; Collier, 2006).

Hence, a nation's relationship with IFIs and the amount of money it receives in aid annually may also eventually affect public service delivery in those countries. However, aid also works to the detriment of recipient nations in terms of encouraging dependency and neocolonialist exploitation of relatively weak states (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Elbadawi, 1999; Moyo, 2009). Hence, some observers believe that country-owned aid management is more likely to lead to growth and development than conditional aid

(Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Devarajan, Dollar, & Holmgren, 2001). Other analysts such as Collier (2006) also argue that despite the associated problems, Africa's progress in Western standards of development would have been much slower without economic aid (distinguished from other forms of aid).

Nevertheless, due to the veiled nature of the long-term implications of aid, one could reasonably speculate that if a country receives a lot of international aid, citizens are likely to disapprove of government performance because they see that their government is essentially being replaced by the international organizations. Yet, the aid industry is an ongoing controversy as it appears that IFIs and (I)NGOs have the potential to improve conditions or add to governments' efforts in public service delivery. It, however, cannot be understated that aid typically comes at a hefty and often overwhelming cost to the aided nations because of the give-and-take realities of the global political economy.

2.3. Modeling Citizen Satisfaction

While citizen satisfaction studies have been conducted for decades in developed nations, relatively recent improvements in data accessibility and reliability in African nations has meant that there is new opportunity to test citizen satisfaction models and frameworks in underexplored socio-political environments. In fact, opportunities for exploration of new government systems and dimensions continue to grow, especially in light of the growth of data availability in previously understudied or inaccessible regions of the world. Thus, given the diversity of settings now within reach of scientific analysis,

it is possible to demonstrate that citizen satisfaction manifests as public opinion in environments that nurture the right conditions and incentives for individuals.

The complexity involved in citizen satisfaction studies also means that studies must derive theoretical insights from other disciplines such as economics, sociology, psychology in order to fine tune understanding on promising variables, and enhance methodological techniques. However, political science and public management provide the foundational theories and dimensions by which to assess citizen satisfaction in this study. Figure 2.2 depicts the study's theoretical framework in summary. The different disciplines test these theories as they pertain to different ecological levels and contexts; and they do so while revealing implications for the policymaking process. As the framework indicates, the four main categories in the analyses account for individuals – sentiments and attributes; and political, institutional, and relevant contextual factors that play a role in determining public service production and citizens' personal responses.



Figure 2.2: Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework is not exhaustive, but it facilitates the study of citizen satisfaction as a response to service quality in a manner of approval or disapproval. Nevertheless, because we cannot assume that personal sentiments eventually get translated into political behavior intact in the form of performance evaluation surveys, this study also considers the factors that transform (dis)satisfaction into public opinion. Public opinion is, after all, the measurable response to performance. Hence it is important to also isolate and explore how satisfaction is created in citizens' minds (Herbst, 1998; Trentmann, 2006). In order to be considered contributors of public opinion, citizens must participate actively in interacting with government and fellow citizens in expressing their (dis)satisfaction. Unless they do so, their sentiments – genuine or otherwise – remain private and apolitical, and do not contribute any useful information to government performance management. Thus my proposition is that while the literature has offered many public management variables, contextual factors, and individual attributes, it has not explored individuals' performance evaluations as voluntary political acts.

Based on this study's assessment of the literature on citizen satisfaction, I propose the structure depicted in figure 2.3 below as the basic causal model for citizen satisfaction as it relates to government performance evaluation. Citizen satisfaction models have typically treated individuals as an ecological level, rather than a theoretical dimension of individuals and collectives (Trentmann, 2006). That is to say, the individual is largely considered a unit with specified attributes, rather than a meme or behavioral system whose output depends both on the individual and the collective of behavioral systems that is her community. Furthermore, because of inadequate consideration of political perspectives, there has been hardly any distinction made between citizen satisfaction and public opinion.

The neglect of this distinction means that methodological issues such as the endogenous relationship between government performance and citizens' evaluations are not properly understood.

This view of citizen satisfaction is therefore beneficial for at least three reasons. First, the model clarifies the citizen response process that follows government public service provision at a particular level of performance. There is an initial internal response that may be positive or negative, and which essentially reflects approval or disapproval. This cannot be assumed to be the same as the external behavioral response that is the public opinion expressed through performance evaluation. This leads to the second insight derived from this view: If opinion is the observable outcome of satisfaction, then government performance is endogenous not with citizen satisfaction, but with public opinion. Finally, as this study expands citizen satisfaction research to a non-Western setting, it becomes necessary to really emphasize the focus of study – that is satisfaction in individuals.



Figure 2.3: Causal model of citizen satisfaction

In clearly separating government services, performance, satisfaction, and opinion, it becomes apparent that there are essentially two basic interacting elements in satisfaction studies. These are the institutions at the jurisdictional level – local or national, which provide the services; and the people at the individual-level who respond to those services. These unexplored relationships in citizen satisfaction mean that research is yet to truly answer the question: What are the most important determinants of citizen satisfaction with government performance in public service delivery? We know that citizens, power elites, politicians, institutions and the bureaucracy are actors operating in ever-changing policy environments, even as societies grow in size and complexity. This is what makes assessment and generalization challenging. Nonetheless, it also justifies conducting studies in as many settings as possible in order to augment theory development and trend detection.

Indeed, in order to shed light on independent variables impacting citizen satisfaction, theories prescribe improvement in balancing the institutional and individual perspectives. Hence it cannot be emphasized enough that in addition to political and public management views, studying citizen satisfaction requires an understanding of individuals and the socio-cultural phenomena affecting each of them. "... One thing we can know with certainty at this point in history is that individuality is a fundamental preoccupation of contemporary human society," (Davis, 2013). Yet contrary to this view, some analysts and technocrats still see little or no merit in using the publics' subjective views or judgments on service quality.

Public opinion – expressed in the media either as individual stories and anecdotes, or through public opinion polling data – is at best considered an important but imprecise gauge of how the public and community leaders are thinking about issues (Birkland, 2005,

p. 52; Marvel, 2015b). Bureaucrats or public service officials have informational advantages and technical know-how over the general population. As such, in reaching “objective” policy solutions, technocrats may evoke enough trust among members of the public such that they delegate all policy deliberation to the experts. Such delegation may depend on substantive policy areas or services; but the “surrender” is also likely to occur in a relatively powerless citizenry. In the following chapters I explore what such and other contextually relevant factors and concepts tell us about citizen satisfaction.

CHAPTER 3: AFRICA'S CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY

3.1. African vs. Western Socio-political Settings

In recent years, there has been much controversy over assumptions about African socio-politics in academia and among members of the general public. For example, tribalism and nepotism continue to be problematic for different countries across the continent, even as they continue to struggle with corruption and mediocrity in government (Berman 1998; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Kalejauye & Alliyu, 2013; Lentz, 1995; Lubaale, 2015; Mulinge & Lesetedi, 1998; Platteau, 2007; Vail, 1989). Yet some scholars maintain that ethnicity is not the only factor that Africans consider when making political decisions (Bratton, 2010; Kimenyi & Gutierrez-Romero, 2008; Posner & Simon, 2002; Youde, 2005). The alternative view insists that Africans are more fundamentally concerned about their incomes, employment, and standards of provision of public goods. It is therefore important to bear in mind, over the course of this discussion, that Africans' needs and preferences are not necessarily different from those of other societies around the world at a fundamental level.

Nevertheless, there are important points of divergence between African and Western nations, which potentially affect citizens' attitudes towards government performance. In fact, Africa's sheer geographic size and demographic content (much larger than Western Europe and the U.S.A combined) provides a richly diverse political environment suitable for testing the generalizability of non-African theories. As I mentioned in passing in my review of Western theories, Africa differs from the West in the sense that the process of democratization has been forcibly imposed and unevenly adopted across the continent in the postcolonial era. In addition, Hyden's (2006) expression of the

general view is still true: Even though African leaders still prefer control to facilitation – and they tend to react negatively to criticism, they all differ in degrees of legitimate control (as proscribed by the extant political system in each country). Partially because of these circumstances, the continent seems to lack pervasive publicly held political ideologies on the basis of which ordinary citizens can demand accountability and responsiveness from their government officials.

In fact, resulting from studies in different parts of the continent, some scholars contend that African political ideology is nonexistent (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Erdmann, 2007; Ferree 2004, 2008; Kalipeni, 1997; Lindberg, 2008). More accurately, unlike in other parts of the world there are no major prevailing ideological premises upon which African politicians establish norms and traditions in matters pertaining to public affairs. But even worse is the suggestion that the continent is philosophically challenged because of a tendency among African thinkers to privilege Western concerns, topics and problems without giving fair representation to African realities (Hallen, 2006). How can citizens of any nation engage and communicate with their governments politically if their subjective and inter-subjective lives are defined, interpreted and communicated back to them by occupiers and/or individuals in distant places around the world? How can citizens of any African nation coalesce into (a) vocal political corps that can balance and check government if post-colonial regionalism and ethnocentrism persists in African thinking?

Meanwhile, two decades after many African States gained independence, Crocker (1980) observed that only a few African governments had the capacity to implement policies to inculcate any specific set of norms within their societies. This indeterminate

quality in African politics persists today, and Crocker suggests that it may be due to the fluidity and weakened state of cultural and political institutions (p. 82). In effect, in addition to leaving individuals and collectives more vulnerable to governmental corruption and exploitation, ideological deficiencies/discord also make it even more challenging to establish institutional benchmarks of performance in public service delivery. In Western states with much longer established societal norms and expectations, institutional benchmarks are easier to determine. Furthermore, citizens have many avenues by which to express their grievances when those standards are not met.

Yet even in critiquing the continent's unsurprising lack of broad unifying philosophical grounding in Western-style politics, it is important to always remember certain circumstantial truths from the institutional perspective. Generally, as part of the colonial legacy, African governments have been denied the opportunity to develop the financial and/or technical capacity to perform well in public service delivery – let alone respond to citizens' evaluations of their performance. Hence African governments are, *de jure*, public service providers. However the *de facto* reality is that the African State is an expression of power – the power of local heads of state, and the power of neocolonialist interests abroad. Also, compared to the collective of Western nations, the government resource disparities across the continent are stark in their variation from country to country. For example, Niger with a population of 17.5 million and a GDP per capita of \$800 lags far behind nations like South Africa in development. The latter has nearly three times the population of Niger, but accrues over \$11,000 in GDP per capita per year. How do these severe discrepancies in the rate of growth and development come about?

The answer to this question is a matter of point of view. Colonial regimes undermined Africa's pre-existing socio-political structures upon arrival and over the course of the 19th Century scramble for territory on the continent. In fact, between 1876 and 1912 there may not have been as much of a scramble for Africa as much as there was a scramble *in* Africa. That is to say, the "scramble" was not just a rush to grab land and resources; it was a literal and deliberate jumbling and distorting of Africa's intellectual and cultural wealth. As Pakenham (1991, p. xxiii) observes, in a space of 35 years centuries of relatively independent socioeconomic progress were arrested and almost completely destroyed under European control. By the end of that period 10 million square miles, 110 million people, and 30 newly carved colonies were assumed European chattels. The colonialists executed a divide-and-conquer strategy, eliminated African leadership, and generally repressed African participation in governance. Not surprisingly, a century later Crocker (1980) witnessed the indeterminacy in politics and ideology among societies that had been torn apart and randomly reconstituted under new and alien rules, in a new and rapidly changing world.

Similarly insidious policies such as the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s were prescribed by the neo-colonial forces to promote "long-term economic development"; but these measures ultimately failed. The unpopular "solutions" included strengthening of incentive schemes; reviewing of investment policies; improving managerial capacity in managing the economy; encouraging domestic resource mobilization; developing and utilizing human resources effectively; and encouraging grass-roots participation in the development process (Wamalwa, 1989, p. 117). Yet since that era of administrative reform and change, government bureaucracies continue to be plagued by corruption and severe

inefficiency (Asongu, 2013; Bennell, 1997; Hamano, 2011) – and the consequences are particularly evident in public service delivery operations in many nations. In fact, Bratton (2010) observes that African citizens generally hold the view that their governments perform poorly in public service delivery. Even at the grass-roots or local levels, there is no clear pattern for (council) authorities characterized as performing “well”.

Complicating matters further in the African setting, elite theory suggests that when a political landscape is characterized by small minorities of economic elite, policy communities and networks, political power and influence is not necessarily legitimately acquired through democratic processes (Zaller & Chiu, 2000). The result is fluid and dynamic strategic behavior among leaders, which facilitates a system of conditional service provision. Scholars observe that elite capture of local power structures in Africa is facilitated by a desire among the ruling elites to create and sustain power bases in the countryside (Crook 2003; de Hart & de Sardan, 2015) Olowu, 2003). So much so that even where official decentralization programs have been implemented, most central agencies are reluctant to share significant powers with local government. To this, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) adds that high rates of poverty are required in order for clientelism to take hold. In the end, according to Khemani (2013), such places in the developing world report more vote buying and tend to have weak public service delivery performance.

Nevertheless, Bratton (2010) concurs with Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero (2008) that even in terms of voting habits, ethnicity’s relative importance is not as unambiguous as has been typically assumed. The scholars agree that public opinion (approval or disapproval) as voiced through voting depends on how people perceive their group identities. However, they observe that individuals in the dominant or influential ethnic

groups are more likely to engage in identity voting than “others”, who tend to give more weight to other interests and issues. In all probability, the latter group may be more interested in issues of socio-economic equity, cultural validation, ideological affirmation, and so on. This view suggests that contrary to broad speculations, and based on theories of group identity, there are indeed other matters of concern for Africans when it comes to evaluating government performance.

However, even though they may be keenly interested in providing government feedback, African citizens facing the threat of harsh sanctions or even death under repressive governments may be hesitant to make their opinions public. The behavioral response may also be encouraged or suppressed depending on each individuals’ expectations and personal sense of self-efficacy. In addition, Mutz’s (1989) study of the media’s effect on public opinion in South Africa affirmed that citizens are more willing to express their opinions publicly when they perceive support for their viewpoint, or when there is a greater perceived likelihood of achieving success for their issue position. There has since been similar evidence across the continent through the media’s influence in the advancement of socio-political change (Olorunnisola & Douai, 2013). As the recent Arab spring revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East have demonstrated, the internet is now a powerful addition to the communication media that bolster citizen confidence and political self-efficacy.

Despite the historical impediments to progress, the continent is now home to over 1.1 billion inhabitants (2013 est.) in 54 independent nation states; and there are thousands of indigenous ethnic groups speaking an estimated 1200 to 2500 languages. Many African individuals are also firmly established in the international community as a result of the

bridging nature of the globalization agenda, migration, and participation in different kinds of international collaborative efforts. But while many African societies have undergone significant socio-economic transformations in the past two decades, the government institutions seem stagnant within the firm grip of centralized governments and authoritarian leaders. Thus citizens are now governed by a broad spectrum of political regimes. They range from the authoritarian to the democratic, with most countries falling in the middle anocratic category.

Nevertheless and generally speaking, as African nations continue to develop, all are similar to Western states in as far as the basic systems and processes of public service delivery are concerned. As in the West, African governments have mandates to provide security, roads, schools, health services and so on; and they also do so at different levels of government. However, privatization has also been increasingly embraced in preference over the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies (Bennell, 1997). This corroborates Bratton's (2010) observation that African governments are generally perceived to perform poorly in service delivery, and there is no clear pattern for levels of authority characterized as performing "well".

But beyond simple similarities and differences between Africa and the West, some scholars concur that the behavior of African States is also driven – at least in part – by the global balance of engagement (Brown & Raddatz, 2014; Hountondji, 2002; Paul, 2005). That is to say, some African leaders can and do respond to public opinion in their respective nations, but they also face populist pressure to resist hegemonic ideals and practices – Western democracy being one of them. Hence, a third perspective on the African-Western states comparison has evolved since the 1990s. These scholars essentially take a relativist

stance. They caution that it is not always possible or reasonable to assign Western standards and criteria of thought [and action] to the African context (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Onuoha, 2011; Siegle, 2006).

It is because of all these contextual considerations that Africa presents an interesting environment in which to address citizen satisfaction from both the individuals and institutional perspectives. Matters pertaining to ideology and ethnicity, democratization and leadership play out in ways different from the way they do in the West even though the ultimate goals of public management the same. For instance, ethnicity can be a double-edged sword in public-service delivery depending on the socio-political status it imparts to an individual or collective. Thus this discussion of the African setting supports the view that contrary to broad speculations, there is indeed a wide variety of concerns and influencing factors for Africans when it comes to providing feedback to their governments on public service delivery.

3.2. Case Study: Kenya

Because citizen satisfaction theories have largely been tested in democracies, the expansion of the scope of the research to nations with a broader spectrum of experience with this concept means that it is important to try and ascertain how citizens behave as political individuals within such socio-political environments. The experimental component of this study serves to bring my analysis to the local-government level in order to determine whether citizens' political self-efficacy makes a difference in their approval or disapproval of government performance. As I have mentioned previously, my analytical approach is centered on citizens as individuals and as members of collectives. In order for

individuals to transform their satisfaction into measurable public opinion, each must at least recognize her political self-efficacy and act according to that particular level of power and influence.

Kenya is an appropriate location for conducting the survey experiment because of its middle-ground status among Africa's emerging democracies. That is to say, this country's average level of democratization and GDP per capita are the bases of its selection for this study. Chapter 4 presents the full listing of African nations that participated in Round 5 of the Afrobarometer surveys. Based on a localized PolityIV democracy scale for Sub-Saharan countries, many nations are considered anocracies or developing democracies. In that category, the modal value for the entire list of Afrobarometer countries is 8. Kenya's "average" status is therefore based on its democracy score of 8, as well as its GDP per capita of US\$ 1,700 in 2013 – which was the average value for the Afrobarometer countries in the same year.

Meanwhile additional characteristics also make this country suitable for testing the concept of self-efficacy as it relates to citizen satisfaction. While Kenya's constitution allows for civil liberties and freedoms, Kenyan citizens also encounter constraints on those freedoms, as happens in nations closer to the autocratic end of the continuum. Yet, even though the nation has had its share of civil unrest and conflict, the episodes have not been so severe as to completely collapse the public service delivery system – as has been the case in some other countries. Furthermore, as far as individuals are concerned, I do not expect Kenya to differ much from other comparable African states in terms of its social hierarchies. For example, Kenya has similar patterns of inequity to many other African nations with regards to income; gender (Iwobi, 2008; Okome, 2000); health status –

especially in terms of HIV/AIDS (Mukolo, Blevins, Victor, Vaz, Sidat & Vergara, 2013; Skinner & Mfecane, 2005); and other criteria.

While growing up in Kenya in the 1990s, I witnessed the gradual deterioration in the delivery of public services as levels of corruption and lack of civil service training severely undermined government operations. Roads became barely navigable channels of craters and chasms; public school facilities fell into disrepair; and other public services suffered similar neglect. Meanwhile, there was virtually no effort on the part of the highly centralized government to solicit performance feedback from citizens. In this state of low political self-efficacy, Kenyans learned to simply adapt to increasingly difficult circumstances. Yet while government responsiveness has improved with the present and previous administrations and citizen participation has continued to grow, there remain persistent vestiges of repressive politics and the culture of fear that characterized the Moi administration. Hence I seek to understand whether such regional political nuances have a significant effect on how citizens respond to government performance.

However, because the Kenyan government has recently undergone radical structural changes through constitutional reform and administrative devolution, it is necessary to begin with a brief history of government and public service delivery in the country. In addition, it is important to note that my assessment focuses on Members of Parliament (MPs) as the responsible elected representatives of interest. This is because this study's survey conducted in January 2014 reveals that at that time the newly installed county governors and their administrations had not fully adjusted into their official roles within their respective jurisdictions. Consequently, because MPs had previously overseen constituencies, and continued to technically do so through the transition into the new

structure, these elected representatives retained powerful influence over outcomes in government performance at the local government level.

3.2.1. A Brief History of Governance in Kenya

During Kenya's colonial era (prior to 1963), local authorities were created to facilitate governance by the British colonial administration. Citizen participation was not part of the design. The "representatives" of the people or Native Authorities were appointees of the Provincial Commissioner or Governor, and their decision-making was subject to these officers' approval (Muia et al. 2010). At this time, the officially appointed headmen of villages or groups of villages were, nevertheless, supposed to maintain law and order, collect taxes, maintain roads in their areas, and settle minor disputes among Africans.

Meanwhile, the central government issued grants to the local authorities to finance local public service delivery (Smoke 1994). It was not until ten years after the enactment of the District Councils Ordinance in 1928, that Africans were first elected as councilors in their Local Native Councils. In 1950, these became known as African District Councils. Yet even with increased representation, the initial superior-subordinate relationship between the central government and local authorities persisted (Muia et al., 2010; Oyugi, 2000; Smoke, 1993; Stamp, 1986; Wunsch, 2001); and it endured until the 2013 general elections that saw the introduction of devolved county governments.

As illustrated in figure 3.1, Kenya's parliament is now a bicameral house consisting of a National Assembly and a Senate. The National Assembly has 349 members in total. Article 95 of the Constitution stipulates that 290 members are to be elected by the registered

voters. Each constituency is a single member jurisdiction led by an MP, and these officials are mandated to facilitate and promote the development of their respective jurisdictions. In tandem, the Senate or upper house consists of 67 members. Article 98 states that the Senate shall comprise of 47 members, each elected by the registered voters of their respective counties and each representing a single-member jurisdiction. Both the MPs and Senators serve 5-year terms. However MPs are now limited to their roles in local government and may not serve as Ministers in the President's cabinet.




Figure 3.1: New structure of the Kenya government

3.3. Overview of Study Approach

In view of the limitations of the Afrobarometer survey, the cross-national assessment is an opportunity to explore the individuals dimension using conventional attribute variables such as those that have been tested in the West (age, income, education, occupation). However, the Kenya survey experiment lends deeper insight into the drivers of citizen satisfaction beyond what is feasible at the cross-national level. The survey is designed to sensitize respondents to their subjective sense of political self-efficacy through sets of priming questions. As each respondent in the treatment group experiences these priming questions subjectively, they are expected to attach that experience of heightened awareness to the rest of their responses to the survey.

As I have mentioned previously, studies on citizen satisfaction tend to treat individuals as an ecological level; and they tend to only account for their readily perceivable personal attributes. Yet each citizen is a product of both those personal attributes and personal socio-political experiences and relationships. Therefore because there are potentially myriad such telling attributes and experiences in any single individual – perhaps too numerous to capture and study empirically – I use theoretical guidelines to attempt to isolate potential determinants of satisfaction. The factors themselves are identifiable among known socio-political phenomena that affect individuals both discretely and as members of specified collectives or communities. Political self-efficacy is an example of such an under-investigated socio-political phenomenon.

In addition, because I am exploring Africa's diverse socio-political environment, the other contextually-relevant independent variable (as used in the cross-national analysis) in the individuals dimension are ethnicity and co-ethnicity. As has been discussed in the

Africa context, modernist theories on the politicization of cultural difference suggest that ethnicity can be a strong determinant of citizen satisfaction. In this view economic advancement and satisfactory development are possible but contingent on sharing the culture of the group that dominates the state or society (Collier & Garg, 1999; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Thus this premise suggests that in public choice decision-making individuals support or better trust the consensus candidate of their own ethnicity, or candidates from allied ethnicities (Bates, 1974; Horowitz, 2000; Pleskovic & Stiglitz, 1998; Putnam, 1995).

Put another way, co-ethnicity may moderate criticism among members of the same group and facilitate more satisfaction. In addition, individuals may stand to gain materially and/socio-politically if they support those with whom they share kinship and patrilineal ties (Kramon & Posner, 2013). Particularly in ethnically homogenous areas with very high rates of political participation, elections generate pressures and incentives to demonstrate approval of “one’s own people”. This is why, in summary, this survey experiment not only addresses an individual’s attributes, but it also attempts to capture a glimpse of each individual’s unique socio-political context.

In a broad sense, both levels of analysis are expected to produce results with theoretical implications for political and administrative research, as well as institutional policy-making in government performance management. Yet unlike in the cross-national analysis, the Kenya case study is an attempt to determine how individual attributes and individual-specific socio-political realities compare in terms of citizen satisfaction trends. Capturing individuals’ socio-political contexts in this manner gives a sense of those citizens’ internal political sentiments, which they may or may not reveal directly in formal

evaluation surveys. It is those attitudes that are expected to have the highest consequence for whether or not citizens transform their (dis)satisfaction into public opinion.

3.4. Overview of Methodology

In order to supplement the development of my analytical framework, this study seeks guidelines from theories of behavioral psychology, and economic theories of the individual. The dominant dimensions in this study characterize political, institutional, individual and contextual factors that influence citizen satisfaction with government performance in public service delivery. These are the fundamental areas of concern in the causal model. But to achieve my primary goals, I investigate the determinants and congruence of citizen satisfaction in a two-tiered mixed-methods analysis – that is, one multilevel analysis and one experimental analysis. In both of these, survey data is used to obtain citizen’s subjective perspectives on public service delivery. The expectation for the final outcome is that the dependent variable – that is citizens’ subjective approval or disapproval of government performance, has a positive correlation with “objective” measures of government performance.

In the first section, I conduct a cross-sectional assessment of citizen satisfaction with public schools and road services in 35 African nations. The second analytical section is an experimental study of citizens’ approval/disapproval of the same two public services in Kenya. This level of analysis allows for a finer-tuned assessment that will serve to enrich the findings in the cross-national analysis. Further, the results are worth comparing to Bratton (2010), and Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi’s (2005) findings as they are based

on the same extensive Afrobarometer dataset. In a sense, these scholars' work is an early forerunner in this topic – even though their studies were limited to only those countries that were part of the surveys preceding the fifth round. Nevertheless, in the end both analyses should concur or paint the same picture of citizen satisfaction, in at least a general sense.

In the disciplinary perspective, while political science is concerned with the broad ideological bases and behavioral expressions of citizen satisfaction, public management is interested in nuts and bolts outputs, outcomes, and feedback in as far as they apply to citizens and the institutions that serve them. Put differently, it is the public management view that is concerned with maintaining or improving upon standards of performance management and quality assurance. Nevertheless, both disciplines offer plausible propositions on determinants of citizen satisfaction with government performance, particularly when they include the theoretical insights established in Psychology and Economics. The conflation of disciplines, theories, and the two levels of analysis occurs most appropriately in the discussion of the policy-making value of this study.

Thus because my approach to this assessment of citizen satisfaction includes theoretical insights from both Political Science and Public Management, this dependent variable must reflect the language and nuances of the concept in both disciplines. As discussed in the second chapter, citizen satisfaction is a subjective judgment, and the initial response to service delivery. However, as long as this initial response remains personal or is otherwise not expressed publicly, it is of no use to performance management and policymaking. The expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction to unfamiliar persons is what basically constitutes public opinion. This expression manifests in a variety of forms. Therefore, while the Public Management view is primarily concerned with how

performance relates to citizen satisfaction, Political Science considers the implications of citizens expressing that satisfaction as public opinion.

Policy analysis translates public opinion and its correlations into useful information that can help with future political strategy and policy implementation. However, institutional stakeholders are typically interested in understanding whether the citizens *currently* have either a positive or a negative attitude towards government. This is essentially what citizens communicate when they choose to vote one way or another; or when they choose to protest or not to protest; or when they choose to provide feedback in polls and surveys. The following two chapters depict my methods in first, the Africa study, and then the Kenya survey experiment.

CHAPTER 4: AFRICA STUDY

4.1. Introduction

In this cross-national assessment, survey data on satisfaction is derived from the Afrobarometer Survey. This survey is a product of the combined efforts of several international non-governmental and development organizations, as well as institutions of higher learning. The project is administered by Michigan State University and is funded by: the Mo Ibrahim Foundation; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); Department for International Development (DfID), UK; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and the World Bank, among others. Afrobarometer rounds began in the late 1990s, and the survey is now the most consistently conducted, extensive, and widely used survey of its kind in Africa; and it provides questions suitable for assessing citizen satisfaction across the continent.

The question used in Afrobarometer surveys to determine citizens' views of their governments' performance in the delivery of services asks respondents:

65. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?

The specific matters related to public school and road services are:

H. addressing educational needs

N. maintaining roads and bridges

These two services were selected because of their accessibility to a wide segment of the population. Most people interact with roads and/or schools frequently over the courses of their routine lives. The services were also selected because they have readily tangible or conspicuous outputs. Thus, the questionnaire asks respondents to rate their views as: very

badly, badly, fairly well, or very well. The respondents can also submit an “I don’t know” or “No response” answer. Respondents who preferred not to answer or who expressed lack of sufficient knowledge are excluded from the regression analyses as it is assumed that they have no public opinion in the manner of citizen evaluation to communicate to their service providers.

Upon determining the respondents’ sentiments, I consider what that measure means for the causal flow that ends in public opinion expressed as a formal evaluation of government performance. Fuchs and Pfetsch (1996) observe that public opinion concerns citizens communicating their interests and demands, approval and disapproval, to government officials and elected representatives. Fitzgerald and Durant (1980) also concur that public opinion derives from the individual citizen’s desire to exert some influence on government. Government’s responsiveness to citizen approval or disapproval, on the other hand, is contingent upon several internal and external factors including public opinion itself. This interaction reminds us that there is an endogenous relationship between performance and opinion. For example, one may ask: Is a local government’s road service performance considered “high” because citizen opinion is positive; or is citizen opinion positive because the road service performance is *actually* high? This study utilizes a model that accounts for prior performance in order to address this potential for mutual causality between the objective and subjective measures of government performance.

4.2. Multilevel Analysis of 34 African countries

The methodological approach employed in this study is determined by the primary research questions and hypotheses, as well as the nature of the data itself. Monte Carlo

studies with known populations and different testing techniques have demonstrated that multi-level modeling (MLM) can illuminate variability in nested data in cases where there is no apparent mathematical dependence or covariance between different levels. The technique is preferred for this study over alternative approaches because even when samples are relatively small it produces better parameter estimates. Thus STATA 14 is used for data management and analysis. The statistical tools are essentially used to detect directional patterns for statistically significant variables between and within countries, along with the important drivers of citizens' responses to road and school services.

While authors such as Bryan and Jenkins (2015) and Maas and Hox (2005) caution about the effects of small sample sizes (less than 50) in multilevel models, many country studies are constrained by the natural numbers in which groupings occur. Therefore in terms of the contextual analysis of the Africa study, multilevel estimates on the effects of the different country-specific socio-political contexts must be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless unlike ordinary least squares regression, MLM does capture hierarchical relationships among groups. Hence, the primary goal of an MLM analysis is to obtain parameter estimates based on independent variables functioning at more than one ecological level.

The explanatory power of MLM statistical inferences depends on sample size, research design elements, variance estimates, and the specific research questions and structural proposition associated with the dependent variable. In fact, large level 1 samples are needed for adequate power in MLM studies. In this, the number of individuals within each country included is more important than the number of measurement occasions per individual. It is also preferable to have as many countries as possible at the second level of

the multi-level hierarchy; and reliability of aggregated variables increases as the number of individuals per country increases. Thus the logic of MLM stipulates that the coefficients describing individual-level phenomena are estimated for each country measurement.

The Afrobarometer survey itself is conducted in phases or “rounds” in which citizens views are used to measure the social, political, and economic climate in Africa. At present, 5 rounds have been completed, and I have selected the thirty-four round 5 countries that were surveyed between 2011 and 2013. Table 4.1 below shows the sample countries’ descriptive statistics and democratic levels. The Afrobarometer project uses survey instruments that ask a standard set of questions in order to allow comparison among countries. It is also possible to track general trends by country over time. However, the rounds are not conducted simultaneously and the information is not panel data as respondents are randomly selected in each iteration. In fact, the survey uses clustered and stratified random selection techniques with probability proportionate to (country) population size. This is done so that large and small countries are proportionally represented in the national sample.

Table 4.1: Afrobarometer survey country descriptive statistics

Country	Round 5	Population (millions)	Area ('000s of km)	GDP per capita ('000s of \$)	Urbanization (% population)	Polity score (2013)
Algeria	2013	38.8	2.3	7.5	73.0	2
Benin	2011	10.6	112.6	1.5	44.9	7
Botswana	2012	2.2	581.7	15.9	61.7	8
Burkina Faso	2012	18.4	274.2	1.4	26.5	0
Burundi	2012	10.4	27.8	0.6	10.9	6
Cameroon	2013	23.1	475.4	2.4	52.1	-4
Cape Verde	2011	0.5	4.0	4.4	62.6	10
Côte d'Ivoire	2013	22.8	322.5	1.8	51.3	4
Egypt	2013	86.9	1,001.5	6.6	43.5	-3
Ethiopia	2013	96.6	1,104.3	1.3	17.0	-3
Ghana	2012	25.8	238.5	3.4	51.9	8
Guinea	2013	11.5	245.9	1.1	35.4	1
Kenya	2011	45.0	580.4	1.7	24.0	8
Lesotho	2012	1.9	30.4	2.2	27.6	8
Liberia	2012	4.1	111.4	0.7	48.2	6
Madagascar	2013	23.2	587.0	1.0	32.6	3
Malawi	2012	17.4	118.5	0.9	15.7	8
Mali	2012	16.5	1,240.2	1.1	34.9	5
Mauritius	2012	1.3	2.0	15.6	41.8	10
Morocco	2013	33.0	446.6	5.5	57.0	-4
Mozambique	2012	24.7	799.4	1.2	31.2	5
Namibia	2012	2.2	824.3	7.9	38.4	6
Niger	2013	17.5	1,300.0	0.8	17.8	4
Nigeria	2013	177.2	923.8	2.8	49.6	4
Senegal	2013	13.6	196.7	2.1	42.5	7
Sierra Leone	2012	5.7	71.7	1.3	39.2	7
South Africa	2011	48.4	1,214.5	11.3	62.0	9
Swaziland	2013	1.4	17.4	5.7	21.2	-9
Tanzania	2012	49.6	947.3	1.6	26.7	-1
Togo	2012	7.4	56.8	1.1	38.0	-2
Tunisia	2013	10.9	163.6	9.9	66.3	6
Uganda	2012	35.9	241.0	1.4	15.6	-1
Zambia	2013	14.6	752.6	1.8	39.2	7
Zimbabwe	2012	13.8	390.8	0.6	38.6	1

(Source: World Bank)

Sample sizes in each country range from 1200 to 2400 respondents. The survey includes people aged 18 and older, except for individuals living in institutions. When this data is incorporated into my analytical framework, the multilevel approach is expected to help improve the quality of the inferences. As stated earlier, the approach calls for the nesting of the units of analysis within higher level units of analysis – in this case individuals within countries. This means that unlike in single-level regression modelling, it is possible to simultaneously capture the contextual effects of the higher level on the lower level while using that lower level to avoid ecological fallacies that can result from relying entirely on aggregated data at the higher level. The two analytical levels in this study and their specific hypotheses are the subjects of detailed discussion in the following subsections.

4.3. Hypotheses

i. Institutions and the Country Level of Assessment

Objective measures of government performance in public service delivery are performance management measures. They may be conducted by the government as an internal effort aimed at quality assurance; or the government may be evaluated by independent professional evaluators. For the purposes of this study, objective measures are central to identifying drivers and congruity in citizen satisfaction because they provide a benchmark on which to gauge citizens' opinions and thereby impart "meaning" to their subjective assessments. This study is therefore not concerned with whether performance is high or low *per se*, but whether citizen's opinions mirror the trends in objective performance measures. If citizens' evaluations are on average congruent with objective

measures of performance, it means that citizens are reliable sources for government performance feedback.

Some studies have found a lack of correlation between citizen perceptions and objective measures, while other analysts believe the relationship is “tenuous” at best. Yet Brudney and England (1982, p.129) summarized the latter eventuality as such: “The tenuous relationship between subjective and objective indicators of service performance may be a function of the type and quality of objective output measures employed in research, rather than limitations inherent in subjective service evaluations themselves.” In light of such and other mixed views, I conclude that a comparison of subjective and objective measures of government performance is necessary in the African study, in addition to identifying the most important determinants of public opinion. I hypothesize that:

H_{1A}: Citizens are more likely to approve of government performance in countries where objective measures of that performance have improved over the past year.

Nevertheless, it is also important to acknowledge that despite recent improvements, different countries in Africa are at different levels of development. As previously mentioned by example, South Africa and Niger have a significant gap in their GDPs per capita. This means that the level of infrastructure development and education is not comparable given the fact that one nation has significantly more economic resources than the other. This observation leads to the expectation that:

H_{2A}: Citizens are more likely to approve of government performance in countries where government performance is actually high and disapprove where it is actually low.

This is to say that nations with high GDPs tend to also have higher performance in public service provision because of the availability of resources. Those nations should have citizens who have positive sentiments about government performance compared to those who live in countries that have fewer resources and therefore lower performance.

Meanwhile, democracy in its many forms imposes varying degrees of constraints on leadership and institutions. Furthermore the democratization process is generally uneven in Africa. This has meant that some government agencies operate in the liberal atmosphere of representative democracies while others are constrained by totalitarian democratic rulers. Bureaucratic theory affirms that for public servants working under conditions of high political stress or pressure from their principals, performance tends to be suboptimal. I therefore also investigate the concept of democracy from the institutional perspective in order to determine whether higher levels of democracy affect organizational performance, and eventually citizen satisfaction. In this, I expect that:

H_{3A}: The more democratic a nation is the more citizens approve of government performance.

The next variable in the model is managerial quality, which scholars observe has a positive relationship with government performance (Avellaneda, 2009; Ingraham, Joyce & Kneedler, 2003; Meier & O'Toole, 2002) and ultimately citizen satisfaction (Im & Lee, 2012), albeit with certain context-driven variations in the strength of that relationship. This is a relatively intuitive variable in the sense that it is reasonable to expect that a public service manager with strong leadership and management skills will have a department or organization that performs well. However, managerial quality scholars dig deeper in trying to determine what specific attributes in those successful managers can be empirically

associated with high performance. Even though this is yet another area of study that remains contentious but rich with models and frameworks, the commonly assessed managerial attributes are age, education, leadership tenure, and past experience. Doig and Hargrove (1987) find that the ideal manager has to have, at a minimum, skills that are a good match for their organizational tasks. Hill & Lynn (2009) add that personality and favorable historical conditions are also necessary to complete the picture.

Yet in terms of public services, one may question who the “manager” in question is. Hill and Lynn (Ibid., p. 238) observe that institutional success is also contingent on the extent and nature of the constraints managerial discretion. For Africa, I assume that heads-of-state still greatly influence their government power structures, even though some may do so more benignly or more discretely than others. Hence, at the cross-national analysis, HOGs mostly in the manner of presidents, are considered responsible for the *aggregated* measures of their civil services’ public service delivery performance. Considering the four main managerial-quality factors together, I hypothesize that:

H_{4A}: The higher an HOGs managerial qualities, the more likely citizens are to approve of government performance in public service delivery.

An associated factor regarding HOGs is their popularity with citizens. On a continent where the expectation is that ethnic-politics hold sway in citizens’ attitudes, it is necessary to control for whether the HOGS’ level of popularity has any impact on citizens’ satisfaction with public service delivery. In this the expectation is that the higher an HOGs margin of victory in a country’s prior election, the more likely citizens are to approve of government performance in public service delivery. The reasoning behind this view is that if a leader is popular, she may be effective in her job and therefore generate optimism

among her citizens. Alternatively, she may be effective and actually improve public service delivery, and thereby garner citizens' approval.

Meanwhile, IFIs and (I)NGOs are important in facilitating citizen participation in evaluation of public service delivery. These agencies assist in the distribution of resources and services, and are often important pillars of governance where local public institutions perform particularly poorly. The immediate and sometimes dramatically life-saving impact of both domestic and international NGOs on the continent is often evident where they are involved in grassroots development projects or high profile relief missions. Donor monies is therefore an approximate – but not a precise measure – of the extent to which donors supplement African government budgets and indirectly contribute towards public service delivery. Many of these organizations certainly co-produce schools and roads, and many among those may not operate in ways that are readily obvious to the public. But if they positively affect public service delivery; or if they effectively supplement government efforts, then:

H_{5A}: The higher the NGO/IFI aid allocations to a country as a percent of GDP, the more likely citizens are to approve of government performance in public service delivery.

Also at the country/institutional level this study controls for contextual factors that are expected to influence citizens' satisfaction with government performance. These contextual factors are commonly assessed country characteristics that have a demonstrated impact on socio-economic and political affairs in other studies. They are: percent of urban population, poverty rate, and population density. The typical insinuations of these variables are that countries with more resources and low populations fare better than any combination of the two circumstances. That is to say, citizens in countries with high urban

populations are likely to disapprove of government performance in public service delivery compared to those in countries with low urban populations. Meanwhile, citizens in countries with high population densities are likely to disapprove of government performance in public service delivery compared to those in countries with low population densities. With regards to poverty rates, citizens in countries with high poverty rates are also likely to disapprove of government performance in public service delivery compared to those in countries with low poverty rates.

ii. Individuals and the Individual Level of Assessment

Also relevant for Africa's potential determinants of citizen satisfaction with government performance is co-ethnicity. Unlike in Western nations, race does not apply in the relatively racially homogenous African political environment. Ethnicity has far greater weight in public affairs, even though the extent of that continues to be debated. As a result, I assess this variable in terms of the respondents' ethnic relation, or lack thereof, with their nations' HOGs. As discussed previously, these are the individuals considered the visible and accessible public managers who are responsible for their nations' overall performance in public service delivery. The "conventional wisdom" and norms on the continent indicate that there are benefits to be gained from belonging to ethnic groups led by powerful or dominant elected officials. I therefore test the following hypothesis expecting a positive relationship:

H_{6A}: Citizens who are co-ethnics of the incumbent HOGs are more likely to approve of government performance in public service delivery than those who are not.

Similar to co-ethnicity, political affiliation is thought by some observers to have similar effects on citizen approval or disapproval of government performance. Some studies suggest that citizens with greater voting power tend to enjoy better policy representation. Furthermore, the rewards of voting are even greater for those belonging to groups with higher voting power. However, unlike in the case of co-ethnicity whereby the top bureaucrat is held responsible for performance on the basis of obligations to kinfolk, co-partisanship addresses electoral influences. In matters of national interest, it has been shown that the HOG is more visible than her ministers as the center of authority (Edwards & Wood, 1999). In addition, as an election winner, a head-of-government probably belongs to a party with high voting power. Consequently, those who vote for the HOG may enjoy better policy representation than those who do not. Therefore, since voting power and representation vary across party lines, I will also test the co-partisanship variable with the expectation that:

H_{7A}: Citizens who are co-partisans of the incumbent HOG are more likely to approve of government performance than those who are not.

Yet even as I expect co-partisanship to play a role in shaping citizens' attitudes towards government performance in public service delivery, it is worth determining whether the inclination to vote also shapes citizens' public opinion. In this instance, citizens who perceive higher personal political voice may be more inclined to vote. This propensity itself, may be an indicator of the individuals' tendency towards approval or disapproval of their governments' performance. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is associated with the concept of managing expectations (James, 2009; van Ryzin, 2004). These studies concur that performance minus expectations is positively correlated with satisfaction; and

the reverse applies. That is to say, a government is likely to be perceived positively by citizens who start out with low or no expectations. However, once they acquire positive and normative expectations of where the performance level will and/or should be, satisfaction with those services depends on whether those expectations were confirmed or disconfirmed. Hence, because factors such as information, past experiences, expectations, and actual performance shape voter choice, I expect that voting citizens approach performance evaluation similarly equipped with information and expectations. Consequently this variable's hypothesis is bidirectional in anticipation of unknown mediators. Hence:

H_{8A}: Citizens who vote in elections are more likely to approve of government performance than those who do not vote;

and:

H_{9A}: Citizens who vote in elections are less likely to approve of government performance than those who do not vote.

Because of the potential influence of issue salience in shaping citizens' approval or disapproval with public services, it is important to also consider the role this factor plays at the individual level across the African nations included in this study. While it is possible to simply scour media sources for issues that are making headlines, issue salience is a variable more correctly considered from the perspective of citizens in order to suit the purposes of this study. This is in keeping with MacKuen's (1981) view that media agenda setting effects does not simply create fixed levels of salience of issues, but rather it drives the salience among individuals up and down over time. MacKuen's observation means that each individual potentially ranks each issue at a different level of salience whether or not

the issue is receiving broad media coverage. Therefore, my hypothesis for issue salience is:

H_{10A}: Citizens are less likely to approve of highly salient services than they are of low or non-salient services.

In terms of control factors, the sources and frequency of mass media access is also considered in this study as a determinant of citizen approval/disapproval of government performance. Scholars agree that the media plays a critical role in shaping publics' attitudes. The media is constantly engaged in framing and reframing the news in response to the often competing interests of leaders and the public. In fact there is a view that the media is nothing more than a "conveyor belt" on which elite views are passed on to the public (Jentleson, 1992; Zaller & Chiu, 2000). Therefore some authors argue that the general public relies on elite opinion (especially that of trusted elites) as a shortcut in information gathering. It is therefore valid to argue that opinion developed from media exposure is anything but the public's opinion.

Yet citizens with access to external views of their country's affairs are likely to reflect views different from those who are mainly exposed to local media. However, there is a challenge inherent with measuring media exposure. The first is that in a political environment with no clear ideological bent, it is difficult to categorize people on the basis of the media they prefer to access. Media houses may favor the government to a greater or lesser extent, yet it is not clear that African's access the biased media any less than the more objective sources. Meanwhile, in recent years, the internet has proven to be a powerful interactive political tool – as was the case in the Arab Spring revolutions. Internet access is now available on hand held devices, especially cell phones, which have been

extensively embraced in many African countries by citizens of all socio-economic backgrounds. Thus while many citizens may still lack computer hardware to get on the web, a growing number can communicate online and browse web spaces that may depict better conditions abroad and thus stimulate unfavorable views in citizens' evaluations. Consequently, this study accounts for whether citizens with internet access are less likely to approve of government provision of public service delivery than those without.

The negative direction of this hypothesis is based on the manner in which the question was framed in the Afrobarometer survey. Given that respondents are asked to rank important *problems*, they are likely to be predisposed to disapprove of these policy areas. That is to say, the highest salient issues are probably the biggest problems.

Age, education, income, occupation, and rural/urban residence will also be included in this study as control variables at the individual level. In fact, Hollingshead's (2011) survey of the literature reveals that occupation, education, and area of residence were once perceived as the most important factors that determine social status. Since then, the list has been revised to four: education, occupation, sex, and marital status. Nevertheless, each of these variables has returned different results in different studies around the world. As in other places, determinants such as education and occupation seem to have an ambiguous relationship with citizen satisfaction in Africa. On one hand, it is reasonable to expect that persons with, for example, adequate formal or informal education, will have the cognitive skills and a reasonable degree of objectivity to congruently/consistently evaluate government performance. On the other hand, individuals with advantaged attributes can be just as vulnerable to biases and socio-political pressures as other members of their communities – even if in different forms and with different consequences.

Furthermore, the people who occupy positions of wealth and/or professional authority in Africa are subject to the tension between private and personal interests, and their associations with elites may lead them into bias for or against the government. Yet even this is not necessarily predictable as relationships of power can shift and transform over time. Similarly, it is not necessarily clear why African women should evaluate public services differently from men. Studies in the West suggest that women have a tendency to demonstrate concern for, among other things, issues pertaining to gender and family affairs. However, without definitively ascertaining this to be factual based on empirical analysis, it is impossible to assume that men are not as much concerned about public education.

Finally, it is not apparent that marital status alone as a familial attribute should influence citizens' satisfaction with public service delivery in Africa. The literature suggests that ethnicity and patrilineal ties play an important part in African politics. This means that influence is exerted to varying degrees by husbands, brothers, and other male relatives in the many traditionally patriarchal communities. Therefore, this study assumes that all respondents are at least cognitively independent and form their own opinions. This is as opposed to acting out other individuals views – even though this is certainly possibly albeit to an unknowable extent.

4.4. Variables and Measures

i. Institutions

As mentioned previously, in both parts of this study's analysis, schools and roads are included as the services of interest for at least two reasons. Roads and schools are

services used or experienced by most citizens, and which provide accessible performance information either through exposure or various information sources including the media, non-profits, and the governments themselves. While there have been attempts at decentralization, the process has been unevenly implemented in terms of form and function (Conyers, 2007). In fact Conyers points out that because Africa is large and diverse, it is impossible to draw broad generalizations on the developments in each country. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, elite capture in most African countries has meant that public services may be produced by local governments and contractors, but they are still controlled by the central ruling elites through funding, and through appointed and elected officials at the local level.

In addition, the specific services selected for this study are not coproduced with citizens. These services are selected because government funded agencies and the necessary professionals and contractors are responsible for providing and producing the services – even though citizens may be called upon from time-to-time to raise funds for specific projects. In other service areas such as parks and recreation, health care and so on, citizens ideally take active part in service production in order to realize their benefits. For example, citizens are required to respect public spaces such as parks in order to keep them usable for everyone; and citizens are certainly integral to maintaining their own health and material well-being.

Nevertheless, it is not clear whether citizens respond with more satisfaction to government or to coproduced services. Ostensibly, when government services are coproduced with non-governmental agencies, the information is not necessarily apparent to citizens. Meanwhile, if the coproduction occurs with citizens – such as in parks and

recreation, and health care – they tend to be very local. That is to say they are local to a geographic region, or local to the individual citizen. Citizens may look after their local parks and their personal health but it is difficult to tie those activities to conscious government service coproduction as opposed to “looking out for one’s interests.” Unfortunately, determining how/whether service co-production influences citizen satisfaction requires an in-depth inquiry within the broader context of decentralization.

Therefore within the constraints of this study, in order to answer the question on citizens’ responses to government performance, it is necessary to exclude coproduced services in order to avoid the contamination of the relationship between the results of government operations, and citizens’ contributions and subsequent feelings about the results. Organizational theorists and practitioners in the field concur that ideal performance measures possess the following attributes at a minimum: (1) they reflect both citizen and institutional needs; (2) they are measurable and understandable; (3) they can be interpreted uniformly; (4) they are generalizable; and (5) they provide a basis upon which decisions can be made.

Nevertheless, some scholars have pointed out that there are still challenges in identifying “objective measures” and policy success (Boyne, 2003; McConnell, 2010; Oliver, 2010). Boyne observes that it is important to ask questions such as: For whom are the measures objective? Are there variations across time, space, and culture? What are the effects of methodological approaches and techniques? It is therefore important to identify performance criteria that affect citizen evaluators, and which communicate the construct in a language sensitive to the respondent’s literary skills. It is also worth mentioning that because of Africa’s political climate, study measures derived from non-governmental

entities are more likely (even though it is not guaranteed) to produce unbiased or uncompromised data compared to that from government agencies auditing themselves.

Furthermore, as discussed previously, it is important for my citizen satisfaction framework to make use of measures that are standardized across nations in order to facilitate comparison of satisfaction responses across countries. For these reasons, the criterion assessed in this study is effectiveness. As I mentioned earlier, on a continent arguably overwhelmed by the vices of poor governance and corruption, the realization of public services or effective delivery probably precedes how efficiently those services were delivered – at least in the minds of end-user citizens. In addition, criteria such as equity, quality, timeliness, and responsiveness belie heterogeneity among citizens in terms of tastes, needs, and preferences. In fact, the subjectivity of perceptions with regards to performance measurement is part of the reason why it is difficult to establish benchmarks for performance on the bases of these criteria.

Effectiveness in public service delivery is therefore adopted in this study as it concerns the outputs of the public services – in this case, schools and roads. Using World Bank statistical data, I derive my country-level objective measures of school services performance from the core indicators reported by that organization. The World Bank's EdStats' core dataset contains several internationally-comparable education indicators. The data includes 200 nations and tracks trends (where data is available) starting in 1970 to date. Unfortunately not all countries in sub-Saharan Africa have had consistent data points up to and through the study period. Thus my model specifically accounts for percentage of GDP expenditure on school services. Literacy rate as a percent of the population aged 15

and over who can read is also included in order to account for each country's "starting-point" relative to the other countries within the study's time-frame.

To be clear, Africa continues to suffer under political corruption and mismanagement. Therefore when money is actually spent on its targeted policies that in itself is a measure of effective governance because it means that resources were spent on the target population as opposed to disappearing into officials' pockets or other channels. On the other hand, the literacy rate demonstrates the effectiveness of each nation's education system in using its resources to produce a technically-apt workforce and a culturally enriched society. Hence the expectations are that the higher the expenditures on educational facilities, teaching materials and teacher salaries, the higher the quality of education must be. This should then be corroborated with a high literacy rate. Thus if both of these conditions are true in a given country, citizens should express overall satisfaction with their country's public education services.

Meanwhile, road services are considered in terms of costs to taxpayers, and the work done. That is to say, I measure government performance in road services delivery in terms of: government expenditures on road services as a percent of GDP; and the length of those roads which are paved. This data is available from the World Bank and the United Nations; and just as with school services, the objective measures are also selected for better consistency in reporting over time. This is because this service area also suffers from limitations in the availability of data for each study country in the Afrobarometer survey period. Yet while it is impossible to gauge each paved road for its quality and durability, given the aggregated nature of the cross-national analysis, I assume that the higher the percentage of paved roads, the higher the number of citizens who are within reach of other

government services, and commercial amenities. I expect that this may ultimately serve to increase citizen satisfaction with their governments' performance in that public service sector.

Meanwhile, African nations' levels of democratization are also expected to have an impact on the effectiveness of government institutions in public service delivery. Government agencies working under authoritarian regimes may operate ineffectively with poor quality results. Yet the same despotic manipulation or oppression that undermines performance can transform public agencies into well-oiled and smooth running machines regardless of the outcomes for citizens. Hence the PolityIV index is a commonly used democracy index developed by the Polity IV project of the George Mason University Center for Global Policy, and the Center for Systemic Peace. It is sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force.

In the Polity IV index, the scale is derived from weighted coding of the following elements: political participation; the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; and constraints on the chief executive. The higher the score, the more "mature and internally coherent" the democracy (Codebook, p. 14). The Polity score itself is calculated by subtracting an autocracy score from a democracy score; and it ranges from -10 to +10. By focusing on citizen participation and the constraints on executive powers, this index sufficiently captures the concept of democracy as a country-level environmental determinant of government performance. It informs us in relative terms of the conditions in a country's governmental principal-agent relations, as well as the *de facto* authority of the nation's "top manager".

Meanwhile, managerial quality imparts perceptible effects on service delivery output and therefore possibly impacts citizen satisfaction. In fact, in addition to personal biases and/or political interests, certain qualities have been shown to be most valuable in managing public agencies. For example, long-lived, experienced and/or well-educated managers tend to oversee institutions that are likely to perform better than those with inexperienced and/or under-qualified managers. I therefore include variables that have been shown to be particularly influential as far as organizational output is concerned.

Through their cabinet ministers or corps of advisors, the heads-of-government can set administrative agendas, and thereby affect what services are delivered, how, and to whom. They can run highly centralized administrations, or they can delegate responsibility in varying degrees to other officials. In any case, the course of action is a managerial decision. Yet, as managerial quality is a multifaceted concept, I identify the most promising managerial quality attributes – specifically the leader’s age, education, occupation, and years of experience in public management. From these I create a variable that reflects both a manager’s technical qualifications for the job, as well as factors that may boost or degrade her image in citizens’ eyes.

In Africa, as in many parts of the world, age, gender, level of education, and profession or occupation are personal attributes that determine an individual’s social status or ranking. If private citizens judge each other based on such attributes, it is reasonable to assume that they do the same for their leaders. In fact, the shortage of women and relatively young politicians among HOGs on the continent suggests that Africans still perceive age and masculinity to be closely associated with leadership or managerial ability. I therefore

include heads-of-government and their personal attributes in the model as an additive index called managerial quality. This index is calculated as such:

$$MnQ = A + E + C + S$$

where A is age in years – expressed as a dummy variable where individuals aged 50 and older are assigned a value of 1; E is education level expressed as a dummy variable in which 1 represents post-graduate education and higher; C is occupation – public management or non-public-management related, and also expressed as a dummy; and S is years in government service in a managerial capacity. Individuals who have exceeded the average number of years for the HOGs in this study are assigned a value of 1.

All the conditions related to the value of 1 in the managerial quality index are the preferred qualities for the HOG as a manager. Therefore for example, a HOG that accrues a score of 3 out of 4 is assumed to be 75% “ideal” compared to one who only accrues 2 points or 50% of the criteria. This is a standardization approach that allows for broad comparability without having to account for between-country differences in aspects such as the quality of education received by the manager, or the occupational classification system in use within any particular country. The equal weighting of the criteria also creates a balance in the “most valued” characteristics in a manager, as this is bound to vary from country to country. That is to say, some countries’ citizens may value a more mature-in-age leader, while others may be more concerned with the individual’s level of education.

In addition, if citizens are treated as dimensions, so too should the HOGs. Leaders’ socio-cultural sensibilities or political persona are captured in measures of their popularity. I expect that each citizen relates to these leaders as suits that citizen’s subjective personality traits, experiences and attitudes. Yet there is no data to investigate each HOG and relate

him/her to the specific respondent's views and traits. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, it suffices to simply determine whether public managers' public appeal explains any portion of citizens' judgments of public service delivery under their supervision. Popularity is therefore operationalized as margin of victory in the previous elections. Reelection on its own may not be a suitable measure in this instance because many unpopular and dissatisfying African leaders cling to power for decades by merely going through the motions of holding elections. Thus together, the individual attributes as well as the electoral popularity of the HOGs create an estimate that captures the managers' skills, as well as estimations of the benefits of their public persona.

Elsewhere, NGOs have become important in supplementing government efforts in public service delivery. That is to say they coproduce public services especially where government operations have been severely crippled for one reason or another. I therefore consider IFIs and (I)NGOs here in terms of the aid monies allocated to the study nations annually. This data is acquired from the World Bank data set on net official development assistance and official aid. Aid monies, in current US dollars are measured here as a percent of GDP (also measured in millions of USD) in order to facilitate cross-national comparison.

This cross-national analysis also makes use of the following control variables at the country-level: urban population, poverty rate, and population density. Governments can only perform within the constraints of limited financial resources, and high populations put strains on public resources. Further people living in areas with high poverty rates typically have low political power and influence anyway; and their elected representatives may not be as responsive to them as to powerful elites in the same constituencies. Meanwhile, population density paints a picture of the average number of people who have to be catered

to per unit area of land. Often, the higher this number is, the fewer the resources there are to go around. Unless the service providers regularly and diligently maintain and upgrade services, rapid wear and tear in densely populated areas diminishes the quality of citizens' experiences.

ii. Individuals

Citizen satisfaction literature makes the point that it is important to be aware of the degree to which citizens understand who provides and who produces their services; or what levels of government oversee different services. It is possible that a survey asking questions about their national government may accept answers from respondents whose thinking is actually oriented towards the local level because those respondents may never have left their home areas; or they have no access to mass media; or one of any number of different reasons. This internal validity problem is addressed in the Afrobarometer survey questionnaire, which explicitly states prior to asking question 65 that the question is referring to the national government of the country being surveyed. However, if the local orientation persists, the impact on the validity is not critical. If a representative sample of the nation's citizens has been captured, whatever their local or national experience, their views all aggregate to the central government's performance.

Stated differently, the central government is the umbrella entity that facilitates the functioning of even federalized local governments. If a national government's sub-jurisdictions are not equitably served, then that disparity in performance may ultimately become a national government problem if public opinion is expressed (in non-peaceful

ways). Furthermore, disproportionate local orientation may also lead to assessments that are, on average incongruent with objective measures of performance, thereby still shedding light on the answer to this study's second question. I therefore test the following individuals variables with the assumption that potential respondent "malorientation" informs rather than undermines the research.

In terms of issue salience, citizens' rankings of public priorities are captured within the Afrobarometer survey. Specifically respondents are asked:

"In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?"

Respondents do not view the list of issues, but are instead asked to submit responses that are at the tops of their minds. The canvasser then situates each response as either first, second, or third as the respondents report them. This means that all three responses are high salience issues for the respondents, as they are asked for the most important problems facing their countries. Hence for this study, hypothesis testing is based on the selection of infrastructure and education as among the top problems in the countries.

Because of the mixed findings with regards to Africans' identity sensibilities and those sensibilities' effects on public affairs, this study assesses co-ethnicity and co-partisanship with the HOGs. This is to say that there are benefits to be gained from being born a member of a powerful ethnic group, or from having a political association with powerful government officials and/or local elites. Ethnic and party favoritism mean that elected officials may disproportionately divert resources to members of their ethnic groups and/or party supporters – this latter group benefitting particularly around election time. Alternatively, those who do not support the incumbent may express dissatisfaction as a

ploy to discredit her, or they may do so simply out of spite. I therefore measure both of these variables as dummy variables where 1 denotes co-ethnicity, and also denotes co-partisanship.

Meanwhile, citizens who participate in voting may have prior information or experience, and expectations that are likely to influence their approval or disapproval of government performance. Thus while it is true that people may vote in spite of a sense of futility in their ability to influence outcomes, they must possess a certain amount of confidence in their political voice to participate in elections. The Afrobarometer survey provides information on political inclination through question 27 where respondents are asked whether or not they voted in their country's most recent election prior to the survey. This variable is also measured as a dummy that distinguishes between those who voted and those who cited different reasons that prevented them from doing so.

Elsewhere, media exposure among individuals is expected to affect citizen satisfaction with public service delivery because, as expressed in the literature, the more citizens are exposed to "the outside world", the easier it is for them to develop (subjective) benchmarks against which to judge their respective governments' performance. Today, the most effective medium through which previously marginalized or suppressed communities may find voice through interactive communication is the internet. Access to the interactive world of the internet means that citizens have more lenses by which to view their world. I therefore consider whether citizens are exposed to internet media or not, and the scope of that exposure. The Afrobarometer survey allows me to include a media exposure variable in my assessment through the question:

91. How often do you use:

A. A computer

B. The internet

Respondent choices are: everyday; a few times a week; a few times a month; less than once a month; never; don't know. I create a dichotomous variable to distinguish between respondents who access the internet frequently (a few times a week to a few times a month), and those who do so less than once a month.

The creation of this variable as such is also based on the assumption that the internet is potentially the only true bastion of democratic expression in the media – at least as far as political and corporate manipulation is concerned. That is to say, the internet is demonstrably of greater value as a conveyor of ideas than radio and television, which are controlled by self-interested parties who can effectively censor and spin messages. Yet there has been a lot of concern that public opinion is little more than elite opinion as filtered through the media. Hence the question: Does citizen political participation reflect elite opinion or public opinion?

It requires an extensive focused study to elicit that level of data/information from citizens. However, for the purposes of this study, the cross-national analysis tests citizens in a broad range of democratic settings. I therefore expect that even though most parts of Africa still have significant constraints on media freedom, the democracies and anocracies afford their citizens enough civil liberty protections that allow the citizens to develop and express their own opinions to some (limited) extent without fear of persecution. The people may, nevertheless, still be naturally influenced by their leaders, family, friends, social groups, and other associations.

Again, age, gender, occupation and education may also be important attributes in determining citizen satisfaction among individuals. Different societies in Africa have different social hierarchies depending on history, tradition, and emergent external influences. These hierarchies may be based on gender; age or intergenerational norms; ancestry and/or kinship; economic and political power; professional advancement; ethno-linguistic background; and so on. However, the factors most typically associated with social class in Africa are gender, education, income, occupation, residence, and to some extent health status (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2013; Davis, 2006; Gandy, 2006; Lemanski, 2006; Mbembé & Nuttall, 2004).

The data on respondent's gender, education, occupation and residence are collected variously within the Afrobarometer survey. Gender in respondents is determined as part of the respondent selection procedure, whereby an alternating pattern of interviews was used to balance the number of men and women each interviewer encountered. Education was determined through the question:

97. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

There are 11 possible responses to this question ordered from "No formal schooling" to "Post-graduate". The responses also include a "Don't know" option. For the purposes of my study, I create a dummy variable to capture respondents who have attended post-graduate educational institutions and those who have not. Meanwhile, the survey does not ask respondents to specify their occupations. It only distinguishes between employed and unemployed citizens. I will therefore include this variable as a dummy variable. Finally, rural/urban residence is predetermined as part of the survey. That is to say, the interviewers record their specific interview locations by the country-specific local-government

jurisdictions such as counties, districts, towns and villages. As such I also treat this variable as a dummy in the analysis.

Otherwise, all indications are that socio-political status and voice determine who gets what services, and the quality of the services delivered. I do not expect that Africa differs from most other nations in the world in this regard. For example, a wealthy and highly educated individual is more likely than not considered higher ranking than a highly educated but unemployed and poor individual. Thus the pending indeterminacy in these relationships means that their investigation in Africa is still quite exploratory. The means of testing these open hypotheses is described in the following section on the multi-level research design of the cross-national assessment.

4.5. Research Design

This study builds on previous work on public opinion and citizen satisfaction in Africa and other parts of the world in order to develop as efficient a model as possible for Africa's specific contingencies. In the literature, Stipak (1997) takes a cautious view of the different approaches to assessing citizen satisfaction. He argues that simple comparison of satisfaction levels by geographic region or demographic group may seem sensible, but they are actually misleading. In a multivariate regression analysis, and using an approximately interval-level dependent variable, Stipak found that service quality has little effect on citizen evaluations of local services in the United States. Furthermore, he reported that the objective measures' correlation with satisfaction was unimpressive. He therefore concluded that the findings were insignificant because citizens are not particularly

responsive to service quality change as long as it is within some acceptable range. The experimental approach is therefore viewed as a more satisfactory approach to investigating the drivers of citizen satisfaction (Stipak, 1997; van Ryzin & Immerwahr, 2004).

Still other studies have tested different permutations of models, variables and analytical methods. From an administrative perspective, some scholars have strongly advocated the use of derived importance-performance analysis to understand citizen satisfaction data (van Ryzin & Immerwahr, 2004; Oliver, 1997). van Ryzin and Immerwahr's (2004) study lead them to argue that "the stated importance of urban services or service features may not paint a clear picture of what drives citizen satisfaction and its behavioral consequences such as complaining, trusting local government, or exiting a jurisdiction," (p. 146). Hence these authors recommend assessing derived importance through a regression-based model. Such a model should relate the service to a criterion variable - typically overall citizen satisfaction.

In light of these foundational guidelines, determining the congruence of subjective citizen opinion with objective measures of government performance in service delivery is essentially a correlation assessment. The premise behind this test is to determine whether citizens approve of higher government performance but disapprove of lower performance; and whether they do so with enough within-group consistency to justify their inclusion in government performance management. As this study is a cross-sectional study, it is important to clarify that consistency in this case means that the majority of citizens develop public opinions that concur with their respective countries' objective measures. Meanwhile, in order to identify the most important drivers of public opinion, my

foundational logistic regression equation for predicting approval/disapproval in each country is as follows:

$$y_{ij} = b_{0j} + b_{1j}(x_{ij}^1) + b_{2j}(x_{ij}^2) \dots + b_{nj}(x_{ij}^n) + e_{ij} \quad (4.1)$$

where b_{0j} is the intercept, j represents country ($j = 1 \dots J$), and i stands for individual citizens ($i = 1 \dots n_{ij}$).

The two levels of analysis feature country-level variables: X_1 – objective measures of national government performance; X_2 – base-level measures of performance; X_3 – HOG popularity; X_4 – HOG managerial quality; X_5 – level of democratization; X_6 – IFI/NGO aid revenues as a percent of GDP; X_7 – urban population; X_8 – poverty rate; and X_9 – population density. The individual-level variables are: X_{10} – approval of other public services; X_{11} – issue salience; X_{12} – co-partisanship with the incumbent HOG; X_{13} – co-ethnicity with the incumbent HOG; X_{14} – residence; X_{15} – internet access; and X_{16} – voter turnout. In addition are the following control variables: X_{17} – respondent’s gender; X_{18} – respondent’s education level; X_{19} – respondents’ age; and X_{20} – respondents’ employment status. Both the intercept b_{0j} and the slope coefficients are country characteristics. Figure 4.1 below is a graphic summary of this model.

At the individual level, if there are no independent variables, the foundational equation reduces to:

$$y_{ij} = b_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad (4.2)$$

This is the intercept-only model and it is useful as a null model or a benchmark for comparing other models in the study. Similarly, if there are no independent variables at the country level, the equation becomes:

$$b_{0j} = \beta_{00} + u_{0j} \quad (4.3)$$

The unified equation from those in 4.2 and 4.3 is thus:

$$y_{ij} = b_{00} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad (4.4)$$

In order to associate the intercept in the general equation with an independent variable, the intercept can be assigned an independent variable with a value of one for all observed units. This means that the intercept can be treated as a regression coefficient. This regression coefficient can then be used in verifying the congruence test in which citizens are either, on average, in congruence with objective measures of performance, or they are not – depending on the sign preceding this coefficient.




Figure 4.1: Model summary for cross-national analysis

In addition, as the independent variables are for the year preceding the citizen survey year (that is, the year the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in each country), in order to assess the robustness of the study findings I also determine whether the core results are affected by change in the length of the lag time between the independent variables and dependent variable. As such, the independent variables of the model (4.1) are expressed as:

$$y_{ij} = b_0 + b_1(x_t) + b_2(x_{t-1}) + b_3(x_{t-2}) \dots + b_n(x_{t-q}) + e_{t-q}; \quad (4.5)$$

where x_t is the value of the variable in period t ; and x_{t-1} is the value of the variable in period $t - 1$ or “lagged one period”.

This means that b_n measures the average effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable q periods ago, all things held constant. This is a finite distributed lag model, and q is a 10-year period. This means that each country is assessed for the average number of years sitting presidents hold office in Africa.

4.6. Analysis of findings

i. Sampling

The individual level comprises sample sizes of 1200 to approximately 2400 respondents in each of the countries included in the Afrobarometer Round 5 survey. These sample sizes exceed the suggested effective sample size (ESS) of at least 450 cases (Hox & Maas, 2001) and are randomly converged to the normal distribution. Individual-level sample sizes vary by country because smaller nations’ such as Uganda and Togo are weighted to counterbalance the larger (more populous) countries such as Nigeria and South

Africa. The weighting variable included in the study is *CombinWt*. This weighting variable standardizes the national samples as if they are equal in size.

After maximizing the availability of data from the different survey questions and country-level sources, the full multilevel models capture at least 30 out of the 54 nations in Africa. The numbers of observations in each country are listed in Table 4.2 below. The 5 instances withheld from the analysis represent countries whose government performance data is unreliable or simply unavailable. The variable most affected in the school services model is the change in school expenditure (*ChangeEducExp*), and specifically for Zambia. Meanwhile, the paved roads variable *PavedRd* has missing data on Burkina Faso. In addition, there are those cases of randomly missing within-country information originating from the surveying process. Nevertheless, out of a response rate of 90.6%, the Round 5 outcome statistics report a contact rate of 97.7%, a cooperation rate of 92.7%, and a refusal rate of 6.2%.

Table 4.2: Sample Sizes by Country

Country	N	Country	N
Algeria	1200	Mali	1200
Benin	1200	Mauritius	1200
Botswana	1200	Morocco	1200
Burkina Faso	1200	Mozambique	2400
Burundi	1200	Namibia	1200
Cameroon	1200	Niger	1200
Cape Verde	1200	Nigeria	2400
Côte d'Ivoire	1200	Senegal	1200
Egypt	1200	Sierra Leone	1200
Ghana	2400	South Africa	2400
Guinea	2400	Swaziland	1200
Kenya	2400	Tanzania	2400
Lesotho	1200	Togo	1200
Liberia	1200	Tunisia	1200
Madagascar	1200	Uganda	2400
Malawi	2400	Zimbabwe	2400

Table 4.3: Africa Study Variables' Descriptive Statistics

Country level variables	Obs.	Mean/ Median	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
School expenditures – inverse (<i>% of GDP</i>)	40,225	0.048	0.039	0.01	0.16
Change in school expenditures (<i>% of GDP</i>)	40,225	-0.169	0.575	-1.70	1.40
Literacy (%)	40,225	73.98	19.78	26.62	98.45
Change in road quality index (<i>int</i>)	40,225	31.267	36.952	0.04	100
Paved roads in km (<i>log</i>)	40,225	2.15e-08	4.58e-07	6.23e-11	2.32 e-06
Classified roads (<i>log</i>)	40,225	10.435	1.311	7.208	12.81
Presidents' popularity (<i>int</i>)	40,225	61.155	14.889	50.7	91.62
Presidents' managerial quality index (<i>ord</i>)	40,225	2.150	0.901	0	4
PolityIV index (<i>ord</i>)	40,225	4.050	4.173	-9	10
Country aid (<i>% of GDP</i>)	40,225	0.194	0.106	0.07	0.69
Country urban population (%)	40,225	0.395	0.159	0.11	0.73
Country poverty rate (%)	40,225	0.444	0.159	0.09	0.75
Country population density (<i>log</i>)	40,225	4.046	1.019	0.98	6.50
Individual level variables					
Approve school services (<i>ord</i>)	40,225	3.000	0.924	1	4
Approve road services (<i>ord</i>)	40,225	2.340	0.985	1	4
Issue salience – education (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.188	0.395	0	1
Issue salience – infrastructure (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.184	0.389	0	1
Co-partisanship with president (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.250	0.375	0	1
Co-ethnicity with president (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.170	0.375	0	1
Rural residence (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.410	0.491	0	1
Internet use frequency (<i>ord</i>)	40,225	0.054	1.204	0	4
Voted in prior elections (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.719	0.447	0	1
Gender - female (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.490	0.500	0	1
Education level (<i>ord</i>)	40,225	3.250	2.130	0	9
Age (<i>int</i>)	40,225	37.220	14.310	18	105
Employed (<i>1,0</i>)	40,225	0.333	0.341	0	1
CombinWt – country sampling weight (<i>int</i>)	40,225	0.786	0.433	0.02	4.56

Nevertheless even after accounting for these smaller within-country instances of missing data, only a further 1,863 out of 49,204 respondents expressed indecision or

unwillingness to answer for school services. This figure was 2041 for road services. This means that indecision or ignorance are not prevailing characteristics of African citizen evaluators of government performance. The people do have opinions on their public service experiences. But do those opinions reflect the reality of their circumstances as comparable to the public service outputs? What are the emergent factors that shape those opinions – whether they are congruent with objective measures or not? Table 4.3 is the summary of variables on services and country characteristics, as well as the relevant Afrobarometer survey responses that are used to try to answer these questions.

ii. Diagnostics

Diagnostic checks for this analysis include verifying model specification, and verifying that residuals have an expected value of zero and no correlation with the independent variables. MLM also requires a normal distribution among the independent variables, specification of covariance matrices, and homogeneity of those covariance matrices across countries. The method further calls for distinguishing between the random and the fixed nature of coefficients due to the different implications of these mixed effects. This helps conserve meaningfulness at each ecological level during model specification. Meaningfulness in interpretation is also conserved by centering variables about their actual means for cases where $\bar{x} = 0$ is improbable or impossible.

Yet despite these preliminary tests and preemptive diagnostics, there are inevitably certain weaknesses inherent in the study. First, this part of the study relies on Afrobarometer Round 5 data for citizens' perspectives on government performance. But

while the Round 5 sample captures a majority of the nations in Africa, the sample may not be representative of African citizens as the surveys were conducted in countries that were largely amenable to study. That is to say, these countries had favorable working (surveying) and political conditions – especially with regards to civil conflict. In addition, because countries were surveyed at different points between 2011 and 2013, history is a potential threat to validity as different countries experienced different intervening events – the Arab Spring being an example of particular importance for the North African countries.

Methodologically, the limitation of the MLM analysis is that it does not account for differences within groups in reliability of data estimates. This means that despite its advantages, the approach is not the best for modeling errors. Nevertheless, this method and hierarchical analyses in general are favored in social science studies (Ferreira, 2013; Nisbet, Stoycheff, & Pearce, 2012; Reising & Parks, 2000). Because of the contextual nuances and complexity revealed in such studies, it is worthwhile to similarly employ multilevel modeling techniques in citizen satisfaction analyses because in the past, the focus was primarily on single-level assessments.

Among the first of the preliminary statistics considered is the intraclass correlation (ICC) among countries. The data reveals a coefficient of 0.14 for public school services, and 0.15 for road services. These low measures of dependency or homogeneity among the countries in the sample helps reduce the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis – which can happen even with a mild violation of the assumption. That is to say, low correlation coefficients mean that the countries in the sample are statistically different. However, it is important to remember that the country sample size in this study is small and cross-country comparisons must be addressed by assessing variances through

the random slope and intercept models. Nevertheless, the calculation of the ICC is a step that precedes the study itself because it gives a reasonable sense of how the countries relate to each other.

Preliminary overviews also reveal some very high and some very low variable values in the data set. For example, different countries have different population sizes. In the case of this data set, the range for population density is 663.6 inhabitants per square kilometer on the small island nation of Mauritius to 2.6 inhabitants per square kilometer in Namibia - which is much larger, but which also has very low populated regions particularly in the Namib Desert. As such large differences are certain to skew distributions and ultimately lead to weaker error estimates and inferences. It is therefore necessary to generate log values of the certain variables in order to moderate the effect of the natural but very wide ranges in data values. Thus the variables that are transformed into base-10 logs are classified roads (*ClassRds*), and population density (*PopDensity*).

In addition, the change in road quality index variable (*ChangeRdQltyIndex*) and the school expenditure variable (*EducExp*) are transformed using weighted least squares inversion where:

$$[x] = (1/[x])^2$$

This is done because the variables have excessive kurtosis values of 23.57 and 7.06 respectively. That is to say, compared to the other variables in the data set, the road quality index and school expenditure variables had high peaks relative to the normal distribution. Because this peakedness also has the potential to bias regression estimates, I employ inversion to minimize the weighted sum of squared residuals. The effect is that error terms

with large variance get a smaller weight than those with small variance, ultimately reducing the peakedness of the distribution to an acceptable level within the data set.

Unlike with linear regression and general linear regression models, logistic regression models are not reliant upon the preservation of many assumptions pertaining to linearity, normality, homoskedasticity, and measurement level. Linearity is not required because this analytical approach applies a non-linear log transformation to the predicted odds ratios. In addition, the method does not require multivariate normality among independent variables and residuals. It also does not stipulate heteroskedastic variances for each level of the independent variables. Nevertheless, in terms of levels of measurement, logistic regression can handle ordinal and nominal data as independent variables. That is to say, the independent variables need not be metric (interval or ratio) scaled.

MLM analysis however does not accommodate dependent samples designs such as matched pairings, or before-and-after measurements. It is therefore important to check the levels of correlation among the determinants as part of the model specification process. In fact, after dropping GDP per capita (*LnGDPPerCap*) because of an excessively high collinearity between this variable and the road quality index, both the road and school services models achieve acceptable mean VIF values of 1.53 and 1.36 respectively. (See Appendix A for complete tables). Meanwhile, the models' heterogeneous residual vs. predictors and added-variable scatter plots verify case-wise independence. Lacking these conditions, the logistic regression underestimates the strength of the relationships and increases the likelihood of Type II error.

iii. Estimating Variances

As was discussed previously, the totally unconditional model in this study is derived from the function:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(x_{ij}^1) + \beta_{2j}(x_{ij}^2) \dots + \beta_{nj}(x_{ij}^n) + u_j + e_{ij} \quad (4.1)$$

The null model, which allows for country effects is:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + u_j + e_{ij}$$

Hence the mean y for a country j is:

$$\beta_0 + u_j \quad (4.2)$$

No predictions exist in this empty model. However, it determines how well citizenship in a particular country is a predictor of citizen satisfaction with public services. The model provides estimates of variances at each level (within-country – σ_e^2 ; between-country – σ_u^2). These estimates help determine the degree of variability that exists at each level of analysis. More specifically, the variance partition coefficient (VPC) is calculated to determine the proportion of total variance that is due to differences between countries – the rest is assumed to be due to variability among individuals. This is obtained by dividing the within-country variance with the sum of the within-country and between-country variances.

Subsequently, the multilevel random intercept model (4.3) is comprised of two components: a fixed part, which specifies the relationship between the satisfaction mean and the model's independent variables; and a random part which contains levels 1 and 2 residuals. In:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1j}(x_{ij}^1) + u_j + e_{ij} \quad (4.3)$$

the components $\beta_0 + u_j$ comprise the intercept β_{0j} specific to each country. The fixed and random parameters are thus $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ and $\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_e^2$ respectively. The random intercept

model therefore means that the regression line is specific to each country, and the fixed part can be extended by adding more predictors. However, while the intercept may vary from country to country, the slope β_1 remains the same for each country.

To relax the constraint on the slope coefficients, the between-country variances are allowed to fluctuate depending on selected variables. Hence the random slope model:

$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1j}(x_{ij}^1) + u_{0j} + u_{1j}x_{ij}^1 + e_{ij}$ derives:

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + u_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \beta_1 + u_{1j} \tag{4.4}$$

where $u_{1j}x_{ij}^1$ is the interaction between a country and variable x^1 ; β_1 is the slope of the average regression line; and $\beta_{1j} + u_{1j}$ is the slope of the line for country j . In this study, variables are centered around the grand mean, and around the group means. As has been mentioned, the intercept variance has no useful interpretation if zero is outside the observed range of a variable x . Thus in the random intercept model, the intercept is affected while slopes remain unchanged. However, in the random slopes model, the intercept variance $\sigma_{u_0}^2$ and the intercept-slope covariance σ_{u_01} are both affected.

Finally, if the coefficients for the residuals denoting fixed effects and random effects tell us how much difference exists respectively between and within the countries, then the combined model depicting the fixed and random parts of the model is:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1j}(x_{ij}^1) + \beta_{2j} \dots + \beta_{nj}(x_{ij}^n) + u_{0j} + u_{1j}(x_{ij}^1) + u_{12j} \dots + u_{nj}(x_{ij}^n) + e_{ij} \tag{4.5}$$

This represent the third iteration of the multilevel model where the complete model is run to assess the combined effects on the model estimates and fit. The two groups of interest among the random parameters in these models are co-partisans and co-ethnics. As one of this study's goals is to make a comparison of levels of democracy, if co-ethnicity and/or

co-partisanship are significant along with democracy, they may be indicating an added dimension to the concept that is more relevant for politics in Africa than in the West.

With all these preliminary considerations in mind, the next sub-section details the results of the Africa analysis where the first research question I address is that on the congruence of citizens opinions with objective measures of performance in public school services delivery. I then identify the most important determinants of citizen satisfaction in this service sector. The same outline will apply to the road services section.

4.7. Results

4.7.1. Approval of Public School Services

To answer the study questions, the sequence of models addressed is first, the null school services model. This will be followed by the fixed and random effects models, and finally the combined multilevel ordered logistic model. However, I begin by discussing aspects of variance within the model that ultimately affect the interpretation of the final results. Again, the study highlights outcomes for the co-ethnicity and co-partisanship variables because they are theoretically identified as groupings of particular relevance to the African political landscape. Overall, the degree of country-wise variability for satisfaction with school services is depicted in figure 4.2 below.

Assuming normality in residuals, means comparison tests reveals that co-ethnicity is the only variable found to have significant statistical difference between its groups relative to school services. This should be the case if the co-ethnic groups are “overwhelmed” in numbers by other communities in their countries such that their impact

is not necessarily apparent. But if this is true, then it diminishes the probability that the variable is a significant determinant of citizen satisfaction. In fact the data indicates that co-ethnics comprise only 15% of the total sample. Nevertheless, the impact of this variable on citizen satisfaction is ultimately confirmed (or not) in the multilevel model analysis when co-ethnicity is considered within the context of other determinants of citizen satisfaction.




Figure 4.2: Graph of variation in country effect in approval of school services

The relative importance of the country effects is determined by carrying out a likelihood ratio test. This is done by removing the random country effect in order to compare the null multilevel model with a null single-level model. The likelihood ratio test statistic is determined by multiplying the difference in the log-likelihood values for the two models by two: $LR = 2(LL_1 - (-LL_2))$. The result is 6252.07 on 1 degree of freedom. As the 5% value for a chi-squared distribution on 1 degree of freedom is 3.841, the findings make yet another strong case for the assessment of the model in a multilevel analysis.

Meanwhile, the between-country (level 2) variance is estimated as 0.021, and the within-country (level 1) variance is 0.863. Thus the total variance is 0.884, and the VPC is $0.021/0.884$. This means that 2% of the variance in satisfaction can be attributed to differences between countries.

When the countries are ranked in order of their respective effects, the top-ranked country in this study's sample was Egypt with a residual of -1.818. This means that this country has a mean approval score of $-1.82 + 2.66 = 0.84$; or a general disapproval of school services. By contrast, the lowest ranked country was Burundi with a mean approval score of 4.5. This suggests a general attitude of approval of school services among citizens of that country. Table 4.4 is a summary of the mean scores for each country. Scores above 2.00 mean that on average, citizens feel their respective governments are performing at least "fairly well" in the delivery of public school services within those countries. Scores below the mark denote countries with average negative views of government performance.

There are no countries with neutral citizens as far as public school services were concerned. However a strong majority of countries had average approval scores above 2.00. In fact only Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Senegal reported dissatisfaction scores. None of these countries had congruent responses. In the end, 50% of the countries had citizens whose views did not, on average, correspond with the change in funding for their respective countries' public schools. While funding is unlikely to be the only factor that influences citizens' attitudes towards public school, as was discussed previously, this is a sector in which performance is particularly sensitive to funding issues. This is due to the fact that high value is placed on formal education in most developing countries where resources are limited.

Table 4.4: School Services Approval Rankings (Africa)

Country	Mean score	Rank in Effect
Algeria	2.898	19
Benin	3.217	25
Botswana	3.530	28
Burkina Faso	2.770	17
Burundi	4.500	32
Cameroon	2.700	16
Cape Verde	3.081	22
Côte d'Ivoire	2.357	10
Egypt	0.839	1
Ghana	2.684	15
Guinea	2.210	7
Kenya	3.125	24
Lesotho	2.819	18
Liberia	3.509	27
Madagascar	2.417	13
Malawi	3.725	30
Mali	2.540	14
Mauritius	3.739	31
Morocco	1.496	3
Mozambique	2.903	20
Namibia	3.454	26
Niger	2.050	5
Nigeria	2.288	8
Senegal	1.880	4
Sierra Leone	2.391	11
South Africa	3.055	21
Swaziland	3.633	29
Tanzania	2.398	12
Togo	2.205	6
Tunisia	1.021	2
Uganda	2.330	9
Zimbabwe	3.115	23

It would therefore be premature to speculate, at this stage, on the possible causes and effects of the apparent incongruence between public opinion and the measures of spending on public schools without first considering the citizen satisfaction model in its entirety. First, the null model indicates that the overall mean approval level for school services is estimated as 2.66. However, as has been discussed previously, assigning numerical values to the approval/disapproval scale does not indicate the effect observed with precision. It merely facilitates analysis. Nevertheless, the median respondents in the study sample felt that government was performing fairly well (category 3); and the average value corroborates the null model's regression coefficient. This verifies the attitude of overall approval among the citizens in the countries sampled – at least when other factors are excluded.

For the full model, table 4.5 below depicts the coefficients derived for both fixed effects and random effects models, and clustered by country. The use of robust standard errors in all the models means that the estimates are conservative. I specify an unstructured covariance in order to allow both intercepts and slopes to vary randomly. In this way, I can calculate the significant variable's effects on satisfaction within the context of other factors. The results estimate the intercept variance σ_{u0}^2 at 0.29 while the slope variance σ_{u1}^2 is 0.17. The covariance estimate σ_{u01} is -0.12. The negative covariance means that countries with a high intercept (above the average 2.00) tend to have flatter than average slopes. This means that, as indicated in figure 4.2, it is the countries with overall negative views of government performance in school services that have a larger effect than the positive countries within the context of co-partisanship. Appendix A presents the variance inflation factor VIF for the models in this study.

Table 4.5: Regression Estimates for School Services (Africa)

Parameter	I: null	II: I+country	III: II+individual	IV: III+country weights
Fixed				
Intercept	-0.0838 (0.074)	-0.1807 (0.122)	-0.1070 (0.079)	-0.1338 (0.079)
School expenditures (% of GDP)		2.3971 (3.816)	3.3390 (3.703)	3.2912 (3.718)
School expenditure change (% of GDP)		0.0222 (0.174)	0.0895 (0.183)	0.0823 (0.185)
Literacy (<i>int</i>)		0.0095* (0.004)	0.0097* (0.001)	0.0099* (0.004)
PolityIV index (<i>ord</i>)		0.0716* (0.032)	0.0617* (0.031)	0.0614* (0.030)
HOG's popularity (<i>int</i>)		0.0007 (0.001)	0.0009 (0.001)	0.0009 (0.001)
HOG's managerial quality index (<i>ord</i>)		0.0957 (0.105)	0.0735 (0.085)	0.0766 (0.086)
Country aid (<i>int</i>)		1.7326*** (0.346)	1.7539* (0.291)	1.7397*** (0.295)
Country urban population (%)		-0.2395 (0.331)	-0.1313 (0.380)	-0.1368 (0.312)
Country poverty rate (%)		0.2968 (0.273)	0.2472 (0.271)	0.2538 (0.275)
Country population density (<i>log</i>)		-0.1418 (0.087)	-0.1437 (0.076)	-0.1411 (0.076)
Random				
Approve road services (<i>ord</i>)			0.3918*** (0.046)	0.3918*** (0.046)
Issue salience – schools (<i>I,0</i>)			0.1569*** (0.043)	0.1575*** (0.043)
Co-partisanship with HOG (<i>I,0</i>)			0.3845*** (0.067)	0.3838*** (0.067)
Co-ethnic of HOG (<i>I,0</i>)			0.1081 (0.107)	0.1059 (0.107)
Rural residence (<i>I,0</i>)			-0.1170** (0.042)	-0.1299** (0.045)
Internet use frequency (<i>ord</i>)			-0.0155 (0.014)	-0.0155 (0.014)
Voted in prior elections (<i>I,0</i>)			0.0737 (0.039)	0.0734 (0.039)
Female (<i>I,0</i>)			-0.0009 (0.022)	-0.0012 (0.022)
Education level (<i>ord</i>)			0.0131 (0.008)	0.0134 (0.010)
Age (<i>int</i>)			-0.0026* (0.001)	-0.0026* (0.001)
Employed (<i>I,0</i>)			0.0044 (0.043)	0.0050 (0.043)
CombinWt				0.0495 (0.027)
Log-lik.	-67866.20	-49471.06	-48902.97	-48899.78
Number of groups	30	30	30	30

*= $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$

As indicated in table 4.5, the model does not report any significance for the objective measures of performance. Nevertheless, in countries with limited resources, underfunding or cuts in funding often have visible repercussions – especially in service sectors such as education where union strikes and other expressions of public opinion are common. Thus, the comparison of service expenditures and citizens attitudes warrants a deeper investigation into the specifics of the financial triggers that influence citizens' responses in surveys. Nevertheless, the positive relationship between approval of school services and democracy is more promising. It lends credence to the notion that individuals living in the more democratic nations are more likely to approve of government performance in education services compared to those in less democratic nations

The results suggests that a percentage increase in a country's literacy rate is associated with a 0.01 unit increase in the log odds of approval of government performance in school services. This supports the view that a more literate population is also more affluent and more politically effective, such that the citizens are able to demand better government services compared to those in countries with lower literacy rates. Thus as this variable is a frequently used outcomes measure for comparison of the quality of country education services in general, this finding corroborates the expected results for such country benchmarks. That is to say, the better a nation performs for a given measure, the higher the probability of satisfaction with those services among its citizens.

In this instance of assessing literacy's relationship with citizen satisfaction, the results indicate a 0.01 unit increase in satisfaction. What does this 0.01 unit represent? Nothing verifiable. In fact the value cannot be directly ascribed to a uniformly felt level of

satisfaction in the study because such uniformity in personal experience is very unlikely. Nevertheless, the value represents an average measure of increasing positive attitudes towards school service delivery as a result of increasing literacy levels – and that is only true when all other variables are held constant. In effect it indicates that as far as school services are concerned, there is more satisfaction than dissatisfaction with increasing literacy among the citizenry.

Meanwhile, whereas nations with limited resources may experience some civil unrest when funds are withdrawn from important services such as education, these expression of public opinion may only really be possible and/or visible in democratic or transitioning nations. Hence the importance of accounting for the level of democracy in each nation included in the study. In this case, the MLM models lend support to the expectation that the more democratic a nation is, the more citizens approve of government performance. The findings suggest that on average, there is a 0.06 unit increase in the log odds of approval for each level increase in democracy, controlling for other variables.

As most of the nations in the study are transitioning (anocratic) or democratic, it can be argued that the citizens already have a *generally* positive attitude towards their respective governments' performance in public service delivery. Yet there is no way to determine the consistency and depth of feeling implied by the 0.08 unit effect on the log of the odds for approval. Furthermore, citizens granted more rights by their government are just as likely to express dissatisfaction as satisfaction. Thus, conclusions can only observe that the coefficient is positive and this suggests that the trend towards democratization does have a positive impact on citizens' attitudes towards delivery of school services in Africa – even though this factor is certainly not the only positive influence to speak of.

There is also statistical support for the hypothesis, which states that the higher the level of foreign aid to a nation, the more likely respondents are to approve of school services. As some observers have pointed out, despite the fact that international aid is costly in the long run, citizens in beneficiary countries do accrue important benefits from these relationships. In this instance, a unit increase in the amount of aid received is associated with a 1.80 unit increase in the log-odds of approval when all other variables are held constant. This suggests that even though their countries in Africa typically get trapped in concessionary relationships with foreigners over natural resources, the benefits garnered generally overrule concerns regarding future exploitation.

In a sense, this finding upholds the view that attitudes towards government can be enduring. This is because if citizens develop a reliance on foreign aid for their developmental needs, then they will probably adopt favorable attitudes for as long as their governments are able to solicit the foreign monies and keep delivering services. However, without panel data it is difficult to establish causality because it may be the case that citizens may be expressing approval for their donor agencies instead of their respective governments. Nevertheless, as public management theory indicates, even the raising of funds is a measure of government performance. Therefore, even if citizens approve of that performance because of reliance on other governments and non-governmental agencies, their governments are still credited for establishing those relationships – in as far as they somehow benefit the people.

Among the individual-level parameters, views on road services are a strongly significant driver of citizen approval of school services. This is to say that there is a positive correlation in citizens' attitudes towards school services and road services. When citizens

approve of road services, they are also likely to approve of school services. This finding suggests that there may be both practical and psychological associations between different government services. In a practical sense, school services are associated with road services because typically one utilizes road services in order to access schools.

The positive correlation may also reflect on-the-ground realities where the general quality of services in a particular jurisdiction are contingent upon the public funds and resources available in that jurisdiction. That is to say, more affluent areas are likely to have good services in general, while less affluent areas may have services that reflect the existing level of wealth. However, this alone cannot explain the positive correlation because it is not always the case that poor jurisdictions have poor services. Hence the positive correlation may also be an artefact of the human tendency to generalize. It may be the case that respondents to surveys simply rate different services based on a pre-existing level of optimism or pessimism.

Issue salience is also a strongly significant determinant of citizen approval of government performance in delivery of school services. The data supports the hypothesis that citizens are less likely to approve of highly salient services than they are of low or non-salient services. This is because the 0.15 unit increase in the log odds for approval (or 13% increase in probability of approval) reflects movement that is, nevertheless, well within the lower half of the approval scale (i.e. disapproval). In other words, as expected, the priority issues (value 1) have a lower level of approval than non-priority issues. They fall well below the dependent variable's mean of 2.3 for roads and 2.6 for school services. Again, this reflects the reality that "issues" in the sociopolitical environment tend to be policy

problems. Hence if a service is among the highest priorities, it is usually there because citizens are feeling or expressing the most disapproval of it.

The results also affirm the idea that, on average, co-partisans— in the context of other factors held constant – are more likely to approve of government performance in school services than non co-partisans. The apparent trend is one of broad affinity among citizens for their HOGs, rather than preference for specific characteristics of the leaders. This is suggested by the non-significant managerial quality variable. Also, when considering entire voting populations in any particular country, Africans do not automatically vote ethnic because the number of co-ethnics is typically not large enough to be an overwhelming majority in the electorate. Thus satisfaction is probably more contingent upon electoral environments where co-partisanship addresses broader concerns held by the citizens – depending on each party’s platform and appeal to individual voters..

Meanwhile, because of varying natural and societal conditions from country to country, it is hard to precisely judge whether city dwellers in Africa are generally more satisfied with public services than are rural residents. It would require larger and repeated studies to confirm this. However, the data from the countries sampled here suggests that rural citizens are inclined to approve of school services. The data suggests that rural residents have a 0.12 unit increase in the log odds of approval over non-rural residents. This finding is somewhat surprising because Africa’s rural areas are generally underdeveloped relative to urban centers where seats of government and affluent business districts are located. This fact may therefore reflect a tendency to value education more in rural areas than in urban areas where access to education services is relatively easier.

However, this is speculation and would require in-depth analysis into the pros and cons of rural residence relative to public service provision.

Finally, in assessing the individual-level variables, the respondent's age suggests an inclination to disapprove of government performance in school services the older individuals get. In fact, on average, a year increase in age corresponds with a 0.03 unit decline in the log odds for approval when the other variables are held constant. While coefficients denoting sentiments are impossible to standardize among individuals due to the subjective nature of satisfaction, this very small coefficient is reasonable in this context as we would expect annual changes based on age to be relatively small or imperceptible compared to aggregates of feeling over lengthier periods of time. That is to say people do not typically change their sentiments drastically simply because they aged an additional year. Yet even though the effect of the decline in satisfaction is very small, the data shows an acceptable level of significance for this variable as a determinant of citizen satisfaction.

In light of these findings, the MLM model affirms the indication of a lack of *general* congruity between public opinion and objective measure of performance. The countries in the study experienced a mean decline in school expenditures of 0.15%. This should have led to an average attitude of disapproval among the citizens of the countries surveyed. However, the mixed effects constant intercept is 0.11. This means that in the context of other determinants of citizen satisfaction, the countries start off with a 0.11 unit uptick in log odds of approval. This suggests a positive inclination rather than a negative one. Hence the data affirms that for public school services, public opinion tends to be incongruent with objective measures of performance in the countries included in the survey.

This last statement on the actual scope of the effects observed is important to remember. This is because the results discussed reflect findings in just over half of Africa's countries. Nevertheless, inflated standard errors and accommodation of country-level effects in the multilevel model means that the estimates are a reasonable yet conservative gauge of certain dynamics of citizen satisfaction on the continent. In fact the data shows that some hypotheses that have been verified in Western democracies also apply in African nations.

4.7.2. Approval of Public Road Services

This section of the analysis continues the investigation of the study's grouping variables. Here unlike in the public schools model, residuals' statistical difference is supported in the equal variance tests for group-wise homogeneity for *RCopartisan* groups, but not the *RCoethnic* groups. Why is this the case? Just as with co-ethnics for school services, co-partisans are dissimilar in their attitudes towards government performance in road services compared to non co-partisans. (School services has co-ethnics and co-partisans approving at rates of 66% and 68% respectively.) However, the imbalance in the co-ethnicity variable diminishes its significance in this service sector. When the relative effects of the grouping variables are assessed, the results affirm that there is a negative correlation between the dependent variable and co-partisanship and co-ethnicity. However only co-partisanship retains an acceptable ratio with its standard error of residuals.

Meanwhile, the significance of the country effects is again determined by comparing a null single-level model with the null multilevel model. Doubling the difference of the models' log-likelihood returns a result of -5405.114 for 1 degree of

freedom. This outcome of insignificance is symptomatic of the diminished influence or “more balanced” opinion of co-ethnics and co-partisans towards road services. Figure 4.3 below graphs the stronger negative effect where the higher the intercept, the flatter the slope for the index change variable. Nevertheless, the empty road services model indicates a positive mean approval level with a coefficient of 2.32. The overall country effects and rankings are indicated in table 4.6 below. Here the median respondents felt that their governments were performing “fairly well”. However the intensity of feeling was somewhat diminished to the estimated 2.32. Put differently, compared to school services, there is an attitude of general approval among citizens, but their views are less enthusiastic than they were for school services. The attitude towards roads are closer to feelings that government performed “fairly badly”.




Figure 4.3: Graph of variation in country effect in approval of road services

Table 4.6 also shows a decline in the number of countries with high scores (>3). In fact, Mozambique had the highest score at 3.1 for approval of road services. Citizens of

Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia expressed dissatisfaction again. However, they were joined by Zimbabwe, Botswana and Swaziland. In this instance, Botswana, Egypt, and Swaziland had congruent results between citizens' views and the changes in road quality. Ultimately, there was more agreement for road services because 80% of the countries' had citizens whose views correctly reflected an increase in road quality. However, the between-country (level 2) variance is estimated as 0.011, and the within-country (level 1) variance is 0.928. Therefore only roughly 1.2% of the variance in satisfaction with road services can be attributed to differences between countries in this model (See appendix A for VIF estimates).

The summary of regression outcomes for road services is indicated in table 4.7 below. The multilevel model supports the notion that citizens are more likely to approve of government performance in countries where objective measures of performance in that sector have improved over the past year. Despite the negative finding in the case of school services, the results for road services reinforces the view that citizens in the different African countries do make useful contributions to government performance evaluation because more than half have a correct sense of changes in this service sector. For road services there is a strong negative relationship between the change in the country road quality index and citizen satisfaction.

Table 4.6: Road Services Approval Rankings (Africa)

Country	Mean score	Rank in Effect
Algeria	2.186	16
Benin	2.647	26
Botswana	1.935	6
Burkina Faso	2.137	12
Burundi	2.413	21
Cameroon	2.657	27
Cape Verde	2.196	14
Côte d'Ivoire	2.970	18
Egypt	1.875	4
Ghana	2.725	28
Guinea	2.178	13
Kenya	2.380	19
Lesotho	2.647	25
Liberia	2.043	8
Madagascar	2.513	23
Malawi	2.572	24
Mali	2.407	20
Mauritius	2.039	7
Morocco	1.810	3
Mozambique	3.086	32
Namibia	2.827	30
Niger	2.103	9
Nigeria	2.177	15
Senegal	2.784	29
Sierra Leone	2.131	10
South Africa	2.475	22
Swaziland	1.961	5
Tanzania	2.232	17
Togo	2.888	31
Tunisia	1.813	2
Uganda	2.132	11
Zimbabwe	1.770	1

Table 4.7: Regression Estimates for Road Services (Africa)

Parameter	I: null	II: I+country	III: II+individual	IV: III+country weights
Fixed				
Intercept	0.0837 (0.074)	0.0882 (0.055)	-0.0169 (0.044)	-0.0169 (0.044)
Road quality index change – inverse (<i>int</i>)		-0.2934*** (0.086)	-0.3088*** (0.094)	-0.3079*** (0.094)
Paved roads (<i>int</i>)		-2.7962E5 (1.127E5)	-2.521E5 (2.253E5)	-2.5386E5 (2.256E5)
Classified roads (<i>log</i>)		-0.0652 (0.067)	-0.0729 (0.061)	-0.0714 (0.060)
HOG's popularity (<i>int</i>)		-0.0008 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0099E-2 (0.001)
HOG's managerial quality index (<i>ord</i>)		-0.1364 (0.119)	-0.0485 (0.122)	-0.0494 (0.122)
PolityIV democracy index (<i>ord</i>)		0.1087*** (0.019)	0.0718*** (0.014)	0.0720*** (0.014)
Country aid (<i>int</i>)		0.0657 (0.404)	-0.0850 (0.320)	-0.0833 (0.319)
Country urban population (%)		-0.1898 (0.211)	-0.2276 (0.174)	-0.2281 (0.174)
Country poverty rate (%)		0.2314 (0.216)	0.0249 (0.233)	0.0263 (0.233)
Country population density (<i>log</i>)		0.0715 (0.073)	0.1030 (0.062)	0.1037 (0.062)
Random				
Approve school services (<i>ord</i>)			0.7373*** (0.051)	0.7372*** (0.051)
Issue salience – roads (<i>I,0</i>)			0.2026*** (0.039)	0.2027*** (0.039)
Co-partisan of HOG (<i>I,0</i>)			0.1102 (0.073)	0.1102 (0.073)
Co-ethnicity with HOG (<i>I,0</i>)			0.0703 (0.081)	0.0720 (0.081)
Rural residence (<i>I,0</i>)			0.3683*** (0.072)	0.3685*** (0.072)
Internet use frequency (<i>ord</i>)			-0.0006 (0.017)	-0.0006 (0.017)
Voted in prior elections (<i>I,0</i>)			-0.0460 (0.031)	-0.0461 (0.031)
Gender – female (<i>I,0</i>)			0.0628** (0.019)	0.0628*** (0.018)
Education level (<i>ord</i>)			0.0186 (0.015)	0.0186 (0.014)
Age (<i>int</i>)			-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)
Employed (<i>I,0</i>)			0.0368 (0.042)	0.0369 (0.042)
CombinWt				0.0102 (0.036)
Log-lik.	-67866.20	-64492.96	-54902.83	-54902.68
Number of groups	30	30	30	30

* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001

Similarly, there is also a soundly significant relationship between citizen satisfaction with road services and the length of the paved roads network in a country. That is to say, in this sample of African countries a kilometer increase in the length of roads paved leads to a 2.5E5 unit decrease in the log odd of approval. The large coefficient in this case is due to the skewed distribution of this variable where the range of values is 657km in Liberia compared to 126,742km in Egypt. Nevertheless, the evidence verifies what makes sense intuitively: The more extensive a road network, the more access citizens have in travelling through their country for both business and pleasure. This in turn leads to higher satisfaction among citizens. However, if the roads are of poor quality, the positive effects are superseded by dissatisfaction. Hence this variable corroborates the negative findings for the change in the road quality index, which had a mean decline in the study timeframe.

Also significant for citizen satisfaction with road services is the PolityIV index. Again, the expectation was that the more democratic a country is the more citizens approve of government performance. In this case the results indicate that a level climb on the scale towards democratization has an average effect of an increase of 0.12 units in the log odds of approval for road services. This finding is certainly an affirmation of the virtues of living in a democracy whereby citizens can enjoy the opportunity to engage their governments in the processes of public service delivery and evaluation. However, in terms of citizen satisfaction research, the finding also supports the expectation of homogeneity in feelings and attitudes among politically diverse nations. In effect, these results and the low country-wise variance (1.2%) are evidence that citizens in Africa are not necessarily different from

citizens in Western nations with regards to how democracy affects their views of government performance.

Because democracy informs one of the overall study's key questions, it is worth verifying this variable's robustness as a determinant of citizen satisfaction with public service delivery. As such, the concept is also tested under the measure of the Democracy Index. This is an "expert" generated index of 167 countries. While the originators of the criteria and their estimates are largely unknown, this index is published annually by the London-based Economic Intelligence Unit. The index scores nations on the basis of electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. Countries are then assigned to one of 4 categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid democracies, authoritarian democracies. Using the 2012 country overall scores rather than the category designations, the results produce the same high level of confidence as the PolityIV index. This verifies the importance of democracy in shaping citizens' attitudes towards their governments' performance in public service delivery.

At the individual level of analysis, approval of road services correlates positively and strongly with approval of school services. In this sense the data corroborates the previous finding that approval of school services generally means satisfaction with road services. As suggested previously, this finding may indicate that the respondents either closely associate the two services, or that their evaluations are contingent upon the individuals general psychological state or attitude towards public services. Uncovering this distinction is beyond the scope of this study. However, it further emphasizes the point that there is an important difference in the details when comparing what citizens experience

and what they actually report in evaluation surveys. In fact, it may very well be discovered that inconsistent evaluations of different service sectors is a good indication of a reflective respondent. It would suggest that reflective respondents are not prone to assessing government performance largely on the basis of a general political attitude, but rather take the time to objectively assess their experiences or knowledge of each service.

Meanwhile, citizens in the study were again more likely to approve of low salience services than they were of high-salience services. As with the school services model, issue salience is also a dummy variable in the road services model. Thus the 0.22 unit increase in the log odds for approval with decreasing salience reflects the point that high-salience issues are public problems. In fact, the mean score for issue salience in road services is 0.22. If this value is taken as a natural midpoint among the sample countries, only 40% of the countries sampled had means above this value. This means that road services were less salient and potentially less problematic in these countries than they were in the other 60% that had mean scores below 0.22.

This finding is yet another that lends credence to the view of a prevailing negative attitude towards road services on the continent. However, there remains the possibility that the observed results are due to a not-surprising tendency to generalize among citizens. That is to say, whatever feelings they may have for any particular service sector, those feelings may have a strong influence on the views they express for other service sectors – especially those that occupy approximately the same level of salience or importance among the issues on the public agenda.

This model also suggests that there is a significant difference in the responses given by women and men. The results suggest that there is a 0.05 increase in the log odds for

approval of road services among women compared to men – holding other variables constant. While it may be tempting to assume that women are more optimistic than men for any number of reasons, there may be a possibility that the result is due to more careful consideration of questionnaires among women compared to men. If the objective measures of performance are positive, it may also be the case that women are more reflective in their responses and therefore reflect an opinion with enough uniformity to have a significant impact on the overall model. However, hypothesizing that women are better survey-takers than men requires further study to verify.

4.8. Discussion

The analytical results of this study provide both a broad overview of citizen satisfaction in Africa, as well as a glimpse at country-specific characteristics that also influence citizens' attitudes towards government performance. The overall contextual considerations applied in this study reveal that political factors have an important role to play in shaping public opinion on public service delivery – at least for schools and road services. The cross-national model affirms practical and potential cognitive associations among services. Meanwhile, the positive correlation in approval of schools and road services also informs us that on-the-ground realities mean that performance in different services areas may be related through resource availability where the quality of several services in a particular jurisdiction reflect the level of capacity in that jurisdiction.

The findings certainly suggest a natural artifact of human cognitive abilities. This is the tendency of people to generalize. As has been emphasized in this study, citizens'

responses to surveys cannot be taken for granted as accurate reflections of their true feelings. Individuals may be inclined towards a certain attitude or level of optimism or pessimism. As a result they may simply generalize different services at the same level. Future analyses must therefore attempt to disconnect service areas in surveys and questionnaires in order to more accurately assess the relationships in citizens' attitudes towards different services. This means that future studies would benefit from a longitudinal data structure that observes attitudinal trends over time relative to changes in objective measures. Alternatively, it may be necessary to intensively focus each individual on one service sector only at a time in order to avoid "cross-sector contamination" of opinions.

Meanwhile, the finding that citizens in democratic nations are likely to approve of government performance in the delivery of school and road services must be acknowledged as true, but necessarily within the context of other influences. As has been discussed previously, freedom to choose means freedom to approve or disapprove. Citizens may be inclined in either direction even in the nations with the highest levels of democracy. Furthermore, African democracies do not mirror Western societies ideologically. African states are subject to their own culturally driven interpretations of "the right to choose" even as they are relentlessly burdened by the older democracies politically and economically. Hence, even if the coefficients associated with the democracy variables in this study had been negative, it would still mean that democracy is as relevant and strong a determinant of public opinion on government performance in Africa as it is in the West.

Additional research will verify whether or not this is true for public services across the board. It is possible that factors such as cultural differences and practical considerations may eventually be found to influence public opinion in a manner that precludes recourse

to democratic values. For example, in strongly religious countries some services (such as religious schools) are prioritized over others. In such cases religion, and not democracy, reflects the will of the people. Another example is that a country that is largely a desert may not be as concerned with building roads as it is with supplying water to citizens. In this case, practical life-or-death matters of water supply may override the issue of democratic opinion on how well or in what manner government should deliver those services.

In the case of testing the impact of HOGs on public school services and road services, the results show that the citizens are, on average, not notably concerned with the specifics of the HOGs managerial qualities or electoral popularity when it comes to assessing public service delivery. Similarly, the specific ethnicities of the HOGs have no influence on satisfaction. Instead, the data shows that perhaps except in countries dominated by a majority ethnic group, most leaders voted into office must garner more than 50% of the vote by winning over or appealing to non co-ethnics.

This finding therefore demonstrates that while co-ethnicity may be an important factor for citizens electing their local government representatives, at the national level citizens often have to elect non co-ethnics. If Africans were always determined to get a co-ethnic into the highest office, there should be many cases of entire ethnic groups boycotting elections. This is not the case. In fact, party coalitions are more effective in elections because they facilitate the unity of co-ethnics and non co-ethnics under one leader. In those instances, ethnic preferences are suspended for the gamble of throwing support behind an individual who may or may not serve the interests of the ethnic groups in her coalition after the elections have passed.

Elsewhere, the results also show that citizens' approval diminishes with the high-priority issues relative to the low-priority issues. This reflects the general pattern of behavior in the policy process because priority issues are policy problems that need to be addressed in the sociopolitical arena. Hence the finding lends support to the importance of assessing citizen satisfaction as not just an administrative or political phenomenon, but as a phenomenon firmly embedded within the context of the policy process. Without situating approval or disapproval as an expression of citizens' reactions falling between the policy implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process, one runs the risk of overlooking the reality of what public issues actually represent in society. Issue salience rankings with positive coefficients may be erroneously interpreted as approval when they are in fact scales that represent what people feel are the biggest problems in their communities.

Yet overall, the findings suggest that Africans, on average, approve of government performance in school and road services delivery albeit only slightly so. Again, the independent variables were also lagged by 10-year periods reflecting the average duration of presidential tenures in Africa. While the coefficients fluctuated, the signs and significant variables remained unchanged. However, despite these strong overall findings, each country must be assessed individually for its specific nuances. That is to say, the details that help build the picture in a nation such as Uganda may not apply in Malawi even though there may be broad commonalities between the countries. For example, if high education in one country leads people to higher levels of affluence, then they are bound to live in better neighborhoods with better schools and roads. Those people are more likely to feel positive about these public services compared to citizens in countries where education

levels are low or impeded. On the other hand people may also turn indifferent because they have more choices – especially where there are strong private education institutions that supplement the government effort. Thus assessments of citizen satisfaction with public services in Africa will benefit from further investigation under different data structures and/or different operationalization techniques. In the meantime, the policy implications of this study's findings are addressed in Chapter 6. But first, I turn to the Kenya survey experiment in order to include both contextual settings in the policy discussion.

CHAPTER 5: KENYA SURVEY EXPERIMENT

5.1. Introduction

This field study conducted in Kenya in January 2014. The treatment cases in the survey experiment are respondents who are exposed to four sets of self-efficacy priming statements, which are intended to heighten their awareness of where they fall in their communities' political hierarchies. If low-efficacy citizens are those who would rather delegate public service decision-making to elected officials and experts, then I expect to find higher rates of approval among low-efficacy respondents than high-efficacy respondents. I therefore compute a 10-point additive scale from responses to 20 self-efficacy statements in order to demonstrate the effects of variations in self-efficacy among citizens. As the literature suggests, self-efficacy has an important effect on people's formation of political opinion, and their participation in politics. It instills within the citizens sentiments that range as widely as happiness and pride, and indifference, depression, and fear. These perceptions are part of the process that transforms citizen (dis)satisfaction into public opinion. However, it is important to remember that the "force" or potency of that efficacy is each citizen's internal subjective calculation – informed or uninformed.

Like the concept of cardinal utility in the field of economics, there is no unit of measurement for how strong a citizen feels politically. Therefore, as util (a measure of preference) differences are perceived ordinally in terms of measures that are only contextually relevant, so too are self-efficacy scores in this study. A respondent's total self-efficacy score is treated as a measure of how that respondent perceives herself, and how her community perceives her. The score itself is the difference between scores of the two low-efficacy sets and the two high-efficacy sets. Therefore, a respondent who has low

political self-efficacy will probably identify with more statements in the low-efficacy sets than in the high-efficacy sets. If a respondent has sentiments that fall on either side of the spectrum, the difference between the two scores reveals whether the respondent is more inclined towards low-efficacy or high-efficacy or on the middle ground.

Before beginning the discussion on institutional hypotheses, it is also important to remember that this experimental analysis is designed to supplement the cross-national assessment. While several of the determinants and hypotheses tested in this section mirror the cross-national analysis, there are some important differences in the approach. To begin with, this case is an experimental analysis designed to answer the research questions: What are the determinants of citizen satisfaction with government performance in public service delivery in Kenya; and, are Kenyan citizens' subjective evaluations congruent with objective measures of government performance? Further, as with the cross-national analysis, I also group the determinants as stemming from either institutions or individuals. In this sense, I carry forward the main study themes.

However, at the institutional level, it becomes necessary to do away with determinants pertinent to the country-level because this is a study pertaining to specific amenities in the respondents' respective localities. Consequently in the Kenya survey experiment, the institutional variables of interest are objective measures of performance, and managerial quality of the MPs. To these, I add expectancy disconfirmation and self-efficacy as factors in the individuals dimension as they were absent in the cross-national survey. In short, the variables at this level of analysis pertain to individuals and constituency-level factors that determine citizen satisfaction with government performance in three regions of Kenya.

5.2. Hypotheses

i. Institutions

As with the cross-national analysis, the objective measures of performance at this level more directly associate citizens with the specific services in question. This is unlike in the Afrobarometer survey, which acquires a representative sample of respondents in the national context and asks questions related to national governments' overall performance. In fact, the citizens in this case study all reside in close proximity to these services. Nevertheless, the objective measures serve the same purpose of helping to identify significant determinants of citizen satisfaction, as well as the congruity of subjective evaluations with the objective measures. Thus my expectations are the same as in the cross-national studies. The first hypothesis states:

H_{1K}: Citizens are more likely to approve of government performance in constituencies where objective measures of that performance have improved over the past year.

Also just as in the cross-national analysis, I assess managerial quality in this Kenya model. However, in this instance, instead of focusing on national HOGs the respondents are asked to think about their elected MPs. As I have mentioned before, MPs in Kenya remain part of the new government structure, and were still considered largely responsible for development within their constituencies even as the 2013 general elections saw the seating of the heads of newly established county governments. This slow implementation of Kenya's devolutionary reforms meant that there was also only creeping evidence of positive changes that occurred immediately after the creation of the new government structure. Nonetheless, as in the cross-national analysis, I also make use of the managerial

quality index to assess MP performance in Kenya. Therefore as with national HOGs, I also expect that:

H_{2K}: Citizens are more likely to approve of government performance in constituencies where MPs have greater managerial qualities.

Comparisons are made in the raw data to identify significant patterns and trends associated with these two factors. However, because the research design for this part of the analysis is a survey experiment, the localities included in the study are necessarily similar in terms of size and resources in order to facilitate comparison of the effect of the self-efficacy primer.

ii. Individuals Hypotheses

Among individuals, political self-efficacy is expected to indicate whether citizens' perceived political power influences their attitudes towards public services. This variable is this study's treatment mechanism because of its political relevance in translating satisfaction into opinion. The variable alludes to citizens' attitudes towards their governments, but the priming is expected to reveal whether, depending on their sense of political power, citizens are inclined to approve/disapprove of government performance. I expect that those with low self-efficacy would be more willing to delegate responsibility, then later demonstrate more acceptance of the services regardless of quality. As a result, my central hypothesis in the experimental assessment is:

H_{3K}: Citizens with low self-efficacy are more likely to approve of government performance than citizens with high self-efficacy.

In considering citizen political self-efficacy, one may assume that the higher the level of democratization, the more politically empowered citizens of a nation feel. But this is not necessarily the case. The political environment's effect may be moderated by each individual's interpersonal relationships, occupational and social activities, economic resources, personal attributes, and so on. Hence democracies are not devoid of low efficacy citizens, who often belong to minorities and other marginalized groups. Conversely, autocracies also have individuals who perceive themselves as possessing high political self-efficacy because they may be members or direct beneficiaries of the elite class, or occupy other positions of privilege. It is this rationalization that strengthens the justification of testing this variable in a typical African nation, which is likely to have a good mix of both classes of individuals.

Expectancy-disconfirmation theory suggests that citizens judge public services based not only on experienced service quality but also on an implicit comparison of service quality with prior performance. The idea is that citizens may start off with certain expectations about government services, and later on have those expectations met (confirmed) or not met (disconfirmed). The assessment of expectations is therefore, in part, an investigation of the temporal biases that may affect citizens' approval or disapproval of government performance. That is to say, when citizens' positive expectations are disconfirmed, they disapprove of government performance delivery; and when their positive expectations are confirmed, they approve of the service delivery. I therefore anticipate that:

H_{4K}: Citizens are more likely to approve of government performance when they experience positive expectancy disconfirmation than when they experience negative expectancy disconfirmation.

Opinion and voting have been found to depend in part on how people define their group identities, with “ethnics” engaging in identity voting and “non-ethnics” giving more weight to interests and issues. Yet other views use Afrobarometer data to refute the use of “personalism and clientelism” to explain political behavior in Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya as a nation continues to exhibit ethnic voting, albeit with reduced intensity as the society merges into the global community. Since the implementation of a multiparty political system, Kenya’s politicians have skillfully formed and disbanded interparty coalitions to suit their personal interests... depending on the climate of the imminent round of elections. An example of these is the relationship between President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Vice President, William Ruto. The two joined forces to win the presidency in the 2013 elections, even though their communities were fiercely at loggerheads amidst the chaos of the post-2007 election violence.

Such cases demonstrate a lack of clarity in the literature on Kenyan’s attitudes towards government. But how does susceptibility to elites affect the citizens’ views on government performance? Are citizens more likely to approve of performance in public service delivery when the government or jurisdiction is led by a co-ethnic? Are they just as likely to perceive satisfaction if the government is led by a party-fellow or a coalition that includes co-partisans? The absence of definitive answers to these questions indicates that further investigation into the effects of these variables is required. Hence I test the following hypotheses at the local government level in Kenya:

H_{5K}: *Citizens who are co-ethnics of the incumbent MP are more likely to approve of government performance in public service delivery than those who are not.*

H_{6K}: *Citizens who are co-partisans of the incumbent MP are more likely to approve of government performance than those who are not.*

Elsewhere, based on the growing number of broadcasters and news media in Kenya today, it is useful to consider an aspect of this variable that pertains to fomenting satisfaction among citizens. The concept of local vs. foreign media could not be tested in the cross-national assessment as the Afrobarometer survey does not make this distinction. Yet it is worth considering because – as Lipsky (2010) observes, citizens who have no standards against which to compare their government’s performance in public service delivery are likely to accept any standard as the best they deserve.

Furthermore, despite the fact that the different media outlets in the country carry the “news of the world” so that there is hardly any difference in content, there may yet be a significant difference between local media outlets and foreign resources. While domestic companies may still operate in fear of censure or worse from what remains a relatively strong central government in Kenya, citizens who are more frequently exposed to media based in other countries may pick up on cultural subtleties and ideas. These factors may then effectively shape the citizens’ public opinion in ways different from what domestic companies can achieve. I therefore expect that:

H_{7K}: *Citizens who access local media more frequently than foreign media are more likely to approve of government performance in public service delivery than those who access foreign media more frequently than local media.*

Finally, as with the cross-national analysis, intensity of road use, age, number of children respondent has, employment status, education level, income, occupation, and rural/urban residence are included in this section as individual-level control variables. However, in this case study, I also consider ethnicity itself as a variable for consideration. This is done in order to determine whether ethnicity as a variable in itself helps shape citizens' attitudes towards government performance. Because different ethnic groups rise to dominance over time as political histories unfold, I seek to ascertain whether simply belonging to a dominant ethnic group leads to a more positive view of government performance. Since independence, Kenyan politics has exhibited strong tendencies towards ethnic bias among heads of state and government bureaucrats who are known to favor their co-ethnics in matters of governance. Therefore, as with education, income, and occupation, which are expected to correlate positively with citizen satisfaction, I also expect that membership in the dominant ethnic group – in this case the Kikuyu community – means more positive public opinion with regards to government performance in public service delivery.

5.3. Variables and Measures

This survey experiment selected school and road services that were improved within a year of the administration of the survey. As in the Afrobarometer survey, the Kenya survey asks citizens to rate schools and roads in their localities in a manner that establishes their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The specific question is:

14: Now, let's get a bit more specific. How would you rate your local government overall when it comes to maintaining and developing the following services?

- road maintenance
- public schools

The response options are: very good; good; poor; very poor; not provided; and I don't know. Responses that rate performance as "very good" and "good" are expressions of satisfaction, while those that rate performance as "poor" or worse are expressions of dissatisfaction. In this case, satisfaction or approval is coded 1, while dissatisfaction or disapproval is coded 0. As with Afrobarometer question # 65, in this case I also exclude respondents who fail to provide an answer or answered "I don't know" as they have no public opinion to offer by way of evaluation.

i. Institutional Variables and Measures

In considering the congruity of citizen evaluations with government performance, I assess two measures of performance for each service area. For schools I make use of primary school exit exam results as reported by the Kenya National Examination Council for the 2012 and 2013 school years. The exams are a standardized nation-wide exercise that determines students' progress to the next level of education. Eligibility in top schools is determined by those results. The process is highly competitive and very conspicuous in Kenya, and whole schools and communities celebrate high performing students. In this study all the school are primary schools, and the next level is secondary school or high school.

In order to capture the overall benefits of attending a particular school, I account for the schools' average scores in the five compulsory subjects of the national exams. These are: Mathematics, English, Kiswahili, Science and Agriculture, and Social Studies. Naturally, the higher the average score, the better the school's performance. Thus the focus on primary schools in the survey experiment allows me to test citizens' judgment of schools which administer the same curriculum. That is to say, if the schools adhere to the national curriculum, they should have approximately the same demands in terms of learning, teacher skills, facilities and equipment. To be sure, this does not mean that those demands are actually met... hence the variability in performance. However, the effectiveness of the institutional effort is assessed on an even playing field – at least as far as the expectation of high average scores in the five subjects is concerned.

Meanwhile, the performance of road services is measured in terms of expenditures on the most recent projects undertaken. The Kenya Roads Board Annual Public Roads Program (KRB-APRP) provides detailed reports on expenditures for projects implemented nationwide. Acquisition of these funds from the central and county governments in a country where only 7% of classified roads are paved is a critical responsibility of elected representatives. It is their duty to persuade Parliament to fund projects as and where they are needed. This alone is a sign of effective management. But how do the selected areas compare in terms of their environmental conditions, which may influence the degree to which the local governments can meet their financial obligations?

The sites are all residential areas and traffic primarily constitutes passenger and light commercial vehicles (as opposed to heavy use by trucks and buses). Juja and Butula constituencies are also both agricultural areas that get heavy amounts of rain annually,

which can easily wash away or quickly wear down poorly constructed or materially deficient roads. On the other hand, Embakasi East county in the Nairobi plain is drier, but also experiences heavy downpours in the rainy season. Thus, except for the fact that the Nairobi locations have somewhat higher traffic due to a much higher population density, I expect that on average, the roads selected present comparable demands on their respective county budgets.

Subsequently, I also consider the constituency MPs – the public managers who oversee public service provision and development in their respective jurisdictions. MPs have constitutional mandates to engage in policy implementation and support development projects in their jurisdictions – and they previously did so in collaboration with the provincial administration and the town and county councils. In the foreseeable future, this role as elected representatives will continue at the local level within the county governments. Therefore, as with the cross-national analysis, I also generate their managerial quality index from their age, tenure of service, education level, and public service experience.

ii. Individuals Variables and Measures

Two familiar concepts discussed previously in the cross-national study are co-ethnicity and co-partisanship. In this context, I assess the implications of citizens' associations with their MPs. This part of the analysis is included in order to determine whether or not elected officials' administrations are generally approved of by citizens who either share an ethnic background with the incumbent official, or are their political co-

partisans. Therefore, just as in the cross-national study, these variables are operationalized as dummy variables. That is, respondents are either co-ethnics with their MP or not; and they are co-partisans with their MP or not.

Elsewhere, the view is that consumers are prone to “‘measure’ symbolically, verbally or qualitatively – not numerically – unless they have a reason to be more precise,” (Oliver 2010, p. 101). Therefore, satisfaction or dissatisfaction is the difference between subjective performance evaluation and prior expectations – that is expectancy disconfirmation or simply disconfirmation. For the purposes of this study, I use an 11-point scale to measure this variable in terms of strength of feeling and the general direction of that feeling between the beginning and the end of the year-long timeframe. Figure 5.1 below is an example of this scale as presented to respondents in the questionnaire:




Figure 5.1: Eleven-point disconfirmation scale

The following are the criteria for establishment of both disconfirmation and confirmation:

1. All movements to the left are disconfirmations. These shifts indicate that government performance has failed to meet the respondents' expectations.
2. All movements to the right are confirmations. These shifts indicate that government performance has exceeded the respondents' expectations.

Respondents also have the option of selecting “no opinion”/ “no answer”, or “I’m not sure”/ “I don’t know”. In such instances, the response is evidence in support of the primary null hypothesis. That is to say, it indicates that there is no relationship between citizen evaluations of government performance and objective measures of performance. A lack of opinion automatically invalidates the notion that citizens have meaningful contributions to make in assessing government performance.

The advantage of this approach to measuring disconfirmation is that while it cannot tell us precisely how each citizen perceives a +3 as opposed to a -5, it clearly demarcates the sentiments of satisfaction as opposed to ambivalence or indifference (0). Further, it allows me to at least measure on an ordinal scale the change in sentiments as reported by the respondent. Assuming that the respondent has monotonic responses to the services, each response is internally valid and consistent as the respondent expresses it. In other words, each respondent affixes his/her levels of satisfaction to the scale and transforms it into a unique “ruler” that communicates one or neither of the two shifts. Hence, while citizen preferences are not based on a standard scale, they can be communicated in standardized form on the satisfaction disconfirmation ruler.

As has been discussed, I also expect that citizen satisfaction with public service delivery is contingent upon frequency of accessing the mass media. That is to say, exposure to radio and television may help shape citizens’ opinions on public service delivery. In Kenya, both domestic and foreign media stations and outlets continue to grow in number. However, the government exerts far less obvious control over the foreign companies. I therefore distinguish between specific media companies that are likely to experience government censure, and those that may not. In addition, while all media sources certainly

depict the quality of life in different countries and places, foreign media carry more foreign content reflecting civic concerns (as opposed to entertainment shows) than do the locally based media. Hence I operationalize media exposure here as exposure to either foreign or local media.

The media exposure variable replaces Afrobarometer question (#90) that asks about internet access. As two-thirds of the participants in the experiment live in rural areas with very limited internet infrastructure, it would be unsuitable to include the internet in this case. The media sources listed in the Kenya survey are therefore grouped as indicated below. In this perspective of media exposure the variable is also calculated as a dichotomous variable that indicates the type of media a respondent accesses most frequently. 1 represents local media sources and 0 represents foreign or international media sources.

Local media:

- Taifa Leo
- The Standard
- The Daily Nation
- The Citizen
- Kenya Today
- Citizen TV
- NTV Kenya
- Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
- Kenya Television Network

Foreign/International media:

- IRIN News
- BBC News
- Al Jazeera News
- Voice of America
- AllAfrica.com

Finally, the conventional control variables are also retained for the comparison stage of this analysis. Age and gender are measured conventionally as integer and dummy variables respectively. I account for the number of children each respondent has – particularly in the school services model where the number of children attending public

schools is included. In the roads services model, the citizens are questioned on how frequently they make use of the specified roads. The latter case is measured in a four point ordinal variable, which ranges from “everyday” to “less than once a month”. Both these variables are, in a sense, a measure of a deeper link between the respondents and the specified services. Otherwise, income is scaled as a categorical variable with 8 classes ranging from earnings below \$225 per month in 2013 to over \$1,500. Meanwhile, level of education is a dummy variable that assigns 1 to respondents with a Bachelors degree or higher. Lastly, occupations are distinguished as either professional or blue collar as such:

Blue collar occupations:

- Clerical
- Manual worker/machine operator (e.g. stevedores, jua kali artisans, drivers)
- Farmer (small scale or subsistence)

Professional occupations:

- Sales
- Skilled technician (e.g. electricians, medical assistants)
- Manager or supervisor (all levels)
- Business owner; CEO; organization founder
- Skilled professionals (teachers, dentists, lawyers, engineers)

An interesting point worth noting is that based on gender responses and attitudes towards the survey in the field, it may be the case that men are likely to be more critical of government public service delivery in Kenya than women. This is a suspicion founded on the observed level of frustration among men compared to women. During the field excursions one male respondent even heatedly declared prior to administration of the survey, “Is this about the government?! I have absolutely nothing good to say about the government!” Meanwhile, women were observed to be more thoughtful in their responses, which may result in higher congruence of their opinion with the reality of the services.

5.4. Research Design: Survey Experiment

i. Treatment

The experiment treatment involves the use of questions designed to heighten respondents' awareness of their personal self-efficacy vis-à-vis the quality of public services they receive. To begin, this survey experiment sent two canvassers to the rural villages. These canvassers were both males, and are persons of the same ethnic identity as the people in the villages being sampled. As the purpose of this experiment is to elicit citizens' behavioral reactions to their own self-efficacy, it was considered that individuals are more likely to express these sentiments to someone of the same ethnicity as opposed to an "outsider". On the other hand, in the urban context, citizens are more likely to be accustomed to engaging people of different ethnicities in their daily lives. As a result, this phase of the surveying did not specify any particular ethnicity for the canvasser.

The canvassers went door-to-door and also exploited opportunities at other places of general gathering such as market places. The canvassers were instructed to avoid institutions, religious gatherings, or social venues such as bars because these tend to interfere with the randomness of the sample. This is because the people in such venues are likely to share similar experiences, values, and opinions as they belong to the same social networks. In addition to this stipulation, canvassers administered the questionnaires in an alternating pattern. That is to say, if one respondent fell in the control group, the next would be in the treatment group. Eventually, in each village's balanced sample of 40 men and 40 women, 20 men and 20 women are randomly issued the treatment group questionnaire, and the rest received the control group questionnaire.

This study therefore uses a post-test only experimental design with block random assignment in villages. The rural villages are themselves matched pairs based on relative size, population, and proximity to the schools and roads targeted in this study. In utilizing this sampling technique, I also hope to maximize statistical accuracy by grouping respondents according to two static attributes – ethnicity and residence. In that I administered the survey to a total of 240 respondents in the two rural areas and one urban area. As such 80 citizen satisfaction surveys went to each of the three constituencies in Busia, Kiambu, and Nairobi counties.

In terms of the study's assumptions, most respondents (theoretically) base their responses to satisfaction studies on the same aspects of service performance, which they perceive fairly accurately (Stipak, 1979, p. 49). Hence, the survey is designed to draw the respondents' attention to certain minimal standards in education and road maintenance services. These are the conditions on which the respondents may base their satisfaction because they are changeable from a political point of view. The following is an example of such a question in the survey:

21: Have you noticed any of these at _____Primary School during the past 12 months?

- a. Many pupils who attend this school go on to secondary school
- b. Facilities are in disrepair
- c. The school performs well in national exams
- d. There are overcrowded classrooms

Question 21 is an example of a question that draws respondents' attention to certain minimum criteria for good versus bad services. Within the context of primary schools, I call the respondents' attention to performance measures of graduation rates, facilities maintenance, national ranking, and student/teacher ratios. The language of the questions

(such as #21) is also chosen to resonate with a general population. I expect that citizens feel more emotional arousal when responding to “overcrowded classrooms” rather than a “high student-teacher ratio” because the latter phrase may not mean anything to many non-technical individuals.

It is also worth noting that the ambiguity involved in measuring satisfaction means that in order to have an effective primer, general and ambiguous questions should follow specific ones. Yet surveys may also only reflect the thoughts that are most readily accessible in memory at the time they answer the survey questions. Studies cite response instability as being a major concern because 45%-55% of respondents are found to change their survey answers when repeatedly asked the same questions. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that although people’s “survey responses” fluctuate greatly, citizens have underlying true attitudes that are overwhelmingly stable. Hence, as van de Walle and Ryzin (2011) point out, question order in the survey positions the respondents to cognitively access the information relevant for answering the main ones, even though the precise impact of the prime varies. Thus in order to maximize the individual’s self-awareness, I combine self-efficacy questions with the quality specific questions in the treatment questionnaire.

ii. Sampling and Participants

The inclusion criteria for the survey experiment are Kenyan citizens aged 18 years and older. There is no upper limit to age, but this study requires adult Kenyans who at least habitually encounter the public services relevant to this study. Authors such as Hart (1992), and Skelton & Valentine (2010) advocate (through organizations such as the United

Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)) for the inclusion of children and youth in politics and the policy making process. After all, they certainly perceive the impacts of their sociopolitical environments. However, as youth in this context do not vote, they probably have different relationships with services and service providers than adult citizens do. Furthermore, because it is outside the trajectory of my research goals and beyond the scope of this study to thoroughly investigate children's perceptions, they are not included in this experiment.

Kenya's permanent residents are also excluded because even though they are denizens of the state, they may exhibit much less criteria-based relevance (if any) in their role in Kenya's politics. For example, as their stay in the country is probably temporary, members of this group are not likely to perceive themselves as having any standing on the ladder of citizen participation. Furthermore, they are legally and rationally constrained from engaging substantively in the politics of a country that is not their home, especially if the country in question does not harbor a significant portion of their private interests or investments (Portes, Haller, & Guarnizo, 2002).

Having established the respondents' inclusion criteria, criteria for the counties are: economic development indicators, population size, and ethnic homogeneity. This applies as site selection narrows from the national to the village level. Thus in order to conduct this experiment, I have selected an urban setting, and two relatively comparable rural areas. Table 5.1 below indicates that there are regional disparities in poverty across Kenya, with the central region, Nairobi city harboring much more wealth than most other areas. These discrepancies also persist through the lower sub-regional levels. Yet, while there may be large differences in the poverty incidences among the three regions of interest – Nairobi

and the former provinces, Western (for Busia) and Central (for Kiambu), the gaps close for the poverty intensity and population share of poverty.

Table 5.1: Multidimensional Poverty Across Sub-national Regions in Kenya

Region	Incidence of poverty (%)	Average poverty intensity among the poor (%)	Population vulnerable to poverty (%)	Population share of poverty (%)
Central	31.2	42.5	33.5	10.1
Coast	49.0	52.0	22.2	7.9
Eastern	52.1	47.6	28.9	17.5
Nairobi	3.9	40.3	14.7	6.2
North Eastern	85.5	60.4	10.0	2.7
Nyanza	52.2	45.7	31.2	16.6
Rift Valley	50.7	49.3	27.7	27.1
Western	56.5	45.0	27.9	11.9

Population weighted data based on the \$1.25 a day poverty line.


Source: *Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative Country Briefing 2013*

In terms of population ethnicity and size, the Kikuyus and Luhyas are the top two highest-represented ethnic groups in the country. Kikuyus are the most populous, representing 22% of the population; while Luhyas are second at about 14% (CIA, 2013). Thus compared to the diverse urban setting in Nairobi city, the selected counties are much more ethnically homogenous as they are located in parts of the historical settlement areas of the Kikuyu and Luhya ethnic groups. Thus the study essentially considers public service delivery between two communities that are comparable in certain respects, but which have different political histories.

Because of a lingering suspicion that Kenyans tend to base their political decision-making and attitudes on ethnic and patrilineal/matrilineal ties, this study also selects the Luhyas as an ethnic group that has not had the opportunity to benefit politically or economically from highest-level (presidency) government representation. In fact, since independence, three of the four Kenyan heads of state have been Kikuyus. In addition


Kikuyus are perceived to be more commercially oriented than Luhyas. Hence the Kikuyus may, on average, experience fewer socioeconomic constraints that impact their opinions on public service delivery. This last factor may in turn heighten Kikuyus sense of self-efficacy and affirm it as an important determinant of citizen satisfaction – at least in the Kenyan context.

Thus, after identifying the ethnic groups and sites of interest, I narrow down the comparison to the subnational level. First, the populations and geographic sizes of all 34 constituencies in Western and 36 constituencies in Central are compared. Then the most comparable wards in the closest matching constituencies were selected. Wards are the smallest political jurisdictions in the country. Each comprises sub-jurisdictions called sub-locations – as defined in the former provincial administration structure, where each sub-location was the smallest administrative unit effectively representing a village.



Source: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis: Kenya Economic Report 2013
 *List of selected counties. Average value is 85km/100km².

Figure 5.2a: Road network density by county



Source: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis: Kenya Economic Report 2013
 *List of selected counties. Average value is 44%

Figure 5.2b: Road conditions by county

A summary of the selection of the closest comparable villages is indicated in tables 5.2a and 5.2b. A +/-10% margin is allowed to accommodate the closest comparable jurisdictions given the natural non-identical nature of their statistics. These wards are selected for their closeness to average ward values within their respective constituencies (as in table 5.2b); and also for their location in average constituencies within their respective regions (former provinces), as shown in table 5.2a. Both selected wards have two villages situated close to both a public school, and a public road that was financed for maintenance in FY 2011/2012 to 2012/2013. All the villages included in this experiment are affected by both their proximate schools and roads in day-to-day living.

Table 5.2a: Site Selection Data Summary

WESTERN COUNTIES			CENTRAL COUNTIES		
Selected constituencies	Population	Area (sq. km)	Selected constituencies	Population	Area (sq. km)
Sirisia	102,422	213.2	Ol Kalou	120,282	536.5
Kabuchai	141,113	232.2	Juja	118,793	326.6
Kanduyi	229,701	210.8	Kabete	140,427	60.2
Webuye West	129,233	247.1	Kikuyu	125,402	175.7
Kimilili	132,822	181.2	Limuru	131,132	281.8
Teso South	137,924	293.6	Lari	123,895	439.2
Nambale	94,637	237.9	Nyeri Town	119,273	183.1
Butula	121,870	242.6	Gichugu	124,672	229.6
Likuyani	125,137	301.9	Mathioya	88,219	351.3
Navakholo	137,165	257.9	Kigumo	123,766	242.1
Butere	139,780	210.6	<i>Overall average</i>	<i>128,934</i>	<i>336.7</i>
Sabatia	123,761	105.4			
<i>Overall average</i>	<i>121,342</i>	<i>228</i>			

Table 5.2b: Village Selection Data Summary

BUTULA CONSTITUENCY, BUSIA COUNTY			JUJA CONSTITUENCY, KIAMBU COUNTY		
Wards	Population	Area (sq. Km)	Wards	Population	Area (sq. km)
Marachi West	20,211	36.2	Murera	15,887	59.5
Kingandole	18,270	35.8	Theta	23,134	31.1
Marachi Central	19,816	38.9	Juja	34,134	45.9
Marachi East	20,865	43.5	Witeithie	25,777	68.8
Marachi North	24,054	50.7	Kalimoni	19,861	121.3
Elugulu	18,654	42	<i>Average</i>	<i>23,759</i>	<i>65</i>
<i>Average</i>	<i>20,312</i>	<i>41</i>			

Source: 2009 Census: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

The more affluent Nairobi city area has substantially higher populations within its wards compared to the rural jurisdictions. Yet due to high population densities compared to rural wards, Nairobi wards are also much smaller than the rural jurisdictions. Thus the Nairobi residential areas were randomly selected from the less affluent eastern

constituencies of the county. This means that while the Nairobi wards are only marginally comparable to those in Busia and Kiambu counties in terms of the study criteria, they are nonetheless included for the ethnic diversity of their populations – which is characteristic of the nation’s capital. As such, the selected Nairobi wards are Upper Savannah and Lower Savannah within Embakasi East county. Upper Savannah has an area of 4.6 square kilometers and a population of 37,580, while Lower Savannah has an area of 2.4 square kilometers and a population of 37,944. Overall, this 64.7 square kilometer county has a population of 163,858 inhabitants.

The experiment is therefore conducted in six villages/residential areas in the identified wards. This means 2 villages in Busia County, 2 villages in Kiambu County, and 2 residential areas in Nairobi County. In terms of actual performance in public service delivery, there is variation in outputs among the three locations that does not necessarily reflect income distribution. For example, figures 5.2a and 5.2b demonstrate that road network density at the county level does not directly correlate with road conditions. This means that counties with extensive road networks are not necessarily developing them to the good/fair standard. This is especially true in the relatively affluent Nairobi city. These inconsistencies in outputs mean that there isn’t one region that performs far better or far worse than the others in the overall sense.

5.5. Analysis of findings

The survey experiment’s model is summarized in equation 5.1 and figure 5.3 below. In this analysis, the regression equation no longer accounts for level two factors but instead

focusses on the individual level factors. It is a standard logistic regression equation predicting an ordinal dependent variable:

$$y_{ij} = b_0 + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + b_nx_n + e_n \quad (5.1)$$

Here: X_1 is approval of alternative service sector; X_2 – objective measures of performance; X_3 – expectancy disconfirmation; X_4 – respondent’s media access; X_5 – respondent’s ethnicity; X_6 – respondent’s age; X_7 – respondent’s link to services; X_8 – respondent’s education level; X_9 – respondent’s income; X_{10} – respondent’s employment status; and X_{11} – respondent’s occupation.

Thus overall assessment of citizen satisfaction in Africa is an inquiry that demands a broad perspective in assessment – at least in the extent to which variables are reliably measurable. In fact, even in Western nations where theories have been developed over time and many models have been tested, the exploration of the topic continues gradually with increasing understanding of which factors are promising, and which are not. Nevertheless, even as the focus on determinants continues, there is also a perceived need to broaden disciplinary insight. There appears to be an increase in the sense that individuals should be at the center of the investigations. They are, after all, the originators of the approval/disapproval which translates into government feedback in one form of public opinion or another.

As a result, through both levels of analysis I take this latter approach in developing my analytical framework. The result is a general model that identifies the primary reactions to government performance as satisfaction preceding expression of opinion. This is the concept depicted in summary in figure 2.3, and in detail for the survey experiment in figure 5.3 below. This view better clarifies the specific variables included in this iteration of the

assessment. Thus this part of the study takes an alternative perspective in the sense that individual citizens are treated as *the* dimension of phenomena. In fact I expect that citizen psychology and behavior will be found, over time, to be of greater consequence for citizen satisfaction than external factors.




Figure 5.3: Model summary for survey experiment analysis

5.6. Results

Again, the goals of this survey experiment are: (1) to identify the important factors that shape citizen satisfaction with government public services in Kenya; (2) to determine whether congruity exists between citizen satisfaction and objective measures of

performance in this country; (3) to examine demographic patterns that affect citizen satisfaction and public opinion; and (4) to compare the findings in Kenya with the results of the cross-national analysis. The study treatment reflects the effect of political self-efficacy on citizens' expression of satisfaction with public services. As has been discussed previously, studies have shown that several different factors potentially affect citizen satisfaction with government performance. However, there is a gap in assessing political self-efficacy as a determinant in Africa. There has been little investigation into the effect of each citizen's sociopolitical status on their transformation of personal sentiments into public opinion.

For instance, individuals with a certain level of education may be expected to have similar reactions. However, even within that group individuals vary in terms of their personal efficacy in the political environment (contingent upon factors such as wealth, ethnicity, gender, and so on). The survey experiment therefore seeks to determine whether citizens' political self-efficacy affects their evaluations of government performance. In order to answer the questions in this part of the study, I assess citizens of neighborhoods in two rural counties and one urban county. The rural areas are inhabited by the two largest ethnic groups while the urban constituency has a much higher level of ethnic diversity.

Individuals were asked to assess school and road services in their immediate localities. Half the group was primed to recall their perceived political self-efficacy and answer questions with a heightened sense of that efficacy. The other half of the group received no priming treatment. Thus in this section I use group-wise analyses of variance and means comparison tests to compare individuals in groupings of: treatment, co-ethnicity, co-partisanship, gender, residence, and constituency jurisdictions. In addition, I

make use of logistic regression analysis to identify the significant independent variables. Ultimately, the Kenya survey experiment supplements the Africa study by including under-examined political variables. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that because the data set is, by design, dominated by the Luhya and Kikuyu communities, inferences cannot be generalized to all ethnic groups in the country.

The survey experiment survey data is merged with sociopolitical statistics from the study sites in order to generate the set of variables listed in table 5.3. At this scale, the experiment differs from the cross-national study in that there are only three villages in what would otherwise be a suitable data structure for a multilevel analysis. That is to say, this part of the study has too few level one cases to study in a multilevel analysis. In fact, the high collinearity associated with the group and constituency-level variables means that the regression coefficients are restricted to individual-level variables. In addition, the cross-sectional nature of the time-frame under study means that the individuals are again not assessed for satisfaction patterns over time. Nevertheless, the model deals with specific services that impact the everyday-lives of the respondents. In the following sub-sections, I present the experiment results. As before, I begin each section with comparisons of the groups followed by the outcomes of the regression analyses.

Table 5.3: Kenya Survey Experiment Variables' Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean/ Median	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Approve school services (ord)	240	-0.308	2.227	-5	5
Change in KCPE exam results(int)	240	-3.397	1.459	-4.8	-1
Approve road services (ord)	240	-0.301	1.975	-5	5
Change in road expenditure (millions of Ksh) (int)	240	-0.258	0.472	-2.2	2.6
Manager's popularity (int)	240	31.200	9.443	21	43.7
Managerial quality index (ord)	240	2.300	0.552	0	3
Expectancy disconfirmation schools – inverse (int)	240	0.204	1.686	-6	6
Expectancy disconfirmation roads – inverse (int)	240	0.201	1.943	-6	7
Respondent's political self-efficacy (int)	240	0.682	2.313	-5	7
Respondent's gender - female (1,0)	240	0.500	0.500	0	1
Respondent's school-going children (int)	240	2.817	1.423	0	4
Respondent's co-partisanship (1,0)	240	0.583	0.494	0	1
Respondent's co-ethnicity (1,0)	240	0.396	0.490	0	1
Respondent's rural residence (1,0)	240	0.333	0.472	0	1
Respondent's education level (ord)	240	3.008	1.295	0	5
Respondent's income (ord)	240	5.227	3.053	1	9
Respondent's age (int)	240	36.925	10.407	18	71
Respondent's employment status (1,0)	240	2.180	1.900	0	1
Respondent's foreign media access (1,0)	240	2.025	1.070	0	4
Respondent's occupation (nom)	240	--	--	0	9

5.6.1. Approval of Public School Services:

i. Group Comparisons

The first part of the assessment of school services again addresses the question of the homogeneity of variance among the study's groups. The means comparison test determines that there are no statistical differences among the variables groups for treatment, co-ethnicity, co-partisanship, constituency, and gender. Only the rural residence variable indicates a significant statistical difference in its group categories with a marginal

significance of $p = 0.049$. In this instance, the political self-efficacy primer's effect on the treatment group appears not to occur when all other factors values are held at zero. That is to say, even though they represent half the sample, there is not enough internal consistency among treatment group respondents to have a notable effect on satisfaction in this case. A larger sample size is likely to be more revealing.




Figure. 5.4: Case-wise variance for school services

Nevertheless, in relating the treatment effect to the overall outcome in absolute terms, figure 5.5 indicates the frequency distributions for respondents by levels of political self-efficacy relative to citizen satisfaction. In this diagram, the efficacy score range of -10 to 10 is divided into four quadrants in order to align the scores with the ladder of power levels. 0 is a neutral power position. Thus values below -6 are the lowest efficacy group, which is engaged through therapy and manipulation. Values from -5 to -1 are the next group, which participates in the policy process through information and consultation - but is also largely ineffectual. Values 1 to 5 represents a more effectual group that participates

through placation and partnership. Finally, scores of 6 and higher represent the group which wields citizen control and delegation powers. This is the highest power group.




Figure 5.5: Political self-efficacy level and citizen satisfaction

Figure 5.5 demonstrates that people who perceive themselves to be at level 3 in the ladder of political self-efficacy are the highest represented group. Level four is the least represented. In levels 1, 2 and 3, there is a strong representation of individuals who take a neutral view on the services. Yet none of the other levels is dominated by neutrality as is the case in level 1. At the other end of the scale, level 4 exhibited an opposite pattern. Granted there were only two individuals in that level. But even between them, neither took a neutral stance. A larger sample size would certainly reveal more information about this group within the Kenyan context. However, based on the graphs it is likely that the highest power group continues the trend towards balancing the three positions of approval,

neutrality and disapproval – albeit likely with a much smaller count of neutral respondents compared to level one.

The emergent trend is therefore that level 2 and higher ranks of power are not dominated by neutrality as is the case with the level 2 individuals. This trend reflects the theoretical expectations imparted by political self-efficacy. That is to say indecisiveness, indifference, and/or lack of knowledge among the low power groups is evident in their strong inclination towards neutrality. This is the most logical position when information is lacking, or when it is perceived to be the “politically safe” position. It is also strategic because it is low efficacy individuals who bear the brunt of consequences for negative government feedback.

Thus while individuals in level 3 display as much neutrality as those in level 1, level 3 respondents are more balanced in their positions and there are more individuals who are willing to either disapprove or approve than simply remain neutral. Even among level 2 individuals, there is a stronger inclination to disapprove than to remain neutral. In fact, the general tendency in this data set is for the rate of approval and disapproval to increase with increasing power, even as positions get more balanced within each level. This makes sense because the higher the power level, the less likely citizens are to be ignored or manipulated. Instead, government officials and other citizens seek to pacify them by granting them some degree of partnership and real participation in the policy process. Hence they are more opinionated.

Nevertheless, figure 5.5 and figure 5.6 below indicates that, on average, the sample citizens’ views are not necessarily congruent with objective measures of government performance by virtue of a relatively high proportion (roughly one third) of them taking a

neutral stance on school services. This reduces the effectiveness of these individuals in the evaluation process because their choice for neutrality does not lend information on whether citizens' views match the reality portrayed by objective measures, or not. In fact, it is level 2 respondents who demonstrate the strongest rate of disapproval, which would suggest congruence within that category. However, the overall effect is still undermined by the high rates of neutrality in three of the four categories. Is it possible that the focus on the immediate sociopolitical environment makes citizens less confident in responding to questions regarding their local governments' performance?

The group comparisons generate convenient visual data through charts such as that in figure 5.6. These comparisons are based on the absolute numbers derived from the survey experiment sample. The preliminary results show that 42% of all respondents disapprove of the school services in their locality, just under a third approve, and 27% are neutral. Compared to the Africa data set, 27% of respondents in this case is a substantial proportion of the population and cannot be dismissed because it may reflect a revealing phenomenon. That is to say, while the fact still diminishes the importance of the citizens' views from a performance evaluation stand point, the observed behavior cannot be ignored in this context. There is clearly a difference between responses to general conditions nationwide, and specific local services; and also among the different levels of political self-efficacy.




Figure 5.6: General satisfaction, dissatisfaction and neutrality for school services

Meanwhile, figure 5.7 indicates the outcomes for two-way tests of association between satisfaction and treatment status. The results show a lower rate of approval than disapproval in both instances. However, there is over twice as much neutrality in the treatment group compared to the control group. Yet while the priming also produces results that lend support to the expectation that political self-efficacy has an effect on citizen satisfaction, it is important to remember that the test of association does not on its own suggest a significant relationship between satisfaction and the specific levels of political self-efficacy. It shows that compared to the base levels in figure 5.6, there are noteworthy changes in both the treatment and control groups. That is to say, the treatment effect seems to move respondents more towards neutrality than towards positions of either approval or disapproval.

In view of these results, one can speculate that the priming effect tends to moderate the intensity of feeling among both the high and low efficacy respondents such that they drift towards neutral. In fact, the difference between the overall results and the treatment effect results was about 5 percentage points between those who either approve or disapprove of school services. However, the difference between the overall neutral rate and the neutrality

among members of the treatment group is almost double that at 9 percentage points. While it is tempting to surmise that these categories inflated the neutral group at the same rate due to the same moderating effect of the primer, further investigation of the political self-efficacy variable over time is required in order to understand when and how precisely the distinctions among treated respondents arise.




Figure 5.7: Political self-efficacy primer effect for school services

Within the locality-specific context, the two-way test of association also links each MP with the numbers of their constituents who approve, disapprove, or are neutral on school service performance. It is important to remember that while there were decentralization proceedings under way in Kenya at the time of the survey, MPs remained the de facto area “managers” as the governors established their respective country governments. The results are thus depicted in the chart of jurisdictional effects in figure 5.8 below. The Busia villages have by far the highest percentage of disapproving respondents followed by the Nairobi suburb. Busia and Kiambu are almost at par in terms of approval, while Nairobi has the lowest score at 26%.




Figure: 5.8: Jurisdictional effect for school services

These charts verify, overall, that opinionated respondents in the sample generally disapprove of school services regardless of where they are located – or at least they certainly do not approve outright. In fact, Busia has the most expressive respondents in that it has by far the lowest rate of neutrality at about 16% of the responses. In fact, the county also had the highest rate of disapproval of the three locations where just over half the sample disapproved of school services. In comparison, Nairobi's respondents disapprove at a rate of 42% - which was at par with the sample's overall disapproval rate. Meanwhile, Kiambu has a relatively even distribution of approval and disapproval and neutral rates. It equals Nairobi in terms of neutrality of respondents who account for 32% in both cases.

Concomitant to the jurisdictional outcomes is the MP's managerial quality index. Just as in the Africa study, this variable (*MnQ*) comprises evenly weighted scores for the MPs' ages, education, occupations, and public service experience. Mr. Kariuki had the highest score of the three MPs with three out of a possible points, and Mr. Gitau and Mr. Odhiambo scored two points each. In this index, the higher the score, the better the quality of the manager. Therefore as hypothesized, Mr. Kariuki's constituents should either have the highest proportion of approval or the lowest proportion of disapproval. Indeed, the data for school services reflects this reasoning. Mr. Kariuki has the lowest disapproval rate at 33%, and also the highest approval rate at 35%. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine precisely why a third of this MP's respondents were neutral in their opinions. It is also not possible in this study to determine whether this position is permanent or transient for some or all the respondents.

In the community-by-community view, it is also possible to assess the congruency of citizens' opinions with the objective measures of performance in the three settings. In terms of the KCPE national exam, all the institutions experienced declines in their mean scores from the previous year. We should therefore expect more disapproval than approval in all three communities in order to support the hypothesis that the lower the objective scores, the less likely citizens are to approve of government performance. The results support the notion in Busia and Nairobi but not in Kiambu. In that instance, approval exceeded disapproval by 2 percentage points. While the margin is small, it does reflect the importance of neutrality in attitudes at this location – at least in terms of school services.

Otherwise, also significant in the two-way tests of association is rural vs. urban residence. It is important to note that the percentage values represent proportions in each

category, and not proportions within the *SURUR* dummy variable itself. This is shown in figure 5.9 below. The chart indicates a relatively wide margin between the rate of disapproval and approval among urban residents. Among them 50% disapprove of school services in Nairobi while 30% approve. Yet in the rural areas, the gap is narrower with 29% disapproving compared to 34% approving. This suggests that based on this survey experiment there is more satisfaction in the rural areas with school services than in the urban setting. This is assumed to be the case even though there are notably more neutral respondents in the rural areas than in Nairobi.




Figure: 5.9: Residence effect for school services

Yet while approval rates may be approximately the same between the rural and urban settings, the 50% disapproval rate in the Nairobi suburb stands out in sharp contrast. Why is this the case? There are at least two possibilities to consider. In the first case, the rural villages are strongly ethnically homogenous and closer knit communities than the Nairobi suburb. This means that there are stronger interpersonal influences in the rural areas than in the urban setting. Therefore, the outcomes for satisfaction with school services may be the average shared opinions in the villages. Meanwhile in the suburb, individuals are unlikely to be related or even interact in the complex urban setting. This independence means that people are relatively freer to express their true opinions. Alternatively, the

realities of urban congestion may justify the strength of negative opinion in the Nairobi community. It may be the case that the school services in Nairobi are simply costlier and more overburdened than the rural institutions. However, this is a trend that also requires testing over time to check for consistency.

Meanwhile, figure 5.10 indicates that there is a higher rate of disapproval of school services among co-partisans than non co-partisans. Yet while their approval rates are at par, there is also a nearly 10 point difference in the rate of neutrality among co-partisans and non co-partisans. In that there are more neutral respondents among non co-partisans than co-partisans. This difference in neutrality reflects what should occur within a political faction. That is to say, there should be more decisiveness among people who have chosen to support a specific party or candidate even though there is room for disagreement within the faction. From another perspective, the 23% neutrality in the chart reflects the combined rate of neutrality for the supporters of the three MPs, and this effectively averages at a rate of 7% neutral respondents for each. Nevertheless, disapproval seems high among co-partisans where nearly half disapprove of public school services in their locality.




Figure 5.10: Co-partisanship effect for school services

This outcome, though counterintuitive, is probably a reflection of the nature of electoral politics in the country. As demonstrated in the cross-national study, Africans are not necessarily concerned with matters of ethnicity at the time of choosing their leaders. However, later on ethnicity arises as different groups realize or fail to realize their specific interests. In this particular case regarding school services, it is possible that co-partisans who elected a leader based on coalition-party politics found that their interests were, after all, not met. Consequently there is a high rate of disapproval among those whose expectations were heightened only to be frustrated. It is possible that these individuals are more inclined to express disapproval than those who were already disappointed when their favored candidate failed to enter office. In fact, the relatively balanced nature of the non-co-partisan chart may reflect the trend in the general population unaffected by the relationship between expectations and satisfaction.

Digging deeper, the chart (figure 5.11) depicting the co-ethnicity effect on school services reflects a similar balance among the non-co-ethnics as among non co-partisans where 32% approve, 37% disapprove and 31% express neutrality. In fact in terms of the outcomes for non-co-ethnics, the results very closely mirror those of non co-partisans. The same relationship exists between the outcomes for co-ethnics and co-partisans. Nevertheless co-ethnics indicate a relatively high rate of disapproval of school services where nearly half the group disapprove. Meanwhile a quarter of co-ethnics are neutral in their position on government performance in school services compared to 31% among non-co-ethnics. While this outcome contradicts the expectation that co-ethnics of the incumbent MP should approve of government performance, it supports the idea of congruity of

citizens' opinions with objective measures of performance – at least in the context of different ethnic groups.




Figure 5.11: Co-ethnicity effect for school services

It is important to note that the results for co-ethnicity also reflect the pattern of behavior within the Kikuyu community. This is because the happenstance of the study has two of the three jurisdictions being led by a Kikuyu – that is the Nairobi and Kiambu constituencies. Thus, coethnicity can only really be tested from the Kikuyu perspective. The results verify that there appears to be no appreciable increase in satisfaction among the Kikuyus simply by virtue of being a member of the local MP's ethnic group. For this sample, this is the case in both the homogenous Kiambu constituency and the diverse Nairobi constituency where the Kikuyu are represented in substantial numbers. This lends more support to the notion that politics in Kenya (and Africa) is driven by more issues beyond ethnic ties. However, further testing with larger sample groups must be conducted to verify this finding.

Finally, figure 5.12 indicates the differences in outcomes between women and men. As the charts show, there are strong similarities in the rates of neutrality, approval, and

disapproval of school services among women and men. Among the women, 30% of the respondents approve, while among men the rate was a close 32%. Furthermore, while men approved of school services at a rate 9 percentage points lower than they disapproved of them, there was a 12 point gap between the rates of approval and disapproval among women. In addition, both groups had almost equal rates of neutrality at 28% and 27% for women and men respectively. In sum, the results show very close similarities between men and women in their views on school performance.




Figure 5.12: Gender effect for school services

In fact, with specific relevance to school services, the number of women and men who reported having children was approximately the same. Only 6 women and 7 men reported that they were childless. Further, only 11 women and 12 men reported that their children did not attend the local public schools. This is an indication that most of the respondents in the sample were intimately involved in their local schools and the associated community, and therefore ideally situated to offer their opinions. In fact it is possible that several of the respondents were related at least through marriage, particularly in the rural areas. Hence the vast majority reported having local school-going children and generally

shared the same views regarding the school services those children were receiving. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the responses were generated within the context of several other factors not necessarily related to the groups and categories discussed thus far. These are presented in the following section on the regression analyses.

ii. Case-wise Analysis

I now turn to the outcomes generated in the regression analyses for the entire sample of respondents. This ordered logistic regression model is limited to individual-level variables and the results are clustered by constituency (See appendix A for VIF estimates). Table 5.4 presents the regression coefficients. In this, two variables are identified as being significant determinants of satisfaction. The model returns significant coefficients for approval of road services, respondent's ethnicity as a Kikuyu, foreign media access, and income.

For approval of road services, the model suggests that there is a 0.27 unit increase in the log odds of approval for school services, holding other variables constant. This verifies the view that when citizens' approve of school services, they are also likely to approve of road services. However, it should be noted that the relationship does not appear to be as strong in the survey experiment as it was for both service sectors in the Africa study. Yet the relationship appears to be more persistent than that between the dependent variable and objective measures of performance. In fact at both levels of analysis, the data suggests that for school services objective measures of performance do not apply.

Table 5.4: Regression Estimates for School Services (Kenya)

Approval of school services estimates (robust SE)	
	Coefficients
<i>Individual-level variables</i>	
Approve road services (<i>ord</i>)	0.2687 (0.117)*
KCPE trend (<i>int</i>)	-0.0057 (0.029)
Expectancy disconfirmation – schools (<i>int</i>)	0.0798 (0.265)
Respondent's status – treatment (<i>I,0</i>)	-0.1218 (0.028)
Respondent's ethnicity – Kikuyu (<i>I,0</i>)	0.0131* (0.007)
Respondent's foreign media access (<i>I,0</i>)	-0.4275* (0.173)
Respondent's media access frequency (<i>ord</i>)	0.2837 (0.276)
Respondent's frequency of foreign media access (<i>ord</i>)	0.0144 (0.124)
Respondent's age (<i>int</i>)	0.0115 (0.011)
Respondent's school-going children (<i>int</i>)	-0.0811 (0.109)
Respondent's education level (<i>ord</i>)	-0.0880 (0.152)
Respondent's income (<i>ord</i>)	0.0747* (0.038)
Respondent's employment status (<i>I,0</i>)	0.1535 (0.185)
Respondent's occupation (<i>I,0</i>)	0.0049 (0.097)
<i>N</i>	240

* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$

All three institutions included in the survey experiment experienced declines in their KCPE mean scores from the previous year. This seems to support the overall view (as in figure 5.6), which suggests that there is congruity in opinion because more people disapprove than approve of school services. They certainly did not respond positively to the objective measures. However, deeper reflection suggests that in the context of other variables held constant, the fence-sitters literally neutralize the negative feedback so that

the regression slope is moderated when school services are compared to road services. Yet in this case, there are just not enough positive attitudes towards schools to make the objective measures significant.

Also significant for school services in the Kenya experiment was ethnicity. The regression analysis results indicate that being a Kikuyu imparts a 0.013 unit increase in the log odds of approval for school services. This means that Kikuyus are more likely to approve of school services than non-Kikuyus. It is important to remember that the results of the regression analysis reflect the outcomes of not just the rural jurisdiction, but also in Nairobi County where the tribal communities live in an ethnically heterogeneous environment. The results could therefore mean that the quality of schools in Kiambu and Nairobi are, on average, of better quality than those in Busia; or Kikuyu's generally have a positive attitude towards the public school services. The precise reason can only be determined by observing trends over time. However, on the face of it, it would appear that there is some advantage to be gained from being a member of the dominant ethnic group.

Another significant variable in this iteration of the analysis is income, whereby the higher a respondent's income, the more likely they are to approve of school services. This is not surprising because higher income people live in neighborhoods with better amenities and better qualities of public services. However, the individuals assessed in this study were asked about specific institutions in their local areas. This means that the full spectrum of income brackets had people who were making use of the same services. Why then would the higher income people be more satisfied than the low-income respondents? It is necessary to observe the results for road service before inferences can be made about this services sector in the survey experiment.

5.6.2. Approval of Road Services

i. Group Comparisons

As with school services, I begin the assessment of road services by presenting the results of the group median difference tests. Figure 5.13 illustrates the case-wise independence relative to road services. In the comparison results, the relatively large differences among the within and between group values, and the p-values indicate that the groups are unrelated with regards to road services. This is slightly different from the school services results where residence has significant differences between the groups. In fact, the overall perspective suggests that all the survey experiment's groups are homogenous possibly because of the relatively small sample sizes. Yet the differences in effect within the sample itself are apparent and distinct.




Figure. 5.13: Case-wise variance for road services

How do the sample's different groups' categories compare and contrast for this particular service sector in absolute terms? The chart in figure 5.14 represents the overall

representation of approval, neutrality, and disapproval for road services. This preliminary overview of representation within the sample also indicates more dissatisfaction than satisfaction with road services. In this instance, 41% of respondents disapprove of their local roads. This is a ten points more than those who approve of their local roads. In the meantime, the neutral group remains as sizeable as it was for school services at 28%. In fact the overall results for road services are so close to those of school services (differing only by single points in each category of response) that they lend even more credence to the speculation that the respondents derive their opinions on the different sectors from a general pre-existing sentiment.




Figure 5.14: General satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and neutrality for road services

Throughout the analysis, there has certainly been strong evidence that citizens approval of one service correlates positively with approval for the other – at least in the case of schools and roads. It is indeterminate whether the responses in these two data sets are based on each individuals' feelings of the day, or sustained reactions to government performance that endure over time. Theory suggests that attitudes tend to endure over time – which probably in turn gives generalization opportunity to settle in citizens' minds.

However, further study using longitudinal data for several service sectors can verify these trends.

While the two-way tests of association suggest that the political self-efficacy primer has a negligible effect on respondents with regards to road services, the charts in figure 5.15 indicate the effect the treatment has on the absolute count of citizens' responses. The chart shows that compared to the control group, the treatment group experiences declines in its rates of approval and disapproval, and gains in the rate of neutrality. In other words, as was the case with school services, the treatment appears to have the same effect on citizens' opinions regarding this service sector. In fact neutrality grows to about the same level in both cases – about 35%. This is further support for the view that rather than pushing sentiments from one end of the satisfaction scale to another, the treatment tends to moderate the sentiments so that more individuals report neutral opinions. This is effectively the treatment effect in this study in absolute terms, even though the significance of the relationship between the treatment and the dependent variable appears ambiguous for this service sector.




Figure 5.15: Political self-efficacy primer effect for road services




Figure 5.16: Jurisdictional effect for road services

Next, the results presented in the chart in figure 5.17 indicate the outcomes for the jurisdictions. In comparing the results for approval and disapproval, about 40% of both Mr. Odhiambo and Mr. Kariuki's respondents disapprove of government performance in road services. Mr. Gitau's constituents number slightly higher at 43%. The results run counter to expectations in Busia where the proportion for approval should exceed that of disapproval given that the government was investing more money in those services. The respondents can therefore be said to have responded incongruously even though it was only by a small margin. Otherwise, for Mr. Kariuki in Kiambu there is a nearly 20% point difference between those who approve and those who do not. In addition, Mr. Kariuki's constituents have by far the highest rate of neutrality at 39%. They however disapprove of road services at a higher rate than they disapprove of school services. In fact while 35% of

respondents in Kiambu approved of their schools, only 21% approved of their roads. Overall, the Busia respondents had the highest rate of approval at 37%, while Nairobi had the highest rate of disapproval at 43%.

In terms of the MPs managerial scores, as presented previously Mr. Kariuki in Nairobi scored the highest with 3 points while Mr. Gitau and Mr. Odhiambo each had 2 points. However, contrary to the effect with school services, the results are reversed for road service. Mr. Kariuki is expected to have the highest approval score by virtue of having the highest *MnQ* score. However in this instance he has the lowest rate of approval at 21%. This means that for road services, there is no support for the proposal that the higher the managerial qualities of an MP the more likely his constituents are to approve of performance in service delivery. This finding is probably due to the aforementioned general negative attitude towards road services in Kenya and the high salience of the issue. In fact roads are one of the major problems in Kenya for which citizens continually criticize their representatives. Thus even the chart indicates that the differences in disapproval rates in the different jurisdictions are relatively close.

In terms of residence, figure 5.18 indicates that of the respondents living in the rural areas, 46% reported neutral positions on road services while among urban residents, only 18% were neutral. In fact, compared to school services, neutrality climbs by almost 10 percentage points higher for road services among rural residents. Urban neutrality changed little. Meanwhile, disapproval was predictably high at 44% for the urban residents. This is likely because of the persistent traffic congestion and substandard conditions of most roads in Nairobi. Only 19% of rural residents approved of road services while the figure was 38% in Nairobi.

Figure 5.17 also shows that many more respondents in the rural settings have neutral or worse sentiments regarding their road services compared to their counterparts in Nairobi, which had twice the rate of approval than the rural residence category. Hence even though disapproval is also relatively high at 44% in Nairobi, there was also a much lower rate of neutrality among urban residents than among rural residents. Indeed the relatively high rate of neutrality among rural residents may also reflect the prevalent dissatisfaction with road services nationwide. The residents may simply have no expectations regarding road services that are typically inadequate. They may have learned to make do without the services as they exist, and therefore either disapprove or are indifferent. Based on figure 5.16, Kiambu is probably the higher contributor of neutral respondents to the rural residence numbers.




Figure: 5.17: Residence effect for road services

With regards to electoral politics, the expectation for co-partisans is that they are more likely to approve of road services compared to non co-partisans. Indeed, the results in figure 5.18 indicate a higher rate of approval of road services among co-partisan than non co-partisans. However, there is also a higher rate of disapproval among co-partisans at 45% compared to non co-partisans at 37%. Meanwhile, the inclinations towards neutrality

is also evident between these groups with 23% for co-partisans and more than a third of the respondents among non co-partisans. In fact, among non co-partisans the rate of neutrality is only a percentage point lower than the rate of disapproval. This result is further evidence of the nature of electoral politics in Kenya.




Figure 5.18: Co-partisanship effect for road services

Among non co-partisans, citizens can be expected to lean towards indifference or disapproval of the incumbent administration because the government representative is not a party fellow and is probably not a co-ethnic. Thus fewer individuals in this category are likely to express approval of government performance. On the other hand, co-partisans are comprised of individuals who have ties to the incumbent through either partisanship, or through both partisanship and ethnicity. Those with only ties of co-partisanship are more likely to slip into disapproval or neutrality when that point is frustrated or betrayed. Meanwhile those with at least both points of commonality are probably more inclined to hold a positive attitude – at least in theory.

In fact, co-ethnics in this sample approve at a slightly higher rate than non co-ethnics. This is depicted in figure 5.19. Yet it is also true that co-ethnics disapprove at a higher rate than non-co-ethnics. Meanwhile, only one of the three localities had their roads

paved in the previous year. I therefore surmise that the negative attitude of citizens in Kiambu and Nairobi are the causes of the unexpected results in the cases of co-partisans and co-ethnics. These were the cases where there was a decline in expenditures on roads in the previous years. Recent trends in Kenya suggest that citizens are increasingly inclined to punish politicians who do not fulfill their campaign promises. As such, those with the sociopolitical ties to the MPs are more inclined to be expressive (in either approval of disapproval) compared to individuals who have no ties with the incumbents. While this is a speculative explanation, there is certainly a clear trend of less neutrality among co-partisans and co-ethnics compared to non co-partisans and non co-ethnics.

It is worth repeating, with regards to road services, that typically except for some highways and roads that are frequently travelled by top government officials and other dignitaries, paved roads in Kenya are not well maintained by the government. Pot holes and ruts commonly appear in a relatively short time after construction or after repairs are made, and it is usually an arduous task for communities to get their stretches of road attended to. Therefore, as none of the communities included in this study are located close to major highways or “VIP corridors”, they are unlikely to receive high quality road services.




Figure 5.19: Co-ethnicity effect for road services

Finally, the comparison of gender-wise responses to road services in figure 5.20 indicates differences in the outcomes when compared to school services. For the school services, the distribution for both sexes was relatively balanced. In addition, the rate of neutrality was just under 30% for school services. These points are also apparent for road services. Yet while men approve and disapprove of road services at the same rate of 36%, women break the pattern and increase their rate of disapproval to 45%. In addition, approval drops by 3 percentage points compared to school services. Thus the data indicates that women disapprove of road services at a higher rate than men. The reason for this is difficult to determine precisely without further questioning. In a comparison of road use intensity, about 75% of respondents reported using the roads in their localities on a daily basis. That is to say, 92 women reported using the roads daily while 90 men reported the same.




Figure 5.20: Gender effect for road services

Theory in western countries suggests that security is a major concern for women with regards to the quality of infrastructure. This is in terms of factors such as usability of roads and lighting, which affect their personal security. That is to say, dark roads that are

difficult to traverse have higher rates of assaults on women than well lit and well maintained roads. Thus it is possible that the higher rate of disapproval among women echoes the general disapproval of road services in the general population because the quality of these services affects the ease with which they can move around in their communities – especially at night. This is likely to be particularly true for the Nairobi respondents because the road in the jurisdiction surveyed is paved but not lit. It is therefore probably unsafe for women to travel alone along this road after dark. The situation is similar in the rural areas, however crime rates are also lower in those areas.

ii. Case-wise Analysis

With no variables with heterogeneous categories, the regression model here is again limited to individual-level variables in order to remain consistent in specification and optimum performance of the models. Estimates are once again the most conservative as they are clustered by constituency and thus retain robust standard errors. (See appendix A for VIF estimates). Table 5.5 presents the regression log odds. The important determinants identified in this case are expectancy disconfirmation, ethnicity, income, and frequent foreign media access.

Unlike in the other three models, approval of school services does not appear to be a significant determinant of approval of road services in the Kenya survey experiment. Instead, road services have some sensitivity based on expectations among respondents than school services do. In this case, a positive shift on the disconfirmation scale (confirmation) leads, on average, to a 0.7 unit increase in the log odds of approval. The verified hypothesis here is that citizens are more likely to approve of government performance when they

experience positive expectancy disconfirmation than when they experience negative expectancy disconfirmation. All the jurisdictions experienced an increase in road services expenditures in the study year. Without this verification the reliability of respondents would be in question.

Table 5.5: Regression Estimates for Road Services (Kenya)

Approval of road services estimates (robust SE)	
	Coefficients
<i>Individuals variables</i>	<i>Ordered logistic regression</i>
Change in road expenditure (<i>int</i>)	-0.3325 (0.913)
Approve school services (<i>ord</i>)	0.1745 (0.108)
Expectancy disconfirmation – roads (<i>int</i>)	0.7142*** (0.102)
Respondent’s status – treatment group (<i>I,0</i>)	0.1903 (0.325)
Respondent’s intensity of road use (<i>I,0</i>)	0.0228 (0.025)
Respondent’s foreign news media access (<i>I,0</i>)	0.3925* (0.173)
Respondent’s age (<i>int</i>)	-0.0131 (0.010)
Respondent has children (<i>int</i>)	0.0606 (0.121)
Respondent’s employment status (<i>I,0</i>)	-0.0886 (0.109)
Respondent’s education level (<i>ord</i>)	-0.3533 (0.199)
Respondent’s ethnicity – Kikuyu (<i>I,0</i>)	-0.0206*** (0.004)
Respondent’s income (<i>ord</i>)	-0.0726*** (0.021)
Respondent’s occupation (<i>I,0</i>)	-0.0697 (0.085)
<i>N</i>	240

* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$

Nevertheless, unlike with school services, the respondent's income is found to have a soundly negative coefficient whereby there is a 0.07 unit decrease in the log odds of approval for every level increase in income, holding other variables constant. This finding supports the notion of a possible perceived difference between road services and school services. With schools, citizens may experience a stronger inclination to form personal attachments to the institutions because they are, after all, comprised of human beings with whom they relate and interact. However, roads are material. They are tools that serve a specific purpose in the community and when they fail to serve that purpose, individuals develop negative sentiments more readily.

Hence if road conditions are generally sub-standard and citizens have negative attitudes towards them, the negative sentiments probably intensify with increased income. Why is this the case? The higher the level of income, the higher the expectations regarding public service delivery. As depicted on Arnsteins ladder of political self-efficacy, personal political power (as can be nurtured by income) can determine how government responds to its citizens. Those with higher earnings (in Kenya) generally pay higher taxes. Consequently, they would want better public services in return. Nevertheless, the villages and suburb surveyed in this study are not wealthy neighborhoods. They are lower middle-class/upper-working class settings populated by everyday people. Therefore, income and power must be considered to have a certain upper limit on political influence.

To further support the view that the Kenyan road situation leaves a lot to be desired is the fact that the experiment survey results indicate that Kikuyu ethnicity is also significant for road services, but with a negative coefficient. In this case even the dominant ethnic group perceives road services negatively. In other words, all citizens are exposed to

the same difficulties with regards to public roads. Thus ultimately, when reviewing this sub-section's outcomes with regards to congruence of evaluations among respondents, it is important to retain this strong evidence that Kenyan citizens are justified in their negative attitudes towards government performance in road services. Nairobi is notoriously congested with traffic and most of the paved roads are poorly maintained. In the rural areas, development of the infrastructure takes on the connotation of "rural development" because these regions tend to be neglected or even marginalized in terms of public services delivery.

The data also indicates that when citizens access foreign media frequently, there is a strong tendency to disapprove of public road services. That is to say that there is a 0.11 decrease in the log odds of approval of road services the more frequently citizen's access foreign media. Again, this variable is an interaction variable derived from the frequency of media access and foreign media access variables. Therefore, while the performance measures may indicate that citizens should be satisfied, on-the-ground realities are more in tune with general disapproval than approval. Within the Kenyan context the outcomes for the road services sector appears to have a more practical feel than is the case for school services. The judgement of congruence in this case is therefore manifestly philosophical and contingent upon the observer's sensitivity to either *de facto* or *de jure* realities.

5.7. Discussion

In light of the overall findings and the corroborations between the two levels of assessment, the survey experiment affirms that each country must be assessed individually for its specific nuances. That is to say, the details that matter in Kenya may not matter in Malawi even though there are broad commonalities between the countries. A good example

from the study is the outcome in road services that suggests that citizens' views are incongruous with objective measures of performance. On the face of it, the statistical results are technically correct. Where roads have been paved, citizens should express positive public opinions on their local road services. However as mentioned previously, the reality and history of road service provision in most African countries – including Kenya – is one fraught with corruption, underperformance, and neglect.

In the objective measures, both the change in the road quality index and the paved roads variables were negative. Meaning that, on average, there is a higher probability for dissatisfaction among citizens regarding road services – even though the average length of paved roads increased. In fact, because the average change in the road quality index is negative, the citizens are on balance, expressing the appropriate feedback. That is to say, if the paved roads increased but the overall quality decreased, then citizens can be expected to, on average, express dissatisfaction. This same theme regarding a general negative attitude towards road services seems to carry through the analyses. Thus while future studies may further develop the nuances embedded in the other significant factor such as rural residence, income, and gender, this study reveals a certain clear disaffection with roads as a service sector. This has real implications for the developing continent and should be revisited in future research.

In a comparison of the outcomes of all the analyses in terms of significant variables associated with each service area, there were both similarities and notable differences. In the Africa study, both models agree that factors such as democracy, population density, approval of the alternate service sector, issue salience and residence are the most consistent determinants of citizen satisfaction with public service delivery for roads and schools

services. Ethnicity and income are the similarly strong determinants in the survey experiment analysis. However, it is important to remember that the survey experiment cannot be generalized to the rest of the country without more extensive data collection and analysis. Meanwhile, an interesting outcome was that only roads services registered objective measures and expectancy disconfirmation as significant in the Africa study and the survey experiment respectively. Could this be as a result of the fact that roads are a highly salient and highly problematic public service issue in general in Africa?

The study also suggests that citizens do have the capacity to generate views that are congruent with objective measures of performance. Nevertheless, the findings propose that public service delivery evaluators must have the imagination and ethical fortitude to recognize that congruity, or lack thereof, are both informative conditions. This is because governments deliver services to complex humans; not efficient robotic entities with clear rational judgement. If the (democratically inclined) governments truly work for their citizens, then it is the governments' obligation to devise better ways to effectively include citizens in the evaluation process.

Meanwhile, the survey experiment suggests an explanation for why, in the broader view of citizen satisfaction in Africa, studies such Bratton's (2008) assessment find that, on average, Africans have political concerns that overshadow matters of ethnicity. Co-partisanship was significant in the Africa models, but co-ethnicity was not. In the survey experiment, the results on ethnicity were that – at least for these two public service areas – ethnicity imparts no special benefits to users regardless of ethnic origin. In addition, ethnicity's importance is diminished – if for no other reason other than the simple fact that most people (in any given election cycle) have to choose from panels of leaders that may

not include even one member of their ethnic group. It is, however worth noting that while co-partisanship was the significant determinant, it reflected an inclination towards disapproval among co-partisans. This may reflect a growing tendency to hold underperforming leaders accountable at the polls – among other paradigm changes within the polity.

Thus overall, the following points summarize this study's main findings: Political factors are strong determinants of citizen satisfaction with school and road services in Africa. There is also evidence of citizens' opinions' congruence with objective measures of performance. However, as some scholars have suggested, there is also a need to account for contextual realities and not simply rely on objective data. Road services are a good example of a service sector where this must be done – at least in the African context. The study also finds that with regards to broad determinants of citizen satisfaction, Africa does not differ much from Western nations. However, democracy is an important positive influence. Yet, citizen satisfaction with one public services is, in part, also notably influenced by satisfaction with other public services. This evidence of positive correlation between the two services included in this study supports the view of the tendency of citizens to generalize sentiments and apply those general views to all the services they are asked to evaluate in a survey. But what does all this insight into citizen satisfaction add to the understanding of the policy process?

CHAPTER 6: POLICY AND POLITICAL SATISFACTION

While there is a lot more information to be gleaned from the individuals dimension, the results in this study also show that Africa and its diverse sociopolitical environment is not necessarily different from Western democratic nations in terms of how people interact with their public services. They certainly have the similar patterns of expectations regarding service delivery. Thus the results of both the cross-national study and the survey experiment have similarly important implications for the democratic policymaking processes in African countries. This study has demonstrated through its outcomes, that citizen (dis)satisfaction are political sentiments squarely embedded in the policy process between the policy implementation and policy evaluation stages. The study demonstrates that capturing citizen's sentiments must include consideration of political factors at play that affect the citizens in question. This is because while citizen satisfaction (feelings) with public services is an administrative concern, the public opinion (words and actions) that is articulated is a politically driven matter.

While this study can be more refined and improved upon, the results reveal sound potential among political factors as being determinants of citizen satisfaction. Therefore future opinion surveys would benefit from considering socio-political sentiments (such as issue salience, expectancy disconfirmation and political self-efficacy) and others in addition to always framing questions within their relevant political context. Failure to do so means getting a partial view of what shapes citizens attitudes. Political perspectives are important for situating institutions and individuals' within their socioeconomic realities where underlying political factors inevitably shape people's attitudes towards all sorts of things.

Performance Assessment and Policymaking

“The good governance agenda is unrealistically long and growing longer over time. Among the multitude of governance reforms that ‘must be done’ to encourage development and reduce poverty, there is little guidance about what’s essential and what’s not, what should come first and what should follow, what can be achieved in the short term and what can only be achieved over the longer term, what is feasible and what is not. If more attention is given to sorting out these questions, ‘good enough governance’ may become a more realistic goal for many countries faced with the goal of reducing poverty. Working toward good enough governance means accepting a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what’s working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation seriously; and grounding action in the contextual realities of each country,” Grindle, 2004.

Grindle’s statement reflects the circumstances that encourage the study of citizen satisfaction in Africa. He accepts the realities of suboptimal government performance given the many challenges the continent continues to face. Nevertheless he offers the concept of “good enough” government as a short-term solution. This undoubtedly presents its own challenges in definition; however it emphasizes the need to look at the policy environments as broadly as possible in order to better assess what citizens approve of and what they do not. By what degrees do they approve or disapprove? Is it majority approval/disapproval, or minority feedback that must nonetheless be recognized? What factors within themselves and within their environments shape their approval/disapproval. Learning to properly assess citizens’ attitudes and include citizens in the policy process is critical for Africa’s governments and the development process. This is because if a government does not interact effectively with its citizens and respond to their needs on small issues – such as public services delivery, it is almost certain to overlook them on the big issues – such as economy and war.

Studies have thus far neglected to distinguish between citizen satisfaction and public opinion. Yet, as stated and affirmed severally, the socio-political realities of each

country must be taken into account, and the discovery of effective evaluation policies should be a research goal and a necessary inclusion in any discussion on government performance. The evaluation process should, at the very least have the capacity to trigger real policy dialog if the general sentiment among citizens is one of general disapproval. Conversely, approval should also stimulate policy change towards further performance improvement or innovation. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both public management and political science have significant bodies of work that help explain the phenomena, they generally do so without considerations from the other discipline.

For example, studies in the West have shown, that race is an important determinant of citizen satisfaction. Many indicate that minority groups tend to be dissatisfied with police services. But what do the finding actually say? If blacks in the United States have negative attitudes towards police and policing institutions, is this a characteristic of black people, or is it a consequence of being black? Put differently, if white people (or any ethnic group) were to be subjected to the same levels of police brutality, wouldn't they disapprove of police services too? It is therefore insufficient to make simple reports about satisfaction/dissatisfaction among dissatisfied communities. There is a depth to attitudes towards government because there are socio-political sentiments behind them. Expanding studies to include these views is the only way researchers and governments can appear to take a genuine interest in public opinion.

In light of such facts, the policy perspective must weave together the two approaches to understanding citizen satisfaction as it occurs in political contexts, and is also subject to the influence of administrative factors. The policy view facilitates zooming in and situating citizen satisfaction on a "two-lane single-carriageway" of information

creation, which is set between the implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process. The other lane is occupied by institutional evaluation, as depicted in figure 6.1. This interstitial stage reminds us that citizens add vital information to the penultimate stage of the policy process. That information can be expressed in different ways, and evaluation is just one of them. Yet evaluation is an expression of public opinion and it should have just as high an impact on the political and institutional environments as do more “political” expressions such as opinion polls and protests.



Figure 6.1: Citizen satisfaction and the policy process

In a broader perspective, figure 6.1 is a systems view of the citizen satisfaction causal model. This is a view of the tail end of the policy process, where policy outputs and outcomes should be evaluated by both professional auditors, and citizen evaluators. Unfortunately, the view of the highlighted section is obscured. The effect is part of the “black box” of the formal policy process, which alludes to the mysteries of institutional and bureaucratic politics that determines the degree to which adopted legislation is implemented as mandated. Nevertheless, situating the citizen satisfaction phenomenon within the policy process and applying political and administrative insight to peel away the veils and curtains, helps improve our capacity to anticipate citizens’ responses given different individual, political, institutional, and contextual conditions.

It is interesting to note that of the different forms of public opinion, citizen evaluations are among the more peaceful means of expressing disapproval. Presumably, this would make evaluations a preferred means by which governments can receive citizen feedback, and should therefore be nurtured and actively sought in order to stave off the more violent expressions of dissatisfaction. It is possible that the resources invested in seeking citizen feedback on public service delivery can save the government on costs associated with maintaining the peace, or pacifying dissatisfaction that boils over into protests, demonstrations, and even civil conflict.

As I mentioned in chapter 4, one respondent in the survey experiment was heated about his disapproval of government services. “Is this about the government?! he cried. I have absolutely nothing good to say about the government!” Such a respondent clearly had strongly-felt pre-existing opinions about the Kenya government. Naturally, his responses reflected his deep dissatisfaction. But they did so consistently. Thus in the event that such an individual proves to be incongruent with objective measures, does that mean that his feedback is useless? On the contrary. Researchers and public managers with citizens’ interests at heart should be very interested to determine precisely why this individual has this attitude, whether the feeling is pervasive and justified, and whether it is catching.

Thus, as studies continue to embrace interdisciplinary approaches to assessing citizen satisfaction, this one suggests that important trends that can inform policy decision-making in Africa are in sociopolitical sentiment, neutrality, and generalization tendencies. In addition, theory validly points out that “if variability is the norm in their environments, citizens should also be variable...” (Cantril, 2015; Davis, 2013; Hogarty, 1982). Yet is it these varied socio-political sentiments that wed citizen satisfaction to public opinion. It is

those sentiments that public managers need to pay attention to, and not rote responses on questionnaires. Neutrality should not be ignored in performance feedback because if a sizeable portion of a population is neutral in its perspectives, it means that the people are not satisfied. When these numbers are added to those who actually express dissatisfaction, public managers should be ready to confront and respond to realities where most citizens do not necessarily appreciate their efforts. Otherwise, while the tendency among citizens to generalize may hamper the research process, it should nevertheless also be accepted as a valid measure of citizens' attitudes.

It can be argued that the extent to which a government can obtain citizen feedback and respond to that information is a socio-economic and philosophical matter, which is bound to vary from country to country. In fact, responding to opinions regardless of whether they are of the majority or not can be considered a Rawlsian approach in policy-making. This view argues that social welfare of society is based on the welfare of the least well-off individual member of society. Prior to the colonization era, African societies functioned with this basic principle at the core of societal values. A restoration of these ideals would immensely improve conditions for underrepresented/marginalized people. Unfortunately this is unlikely to occur within the complex global community as it exists today. Hence citizen satisfaction researchers and public managers must always retain a sense of what is possible and what is not when they conduct their studies. Comparing contexts and countries should be done only with sufficient understanding of on-the-ground conditions.

Nonetheless, for government performance evaluations to retain relevance in the policy process, citizen feedback must be preserved as an important guideline in policy

adoption and implementation. In fact governments typically face two choices in this matter: (1) Carry on with lazy and/or disconnected thinking, and implement one-size-fits-all policies; or (2) attempt to understand what presses upon citizens' minds and thereby maintain a content society. It would certainly be worthwhile to uncover citizens interests, loves, concerns, fears, motivations, and so on in order to understand how best to satisfy their interests. Nyamnjoh (2005) observes that what people make of the media depends on where their changing interests lie. Could the same apply to what people make of government performance?

The current wave of citizens throwing stones and burning tires to express their frustrations is a definite indication that citizens in many countries around the world have a sense that their governments do not actually work for the communities that grant them power and authority. This is because, in as much as governments are supposed to "work for their citizens" the relationship cannot in practice be one of principals and agents; it is more akin to clients and their advocates. In this, citizens are heavily reliant on governments to provide security, negotiate on their behalf, and coordinate matters of state. However, governance becomes technically irrelevant the moment it ceases to perform satisfactorily in its fundamental fiduciary duties.

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Appendix A: Variance Inflation Factors

Multicollinearity test for school services variables -Africa

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Aid	1.44	0.696398
Urban	1.66	0.600990
Poverty rate	1.82	0.549701
2012 education expend... (log)	1.77	0.566267
Managerial popularity	1.72	0.580086
Respondent's education level	1.62	0.618730
Change in school expend...	1.45	0.689919
PolityIV index	1.46	0.683457
Literacy rate	1.48	0.674926
Respondent's internet use freq...	1.36	0.735754
Population density (log)	1.31	0.762796
Rural resident	1.23	0.810030
Respondent's Age	1.21	0.828277
Coethnic respondent	1.17	0.857143
Managerial quality	1.23	0.810673
Voting respondent	1.14	0.873999
Employed respondent	1.14	0.880596
CombinWt	1.12	0.892516
Copartisan respondent	1.11	0.900010
Approval of road services	1.06	0.943031
Schools' salience	1.06	0.943074
Respondent's gender	1.05	0.950495
Mean VIF	1.35	

Multicollinearity test for road services variables - Africa

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Democracy index	1.43	0.699775
Aid	1.62	0.616555
Classified roads (log)	2.15	0.464077
PolityIV index	1.43	0.699775
Urban population	1.78	0.562617
Poverty rate	1.76	0.569530
Change in road quality index	1.53	0.652093
Paved roads (log)	1.80	0.555076
Managerial popularity	1.75	0.572878
Managerial quality	1.61	0.621696
Population density (log)	1.47	0.682001
Respondent's education level	1.50	0.666089
Respondent's internet use freq...	1.37	0.732367
Rural resident	1.22	0.818381
CombinWt	1.19	0.837106
Respondent's age	1.19	0.841161
Copartisan respondent	1.09	0.918295
Voting respondent	1.14	0.879681
Employed respondent	1.12	0.890658
Approval of school services	1.06	0.940582
Coethnic respondent	1.07	0.937650
Female respondent	1.06	0.947096
Roads' salience	1.04	0.958970
Mean VIF	1.41	

Multicollinearity test for school services variables - Kenya

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Respondent's education	1.68	0.595595
KCPE trend	1.46	0.683209
Respondent's empl. status	1.43	0.696931
Freq. media access	1.12	0.890210
Respondent's income	1.25	0.797241
Respondent's occupation	1.20	0.834941
Respondent has children	1.18	0.847981
Respondent's ethnicity	1.15	0.871615
Respondent's age	1.16	0.861466
Expectancy disconfirmation	1.05	0.950680
Treatment status	1.08	0.929513
Approval of road services	1.10	0.910524
Mean VIF	1.23	

Multicollinearity test for road services variables – Kenya

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Respondent's education	1.68	0.593951
Road spending change	1.54	0.648092
Respondent's empl. status	1.53	0.655012
Freq. media access	1.31	0.765600
Respondent's income	1.25	0.797241
Respondent's occupation	1.22	0.816373
Respondent has children	1.18	0.847396
Respondent's ethnicity	1.18	0.848760
Respondent's age	1.16	0.861883
Expectancy disconfirmation	1.11	0.900222
Treatment status	1.11	0.902593
Approval of schools services	1.10	0.910518
Respondent's road use	1.06	0.945646
Mean VIF	1.26	