Game Theoretic Approaches for Channel Selection, Power Control and Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks
1 online resource (74 pages) : PDF
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
This work proposes a game theoretic framework for managing the radio resources of wireless sensor nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). We consider data collecting sensor networks that are typical of environmental monitoring applications, which employ asynchronous duty-cycling for energy conservation. Overhearing is a big cause of energy loss in this type of network and hence, controlling the amount of overhearing can improve the lifetime of such networks. We propose two approaches for reducing overhearing: multi-channel operation, and joint power control and route adaptation. These approaches require nodes to take autonomous decisions with the global objective of improving the network lifetime, and involve high computational complexity. We prove that each decision can be associated with a utility function, and by undertaking game theoretic approach we can reduce the complexity of the problems, thereby both the approaches can be implemented as multi-player games. The first approach - multi-channel operation with receiver based channel selection - is proposed as a coalition game, with the aim of reducing the effect of overhearing and interference in the network. The second approach - joint power control and routing - is formulated as a potential game, with the objective function of maximizing the lifetime of the network. Computer simulated results are presented for both the approaches.
CHANNEL SELECTIONGAME THEORYPOWER CONTROLROUTINGWIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Cox, RobertConrad, James
Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2014.
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